A Sickly Season:  The Royal Canadian Navy and the Mainguy Commission by Calow, Keith D
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Scholars Commons @ Laurier 
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) 
2016 
A Sickly Season: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Mainguy 
Commission 
Keith D. Calow 
Wilfrid Laurier University, keithcalow@sympatico.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd 
 Part of the Canadian History Commons, Legal Commons, and the Military History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Calow, Keith D., "A Sickly Season: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Mainguy Commission" (2016). Theses 
and Dissertations (Comprehensive). 1878. 
https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1878 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ 
Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca. 
 A Sickly Season:  The Royal Canadian Navy and the Mainguy Commission 
 
By 
 
Keith Douglas Calow 
B.A., Wilfrid Laurier University, 1988 
LLB, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1991 
M.A. Wilfrid Laurier University, 2005 
 
 
THESIS/DISSERTATION 
Submitted to the Faculty of History 
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
Doctor of Philosophy in History 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
 
© Keith Douglas Calow 2016 
 
 
 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the proceedings of the Mainguy Commission, which 
was established in 1949 to investigate and report on a series of three “incidents” of 
collective disobedience which had taken place aboard Canadian warships in the early 
months of that year.  The “incidents” were the culmination of a series of challenges that 
the senior staff was already endeavouring to address internally.  Media and political 
attention to the indiscipline, however, brought the minister to insist that there be a public 
enquiry. 
 Historians who have examined the report of the Mainguy Commission have 
generally accepted that in calling for the Canadianization of the RCN it represents a break 
between the RCN and its British traditions.  As this thesis demonstrates, the idea that 
there was a groundswell of nationalist sentiment in the RCN, and particularly on the 
lower deck, that required a break with Britain is incorrect.  In fact the RCN had been 
attempting to address morale issues for at least the two years prior to the “incidents” and 
had a very good idea of the issues that had to be dealt with. 
  This dissertation compares the transcripts of the hearings of the Mainguy 
Commission and the report that it produced.  It will argue that the transcripts in fact do 
not reveal any particular concern on the part of RCN personnel that the navy was 
insufficiently Canadian.  The issues facing the RCN, as disclosed in the transcripts, were 
related to the failure of the government to spend the money required to ensure a happy 
and effective fleet.  In focusing on the issue of the Canadianization of the RCN, it will be 
argued, the government was attempting to draw attention away from the real issues facing 
the RCN and to exert control over the naval staff.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 “Mutiny.”  It is a word to conjure with.  In the popular view it brings to mind 
visions of Captain Bligh, Fletcher Christian, and the Bounty of historical, and Hollywood, 
fame.  In naval circles, it calls forth images of mass insubordination and the loss of 
discipline and control over ships in service.  In either case, the very word has become 
synonymous with the most serious of naval offences.  It came as quite a shock to the 
Canadian people and government, then, when, in the early part of 1949, it appeared that 
the spectre of mutiny had reared its head in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). 
 In fact not one but three apparent mutinies in the RCN occurred in 1949.  While 
one such incident could be regarded as unfortunate and isolated, three in rapid succession 
was a matter of concern for the senior officers of the RCN and the Minister of National 
Defence, Brooke Claxton.   Historians are undecided on the significance of the Mainguy 
Commission, which was struck to investigate the three "incidents," and the report that it 
produced.  Some maintain that it marked the end of the RCN as a British institution.  The 
reality is more complex.  This study seeks to place the "incidents" and the report within a 
wider context, for the report was a product of a diverse set of strategic, political and 
budgetary agendas.  It examines the development of the RCN in peace and war and then 
within the strategic uncertainty of the Cold War.  Ultimately this thesis argues that the 
Mainguy Commission sought to divert attention from the Liberal government's post-war 
plans for the RCN, plans that were dramatically different from what the naval staff had 
long envisioned.  The Commission did this by appealing to a nationalist sentiment that 
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was in reality a non-issue for the RCN but did serve to distract attention from the more 
significant issues facing the navy. 
 The first of the apparent mutinies took place aboard HMCS Athabaskan on 26 
February 1949.  While on exercises in company with a number of other ships as part of 
Task Group 215.9, Athabaskan had been ordered to detach and proceed to Manzanillo, 
Mexico to refuel.  After she had arrived there, and after the ordinary morning routine had 
been observed, the hands refused to respond to pipes calling them to duty stations after 
lunch.  After a meeting with the captain, during which a number of grievances were aired 
by the crew, the pipes again sounded, and the crew returned to their duties.
1
  
 On 15 March 1949, less than a month later, the second apparent mutiny took place 
aboard HMCS Crescent.  She had originally been dispatched from Esquimalt on a special 
mission in late January 1949.  She proceeded, during February 1949, to Nanjing, making 
several stops along the way, where she replaced HMS Cossack as the senior naval vessel 
there.  On 15 March, a Tuesday, the hands had breakfast at 0700 and were piped to duty 
at 0800.  As was the case aboard Athabaskan, the hands refused to obey the call to work 
stations, and remained in their mess decks, having locked the doors.  Upon learning of the 
situation, and after speaking to one of the disaffected seamen, the captain of Crescent 
went to the mess deck and spoke to the men there.  After his meeting with the men, 
“hands fall in” was again piped at 0950 and the crew resumed its duties.2   
 The final incident took place aboard HMCS Magnificent, the only light fleet 
aircraft carrier in the RCN, and the lynch-pin of its post-war aspirations towards a 
balanced fleet.  At the time of the apparent mutiny, Magnificent was engaged in flying 
                                                 
1
 “Appointment Composition and Terms of Reference of Board, Annex II,”  MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 5. 
2
 “Appointment Composition and Terms of Reference of Board, Annex IV,” MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 5. 
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exercises in company with the Pacific Squadron
3
 of the United States Navy.  On 20 
March 1949, while participating in these operations, the aircraft handlers refused to obey 
pipes calling them to duty after breakfast.  Again, as with Athabaskan and Crescent, the 
men met with the captain, after which they obeyed the pipes for “flying stations” at 
0900.
4
   
 None of the apparent “mutinies” lasted longer than two hours, and all three were 
resolved efficiently by the captains of the respective ships.  There were no instances of 
violent confrontations between the ratings and the officers.  None of the sailors were 
punished in any way for taking part in the incidents.  From the point of view of the Royal 
Canadian Navy, the crisis seemed to have been averted and order restored with a 
minimum of fuss.  The senior leadership, then, could be forgiven for believing that the 
RCN had done well in the circumstances and that the matter was behind them. 
 If the senior leadership of the RCN did harbour this belief, however, they were, at 
least in the eyes of the Canadian press, sadly mistaken.  While more will be said about 
the public reaction to the incidents in subsequent chapters, suffice it to say that across the 
country, newspapers reported on the apparent mutinies in stories tinged with fear and 
alarm.  The chief focus of the fear, given the era in which the incidents occurred, was of 
subversion within the RCN by communist agents.  If an institution as essentially 
conservative as the RCN could be infiltrated by communists then no institution was safe. 
 The Government, of course, could not ignore the incidents, regardless of the 
results of the RCN’s internal inquiry.  Brooke Claxton, then minister of national defence, 
                                                 
3
 While it is difficult to determine exactly what this squadron refers to it is the manner in which it is 
referred to in the documents.  In all likelihood it refers to a specific task group of the United States Navy. 
Squadron is the term used here as that is how it is described in the summary of evidence and findings. 
4
 “Appointment Composition and Terms of Reference of Board, Annex III,”  MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 5. 
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promised immediate action, and delivered on his promise.  He established a Commission 
of inquiry, with both naval and civilian representation.  This Commission, which became 
known as the Mainguy Commission, after its chairman Rear-Admiral Rollo Mainguy, 
was tasked with, firstly, determining whether there was evidence of communist 
subversion in the RCN.  If no evidence of subversion was found, the second task of the 
Commission was to determine what was wrong with the RCN  The main focus of the 
second line of enquiry was to be on morale and discipline, not broader aspects of naval 
policy.
5
 
 The Commission duly held hearings over the late spring and summer of 1949, 
eventually hearing from 238 witnesses of all ranks, from the chief of the naval staff to 
ordinary seamen.
6
  In October of 1949, in what by today’s standards would be considered 
a miracle of bureaucratic efficiency, the Commission presented its report to the Minister 
of National Defence.  Encapsulated in 74 brief pages, the report summarised the evidence 
presented and made a number of recommendations to improve the service conditions in 
the RCN.
7
  As will be seen, the report was just what the Minister ordered, and put the 
issue of subversion to rest once and for all. 
 The report itself made fourteen observations and thirty-one recommendations 
regarding improvements of service conditions in the RCN.
8
  Only a few of these, 
however, were seized upon by the media and the Government.  These recommendations 
involved mostly the “Canadianization” of the RCN.  They included the reinstitution of 
                                                 
5
 “Appointment Composition and Terms of Reference of Board,” MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 5, pp. 1-2. 
6
 Ibid., p. 2. 
7
 “Report on certain “Incidents” which occurred on board HMCS ATHABASKAN, CRESCENT AND 
MAGNIFICENT and on other matters concerning THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY made to the 
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE,” MG31 E18 Vol. 14 File 4 (hereinafter the Mainguy Report). 
8
 Ibid. 
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“Canada” badges on uniforms of naval personnel, and ending the practice of training 
Canadian junior officers aboard Royal Naval vessels and the institution of a Canadian 
training establishment for both officers and ratings.
9
  As a result of these 
recommendations, some have dubbed the Mainguy Report as sort of a Magna Carta for 
the Royal Canadian Navy; the report is seen as representing the point at which the RCN 
ceased being an adjunct to the Royal Navy and became a truly Canadian institution.  The 
Mainguy Report is, in fact, still taught to new recruits and at the Canadian Forces 
College.
10
  In spite of its importance, however, a detailed study of the proceedings of the 
Commission of Inquiry and of the Mainguy Report has never been undertaken by 
historians. 
 Any such analysis raises a number of questions.  It is important to determine what 
exactly the Mainguy Commission was, and what it was not.  It was neither a court martial 
nor a royal Commission in the full sense of the word.  An examination of the composition 
of the Mainguy Commission and the rules set out for its operation will allow a 
consideration of what exactly the Commission was designed to achieve from both a 
political and military perspective. 
 There is also the question of what precisely constituted a mutiny.  In their 
examination of a rather lengthy series of apparent mutinies in the Royal Australian Navy, 
Tom Frame and Kevin Baker discovered that, while there is a general understanding of 
what the word mutiny means, the legal meaning of the term allows for considerable 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., pp. 52-72. 
10
 Richard H. Gimblett, Gunboat Diplomacy, Mutiny and National Identity in the Postwar Royal Canadian 
Navy:  The Cruise of HMCS Crescent to China, 1949, unpublished PhD dissertation, Université de Laval 
2000, p. 263. 
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flexibility.
11
  The Australian Naval Discipline Act, initially brought into force in 1866, 
remained largely unchanged in its definition of “mutiny” well into the twentieth century.  
In section eight, it defined mutiny very broadly as the disobedience of lawful authority in 
“a subversive manner,” or seeking to overthrow the lawful authority aboard ship.  No 
distinction was drawn between violent and non-violent actions.
12
   
 This definition raises several issues from a legal perspective.  The first of these is 
whether the “subversive” requirement allows passive resistance to authority to constitute 
a mutiny.  Similarly, the act required the specific intent to subvert the authority of naval 
officers.  Leaving aside the question of how intent could be effectively proven, if the 
actions of the crew, particularly in cases of passive resistance, were not designed to 
overthrow the authority structure aboard the ship, then it would not appear that a mutiny 
occurred.  Frame and Baker argue that the Australian definition was sufficiently vague 
that it allowed for the prospect of one man alone, acting violently towards the officers, 
could constitute a mutiny, but so also could a number of men, acting in concert and 
passively resisting authority.
13
  It appears from the analysis performed by Frame and 
Baker that the legal definition of mutiny in Australia was sufficiently vague as to be all 
but useless. 
 An examination of the legal position of mutiny in Canada, similar to the one 
performed by Frame and Baker, is necessary before any meaningful analysis of the 
Mainguy Commission and Report can be conducted.  Canadian naval historians have 
generally characterised the incidents on Magnificent, Athabaskan, and Crescent as 
                                                 
11
 Tom Frame and Kevin Baker, Mutiny!  Naval Insurrection in Australia and New Zealand, (Crow’s Nest, 
N.S.W., Australia:  Allen & Unwin, 2000). 
12
 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 7-10. 
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mutinies in the commonly accepted sense of the word.
14
  An examination of the Canadian 
statutes and regulations governing the conduct of military, and more particularly naval, 
personnel will allow the accuracy of this understanding to be determined.  The legal 
position of mutny, it will be argued, had a significant impact on the decisions made by 
Brooke Claxton as to how to proceed.  If the incidents were clearly mutinies in a legal 
sense, a number of disciplinary options were available to both Claxton and the senior 
naval leadership.  They could have, for example, prosecuted those involved to the fullest 
extent of military law under the Naval Service Act, “pour encourager les autres.”  This 
would have sent a clear message to ratings in the RCN that such action would not be 
tolerated. 
 If, on the other hand, the legal position of mutiny was cloudy, as was the case in 
Australia, the options available for dealing with the “incidents” were much more 
circumscribed.  Prosecution would effectively have been out of the question.  A 
prosecution and acquittal, in full public view, would have been a disaster both for the 
prestige of the RCN, and for naval discipline generally.  Given the public reaction to the 
“incidents,” and the perceived need for governmental action, something had to be done to 
restore public confidence in the RCN.  The decisions made by Claxton and by Mainguy 
and his colleagues can only be understood if the range of options available to them is also 
understood. 
 The second major question that must be asked of the Mainguy Commission is 
what it was seeking to do.  The hearings themselves took place under what can only be 
described as unusual circumstances.  As will be seen, the decision on which witnesses to 
                                                 
14
 See Gimblett, for example, who refers to the “incidents” as mutinies in several places.  This is indicative 
of the general view taken by Canadian naval historians. 
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call to testify involved an interesting mix of compulsory and voluntary attendance, with 
those not called to give evidence free to volunteer to do so.  Prospective witnesses were 
also assured that no disciplinary action would be taken against them due either to their 
participation in the incidents, or as a result of their testimony.
15
  The witnesses were also 
informed that following their testimony all of the records of the Commission would be 
destroyed at the conclusion of the hearings, purportedly to encourage the witnesses to 
speak freely.
16
  These procedural decisions are curious in the context of what, to all 
appearances, was to be a public and supposedly transparent inquiry into the morale 
situation in the RCN.   
 The key to the procedural decisions can be found in the wartime experiences of 
the officers of the volunteer reserve.  The Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve 
(RCNVR) was comprised of men who had volunteered to serve but, unlike the reserves 
and regular officers, had no prior seagoing experience.  They had to learn how to 
command ships in anti-submarine operations from scratch.  What they lacked in 
experience, however, they more than made up for in confidence in their own abilities.  
The vast majority had university education and professional standing.  Prior to the war 
they had been lawyers, accountants and bankers.
17
  They were used to being in charge 
and were comfortable in command.  Louis Audette, who would later assume a prominent 
role in the enquiry, was one of these officers. 
 During the war these Volunteer Reserve officers developed a distinct approach to 
command.  Most of the officers in the corvettes and frigates engaged in the Battle of the 
                                                 
15
 “Appointment Composition and Terms of Reference of Board” MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 5, p. 2. 
16
 “Mainguy Report” MG31 E18 Vol. 14 File 4, p. 2. 
17
 David Zimmerman, "The Social Background of the Wartime Navy:  Some Statistical Data," in Hadley, 
Heubert and Crichard eds. A Nation's Navy.  In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, (Kingston:  McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1996). 
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Atlantic were volunteer reservists, including some outstanding commanding officers, and 
their leadership style was marked by practicalities of hard service in small ships.  They 
tended to have little time for the finer points of naval discipline and routine more suited 
to the big British warships on which officers of the regular navy had received their 
formative training.  Over time the volunteer reserve officers and their crews came to be 
rather proud of their reputation for their often unconventional dress and easier give and 
take between the ranks, and grew to resent attempts by less educated regular navy 
officers to interfere.   The permanent force "professionals" viewed the volunteer reserve 
officers as amateurs and dilettantes, and did not welcome their interference in decision 
making, particularly at the higher levels.  The volunteer reserve officers, for their part, 
viewed the "professionals" as essentially uneducated dullards, mimicking Royal Naval 
attitudes and accents for no other reason than to appear to be as “British” as possible.18 
 Where the Volunteer Reserve officers had the advantage, Richard Mayne argues, 
was in the field of political machinations.  Many of them were very well connected both 
socially and politically, and Mayne traces a number of cabals of "hostilities only" reserve 
officers who actively campaigned against the senior naval leadership.
19
  Mayne argues 
that these groups, through a deliberate political campaign waged in the back corridors of 
power, ultimately brought about the dismissal of Vice-Admiral Percy Nelles as Chief of 
the Naval Staff in 1944 not due to any inability or incompetence on his part, but because 
he represented, in their eyes, everything that was wrong with the "professional" Canadian 
Navy.
20
  While Mayne seems to have assumed that the machinations of the reserve 
                                                 
18
 Richard O. Mayne, Betrayed.  Scandal, Politics and Canadian Naval Leadership, (Vancouver:  U.B.C. 
Press, 2006). 
19
 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
20
 Ibid., p. 4. 
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officers ended with the close of the Second World War in 1945, Audette’s participation 
in the Mainguy Commission raises the intriguing question of whether the campaign, in 
fact, continued into the post-war period. 
 The final question which arises from the Mainguy Commission concerns the dual 
themes of agency and identity in the military, and more particularly naval, context.  In his 
examination of the Georgian navy, N.A.M. Rodger has concluded that the popular image 
of rigid and harsh discipline combined with unpleasant living conditions for crews from 
the dregs of society and only controlled through the perceived social superiority of the 
officers is incorrect.
21
  The Georgian navy was, in fact, much more egalitarian than is 
commonly assumed, and the seamen had a considerable amount of say in shipboard 
matters that affected their lives.  The social structure of the navy, he argues, reflected the 
society that created it, and disturbances occurred when something happened to upset the 
accepted order of things and the expectations of the sailors in that regard.
22
 
 While Rodger was studying the Georgian navy during a distinct period in the 
eighteenth century, an examination of the transcripts of the Mainguy Commission will 
enable some conclusions to be drawn about whether Rodger’s findings about the 
Georgian navy as a reflection of its society hold true in a broader sense.  If the RCN was 
also a reflection of the society which it was created to defend, then perhaps the incidents 
of 1949 were neither unusual nor unexpected based on naval culture as it had evolved 
over time, or in the context of a broader set of Canadian beliefs and understandings about 
how social relationships should be ordered.  This would require a re-examination of both 
the purpose of the Mainguy Report and its impact on naval culture and organisation. 
                                                 
21
 N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World.  An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy. (Toronto: William Collins & 
Sons Co. Ltd., 1986, p. 11. 
22
 Ibid., pp. 344-346. 
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 There is also, of course, the question of national identity, which is central to the 
Report itself and to its reception at the time it was published.  While the Report's 
conclusions are, in fact, far ranging, both the Government of Canada and the Canadian 
media focused immediately on its findings on the issue of Canadian identity and the 
perceived need to make the RCN a more “Canadian” institution, reflecting Canadian 
values and attitudes.
23
  While the discussion of this “Canadian” identity focused on the 
wearing of Canada flashes and the painting of the maple leaf on the funnels of the ships 
of the RCN, these two expressions of identity were, by the time of the Commission, non-
issues.  The Navy, following on from a report on morale prepared in 1947, had already 
reinstituted the wartime practice of wearing the flashes and had approved the painting of 
maple leaves on the funnels of the ships, both of which actions were acknowledged in the 
Mainguy Report.  The real issue addressed in the report was nothing more than the 
specific design that these indicators of Canadian identity was to take.
24
  
 If the issue of Canadian identification for sailors had already been addressed by 
the navy's leadership, then what was all the fuss about?  A detailed examination of the 
transcript will allow this question to be answered.  It will be argued that the questions of 
identity went well beyond the "bric a brac" of national symbols, and that the discussion of 
the Canadian naval identity which took place before the Mainguy Commission was, in 
fact, representative of the crossroads of identity facing the nation.  A younger generation 
of naval officers had shepherded the RCN through the rigors of the Battle of the Atlantic, 
and were justifiably proud of their achievements as Canadians, and not necessarily as 
members of the British Empire. 
                                                 
23
 Mainguy Report, MG31 E18 Vol. 14 File 4. 
24
 Ibid., p. 68. 
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 The senior Canadian naval leadership, most typically represented by the Chief of 
the Naval Staff, Admiral Horace Grant, had grown up in a different time.  They had 
served their apprenticeships aboard the large ships of the Royal Navy, and had "grown 
up," as it were, viewing the RCN as but one cog in the mighty machine that was the 
Royal Navy.  While they too were proud of the achievements of the RCN during the 
Second World War, their pride was to a large extent based on the significant role played 
by the RCN as part of the greater whole, and not in the RCN’s achievements as a strictly 
national institution.  The differences between these two viewpoints, and the difficulties in 
reconciling the two, lay behind the at times acrimonious exchanges between Louis 
Audette, the member of the Commission who led most of the questioning, and Admiral 
Grant and other senior naval leaders.  It was also part of a much larger national 
conversation about identity that was essential as Canada moved into a very different post-
war world. 
  In a similar way, this thesis forms part of a larger conversation taking place 
concerning naval history, both in Canada and internationally.  In Canada, particularly, 
naval historiography has evolved in recent decades to include a growing discussion of the 
evolution of Canada’s navy as an institution.  This, in turn, has required further 
examination of the interaction between Canada’s navy and the rest of the country, both in 
terms of how the RCN came to identify itself, and how Canadians viewed their navy.   
 The study of the RCN as a Canadian institution has been a relatively late bloomer 
in the field of Canadian military history.  Given the comparative youth of the RCN, and 
its limited role in the First World War, this is not particularly surprising.  What is 
surprising is just how late a bloomer it has been.  The official history of Canada’s 
13 
 
involvement in the First World War, written by Gilbert Tucker, was not, for example, 
published until 1952 and covers the period from the inception of the RCN up to the 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939.
25
  Similarly, it was not until 1991 that Roger 
Sarty and Michael Hadley provided more background to the origins of Canadian sea 
power, and a more analytical treatment of the role played by Canadian ships in the First 
World War.
26
 
 The reasons for this paucity of study are two-fold.  First, due to Canada’s position 
as a part of first the British Empire and then the Commonwealth of Nations, Canada in 
reality has no naval history independent of other nations.  Since its inception in 1910, as 
Marc Milner has observed, Canadian naval activity has occurred only in the context of 
Canada’s role as part of an alliance.27  This situation continued post-war with Canada’s 
involvement in NATO.  The result of this participation in various alliances and collective 
defence organisations has been the acceptance by academics of the proposition that 
Canadian naval history only existed, and should only be considered, within the context of 
more general discussions of the British Imperial system or some other collective 
organisation.
28
  Until recently, then, no significant study was undertaken which 
considered the RCN as a uniquely Canadian institution. 
 The second reason for the relatively limited consideration of the RCN is the 
simple fact that, between 1910 and 1939, not much happened which involved the RCN in 
an operational context.  Even as late as 1939, after nearly three decades of existence, the 
                                                 
25
 Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada; Its Official History, (Ottawa:  The King’s Printer, 
1952). 
26
 Michael L. Hadley and Roger Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships:  Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea 
Raiders 1880-1918, (Kingston:  McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991). 
27
 Marc Milner, “The Historiography of the Canadian Navy:  The State of the Art,” in Michael Hadley, Rob 
Heubert and Fred Crichard eds. A Nation’s Navy.  In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, (Kingston:  
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), p. 23. 
28
 Ibid., p. 33. 
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RCN only mustered 10 modern warships and only 309 officers and 2,967 ratings, 
including reserves.  At best, and although the senior officers of the Naval Service of 
Canada had “blue water” hopes for the fleet, the RCN in 1939 was, as it had been for 
most of its history to that point, a small coastal defence force.
29
  There was nothing in the 
uneventful history of this little fleet to stir the blood of naval historians, and so Canada’s 
naval history remained in relative obscurity. 
 The RCN overcame its humble beginnings during the Second World War and by 
the end of that conflict was the third largest naval force in the world, mustering over 400 
warships of all types, and with a personnel complement of very nearly 100,000 men and 
women.  From its beginnings as a coastal defence force, the RCN had grown also into a 
much larger role, assuming responsibility for the defence of the north Atlantic trade 
routes, and taking on a leading role in the battle against the German U-Boat fleet.
30
  As 
well, the navy committed a hundred warships crewed by some 10,000 personnel to the 
Allied landings at Normandy in June 1944 and follow up operations for the liberation of 
Europe even while taking over major British warships that had begun to deploy to the 
Pacific when the atomic bomb brought Japan's early surrender in August 1945.   
 Between 1945 and the early 1980s most of the writing produced about Canada’s 
navy and its role in the Second World War took the form of memoirs and reminiscences 
written by participants, overwhelmingly officers, in the Battle of the Atlantic.  While 
these memoirs tend to be of the ‘we were all really good chaps’ variety, they do provide 
                                                 
29
 W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby et al., No Higher Purpose.  The Official Operational 
History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943.  Volume II, Part 1.  (St. 
Catharine's, Ontario:  Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), pp. 27-28. 
30
 Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy, The First Century (2nd ed.), (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2010), 
pp. 156-157. 
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some interesting insights into issues that the Mainguy Commission would later expose as 
problematic.   
 Hal Lawrence, for example, joined the Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve 
(RCNVR) on 8 September 1939 and underwent eight weeks of training before joining a 
ship.  In his memoirs, A Bloody War
31
 and Tales of the North Atlantic
32
 he discusses on 
several occasions his experiences as a Volunteer Reserve officer serving in the company 
of full-time professional naval officers.  He characterizes the RCN officers with whom he 
came in contact as an elite who were often “excruciatingly British” in their attitudes and 
mannerisms.  Members of the RCNVR and the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (RCNR) 
were frequently condescended to by these officers, who behaved “like members of an 
exclusive club that had been forced to open its doors to a ragtag and bob-tail not 
previously eligible.”33  This treatment grated on the Volunteer Reserve officers, 
especially, it seems, those from Toronto who had come from the “big four” schools, 
Ridley, Upper Canada College, Glendon College School and St. Andrews, and among 
whom there was “a very old-boy social thing.”34  Relations between the officers and 
ratings are treated in a much more nonchalant manner, with Lawrence describing the 
“good-natured vendetta of the lower deck against the wardroom” as one of the “chief 
sources of amusement to both."
35
  Nonetheless, by the end of the Second World War, he 
maintains, the RCN had earned its reputation as a good fighting navy and had added 
uniquely Canadian characteristics to the traditions that it had inherited from the Royal 
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Navy.
36
  Thus, while Lawrence’s memoirs are in essence a loosely organized collection 
of personal reminiscences, and lack in substantial analysis, they do provide an interesting 
glimpse into the social attitudes prevalent in the RCN during the Second World War that 
would have an important influence in the early post-war service. 
 The same comments can be applied to the memoirs of James Lamb, published in 
1977.
37
  Lamb argues that there were, in fact, two Royal Canadian Navies operating 
during the Second World War.  The RCN, comprised largely of permanent force officers, 
was, according to Lamb, the repository of naval tradition and discipline.
38
  The second 
navy, the “corvette navy,” was comprised of the corvettes, with officers and men drawn 
from the Volunteer Reserves.  This navy, he maintains, founded its own tradition of 
“colourful character and eccentric individualism in a world away from the stereotype of 
the professional serviceman” and “jealously preserved an attitude of enlightened 
amateurism in a world of professional inanity.”39  These two navies, Lamb maintains, 
had, in fact, little to do with one another during the war and developed independently of 
one another for the most part. 
 Lamb also makes some interesting observations on the relations between officers 
and men in the “corvette navy.”  He argues that the discipline problems experienced by 
the RCN escort groups during the war were largely the result of the absence of social 
stratification in Canadian society.  Very often, according to his observations, the officers 
and ratings came from the same social strata, leading frequently to situations in which the 
ratings could not understand why they had to obey officers who were socially no different 
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from them, and therefore often resented taking orders.
40
  Similarly the major problems 
with the Volunteer Reserve officers, both the “cringers” who deliberately curried favour 
with permanent force officers and the “martinets” who exercised their powers in an 
arbitrary and high-handed way, stemmed from the absence of stratification in Canadian 
society, which led to an almost inherent inability on the part of Canadian officers to 
exercise power in a hierarchical structure which ran counter to Canadian democratic 
institutions.  This lack of stratification, combined with the absence of experienced 
officers, petty officers, and leading seamen made Canadians, in Lamb’s view, more 
difficult to discipline than the sailors of other nations.
41
 
 The Naval Officers’ Association of Canada produced a series of volumes entitled 
“Salty Dips” starting in 1985, in celebration of the navy's seventy-fifth anniversary.  
Consisting primarily of transcribed interviews with former sailors, there is very little 
about the reminiscences that would qualify as analytical.  Even in Louis Audette’s 
contribution to the series, there are a number of amusing anecdotes, but very little attempt 
to analyse the performance of the RCN during the war.  Audette does, however, comment 
on at least one occasion on the differences between the cultures of the Royal Navy and 
the RCN and on the difficulties that Royal Navy officers had in commanding Canadian 
sailors.
42
 
 While the foregoing collections of reminiscences were generally written by 
Canadian officers who commanded or served aboard Canadian ships, there are a few 
works that are of interest primarily for their differing perspective.  The two volumes of 
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memoirs written by Jeffrey W. Brock fall into this category.
43
  Brock was a Canadian 
Volunteer Reserve officer who served for much of the war on secondment to the Royal 
Navy and, in fact, commanded Royal Navy vessels.  Following the war, he transferred to 
the RCN, where he served for the remainder of his career.
44
  His comments are somewhat 
unique, then, as they provide a Canadian perspective on the social structure of the Royal 
Navy.   
 Brock’s perspective is readily apparent, as he speaks of the RCN throughout both 
volumes of his memoirs as if it were an entirely foreign service and completely distinct 
from the Royal Navy.  Equally apparent is his admiration for the Royal Navy and its 
administration and customs, and his distaste for the different customs and traditions 
developing in the RCN.
45
  By the time of his posting to command of Sixth Canadian 
Escort Group, Brock had become an adherent of the comparatively rigid disciplinary 
system prevalent in the Royal Navy, and found the more informal practices of the RCN to 
be irksome.  He had, in short, become more British than the British.  In one instance, for 
example, Brock retained an unpopular first officer and dismissed the captain of the ship 
in order, by his own admission, to emphatically communicate his authority as the escort 
commander, regardless of the feelings of the ratings or officers under his command.
46
  
Throughout both volumes of the memoirs, then, Brock’s disdain for the RCN is apparent.  
He appears to be exactly the type of officer that Louis Audette, as will be seen, found 
objectionable. 
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 While most of the memoirs produced were written by RCN officers after the war, 
there are two that are of particular interest from the perspective of morale and identity in 
the RCN during the Second World War.  The first of these are the memoirs of Lt.-Cdr. 
A.F.C. Layard, an officer of the Royal Navy who, during the war, was appointed to 
command Canadian escort groups.
47
  Unlike the other memoirs and personal recollections 
produced after, and in some cases long after, the war, Lt.-Cdr. Layard’s observations 
were made at the time the incidents occurred, unclouded by the passage of time or the 
political exigencies of the post-war period.  They also provide a unique insight into the 
RCN, both in terms of operational efficiency and in terms of its social development, from 
the perspective of an officer long steeped in the traditions of the Royal Navy.   
 Lt.-Cdr. Layard had entered the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1913 and by 1942 had 
been decorated for his participation in Operation Terminal, an attack on Algiers harbour 
designed to prevent it from being destroyed or blocked by the Vichy French troops 
stationed there.  He received the Distinguished Service Order for his actions in helping to 
seize the port.
48
  No stranger to difficult commands, then, in June of 1943, at the request 
of senior Canadian naval officers, Lt.-Cdr. Layard was appointed to command the escort 
group W10, a support group in the anti-submarine war raging in the North Atlantic.  He 
was so successful in this role that in January of 1944 he was appointed to command the 
all Canadian escort group E.G.9, one of the most successful of the war, and remained in 
command of this formation until the end of the war.
49
  As senior officer of E.G.9, Layard 
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would have ample opportunity to observe and interact with Canadian officers and ratings, 
and his diary provides a fascinating glimpse into these interactions. 
 From an operational perspective, he appears to have found the RCN, and in 
particular the crews of the corvettes, to have been frustrating but keen.  He comments, for 
example, that “you cannot trust a Canadian ship to do anything without being told three 
times,”50 a comment that is symptomatic of his long-standing frustration over the speed at 
which the corvettes under his command responded to orders.  Conversely, when the 
corvettes were removed from his command and replaced by frigates (which tended to be 
commanded by Naval Reserve officers rather than Volunteer Reserve officers) he 
laments the loss of the corvettes, commenting that he would be “damned sorry to lose the 
corvettes, especially the C.O.s who are really a fine keen bunch of V.R.s.”51 
 While he may have become fond of the corvettes and the RCN personnel that 
manned them from an operational perspective, his diary clearly demonstrates that he did 
not become fond of the Canadians under his command on a social level.  Throughout the 
diary Layard repeatedly comments on what he considers to be the social failings of 
Canadian officers, even remarking in October of 1943, on an incident in which a 
Canadian officer picked up a chicken bone with his fingers that the officer in question 
was “a very nice chap but [had] strange table manners.”52  In a similar vein, when he was 
asked to assume command of an entirely Canadian escort group, he confided to his diary 
his reluctance to accept the position “because one does get tired of them [Canadians] and 
they are not brought up in the same way as us.”53   
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In addition to poor table manners, the other characteristic of Canadians, both 
officers and men, which gave Layard fits was their propensity to consume vast quantities 
of alcohol while ashore.  In May of 1944, for example, he complains of being awakened 
by noise both from the wardroom and from men returning from shore, and asked of his 
diary “why must these Canadians get so very [emphasis in original] drunk?”54  A similar 
exasperation is expressed in October 1944, when, shortly after arriving in Gibraltar, he 
was advised that Canadian sailors had been “breaking up the town."  In this instance his 
frustration with the Canadian sailors had reached the point at which he considered 
cancelling Christmas leave.
55
 
Overall, throughout his tenure commanding Canadians, Layard despaired of the 
lax discipline evident on Canadian ships, and found them more reminiscent of merchant 
ships than naval vessels.  This, he believed, was due largely to the large number of 
Volunteer Reserve officers, with previous sea-going experience, in the RCN.
56
  While it 
is easy to dismiss this and other comments about Canadians as the grousing of a stuffy 
British officer, Layard’s diary does provide some insight into the culture that was 
developing in the RCN during the Second World War.  The hard charging, hard drinking 
and informal attitude of Canadian officers and ratings that gave Layard such anxiety can 
be viewed as the first sign of a distinctive Canadian naval culture which began to develop 
during the war years. 
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The other memoir that is of particular interest is William H. Pugsley’s Saints, 
Devils and Ordinary Seamen,
57
 first published in 1945.  What is particularly interesting 
about this memoir is the manner of its production.  Pugsley was, in fact, an officer in the 
RCN who had gone to sea as an ordinary seaman in order to determine what conditions 
were like on the lower deck of the RCN  This had been done with the permission of the 
then Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, Admiral G.C. Jones.
58
  This would seem to 
indicate that even as early as 1945 rumblings of discontent among the lower deck had 
come to the attention of senior naval officers, who were willing to at least investigate the 
problems, if not to solve them.  Pugsley’s work, then, provides an interesting glimpse into 
the inner workings of the lower deck, and is one of the few memoirs written from that 
particular point of view. 
The most telling comments made by Pugsley concern the application of discipline 
by the officers commanding corvettes.  The King’s Regulations and Admiralty 
Instructions were not, in his view, particularly well known to the officers, and the 
punishments handed out tended to be overly harsh and ‘by the book.’  This, strangely, 
instilled in the men of the lower deck a certain perverse pride in the fact that their 
punishments were harsher than those in the other services for similar offences.
59
  Pugsley 
argues that this tendency to rely too heavily on formal discipline was the result of the 
officers having no experience of life on the lower deck, and describes the post-war policy 
of lower deck service as a prerequisite to Commissioning as “one of the most 
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encouraging developments of the war.”60  Overall, one gets the impression from 
Pugsley’s work of a navy officered by men new to command who had a tendency to 
become martinets to a greater or lesser degree, but that this had very little negative impact 
on morale overall. 
According to Pugsley, there was no want of nationalism in the RCN during the 
war.  Canadian sailors, he comments, were very proud of the “Canada” flashes on their 
uniforms, and tended, when ashore in Londonderry, Ireland, for example, to patronise 
establishments either run by or frequented by other Canadians.
61
  Where this lower deck 
nationalism ran into problems was in relations between officers and the men of the lower 
deck.  Those officers who had been Commissioned during the war, he argues, treated the 
men of the lower deck with a “haughtiness and condescension that was totally uncalled 
for” and as if they were the “feudal overlords” of the lower deck.62  He found something 
fundamentally “un-Canadian” about Commissions being awarded based on personal 
connections and social standing, rather than on open competition.
63
  Throughout the 
memoir, it is the artificial social divide which Pugsley seems to feel is the most 
problematic aspect of the developing RCN, second only to the inefficiency of the shore 
establishments.
64
 
While Pugsley’s work is interesting for its point of view, it is possible to give it 
too much weight.  He was, for example, allowed the rare privilege of having a camera 
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with him.  This was not a privilege usually allowed ratings,
65
 and it is difficult to believe 
that the other ratings with whom he served had not realized that there was something 
unusual about their shipmate, even if they did not realise that he was a plant.  Louis 
Audette certainly believed that the men who served with Pugsley knew the true nature of 
his assignment, and claimed that a number of Pugsley’s shipmates had told him as 
much.
66
  While Audette is particularly bilious in his criticism of Pugsley, his comments 
are not entirely without foundation, and Pugsley’s observations must be viewed with 
caution.   
Regardless of its flaws, however, Pugsley’s work does stand as one of the few 
sources of first-hand information about life on the lower deck during the Second World 
War.  Even discounting for the exaggeration of the sailors with whom Pugsley served, it 
is clear that there was a social division between the lower deck and the wardroom, and 
that the Canadian officers commanding the corvettes were in some cases of dubious 
quality both as sailors and as leaders of men.  More importantly in the context of the 
Mainguy Commission and its subsequent report, the officers Pugsley spoke of were 
officers of the Volunteer Reserve and not of the professional RCN.  This, as will be seen, 
is a distinction of great importance to Louis Audette personally and as the leading 
member of the Mainguy Commission.  It is perhaps this fact that lay behind the intense 
dislike that Audette felt for both Pugsley and his work. 
While the memoirs and diaries of members of the RCN have provided an 
interesting and fairly consistent source of information about life in the RCN, they must be 
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treated with considerable caution.  Firstly, they tend to be lacking in any detailed 
scholarly analysis of either the social or operational aspects of Canadian naval history.  It 
is therefore difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from them in either of these 
areas.  Secondly, with the exception of Pugsley’s work and Layard’s diary, they were 
produced after the Mainguy Commission had completed its investigation and report.  It is 
impossible to determine, therefore, how much their depiction of shipboard life was 
influenced by the particular views in that regard expressed by Louis Audette and his 
fellow commissioners.  Nevertheless, they provided an early starting point for an analysis 
of the RCN as a social institution. 
 Analysis of the RCN’s role in the Second World War also got off to a promising 
start with the publication in 1950 of Joseph Schull’s The Far Distant Ships.67 Schull’s 
work makes no pretence of discussing the human aspect of naval operations in any detail, 
focusing rather on the operations of ships in the broadest sense.
68
  He argues that, while 
the RCN did play a vital role in protecting the convoys traveling to and from Britain 
during the war, the Royal Navy, and later the United States Navy, would have come up 
with a way to do so even without Canadian participation.  The true significance of the 
RCN stemmed not from any particular operational skill or efficiency on its part, but 
rather from their dogged determination in holding the line against the U-Boats throughout 
the Battle of the Atlantic.
69
  The image of the RCN created by Schull, then, is one of the 
RCN as a cog in the much larger machinery of the Royal Navy, and one that, through 
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dogged determination, rather than any particular skill, helped to ensure success in the 
Battle of the Atlantic. 
Following the publication of The Far Distant Ships, interest in the history of the 
RCN waned considerably, and Schull’s work remained alone in the field for almost thirty 
years.  It was Schull’s vision of the RCN as a dull if determined organisation that 
remained the dominant one until the 1980s, when the RCN “awoke to its history” as a 
distinct national institution.
70
  
The publication of The RCN in Retrospect,
71
 in 1982, marked the beginning of a 
veritable hurricane of academic activity which continues to this day.  Marking the 
seventieth anniversary of the RCN, it comprised a collection of essays on various aspects 
of Canadian naval history. The RCN in Retrospect was the first major effort in over thirty 
years to attempt to come to grips with Canada’s naval history, and approached the subject 
with a sense of “sadness at the passing of a fighting force, pride in its achievements, and 
admonition to those who ignore the lessons of naval history.”72  One is left with the sense 
overall that the volume was designed to serve as almost a requiem for the RCN after 
years of neglect. 
Of particular note in connection with the present study are two essays in the 
volume.  The first was penned by Louis Audette himself, and entitled “The Lower Deck 
and the Mainguy Report of 1949.”73  In his essay, he argues that the mutinies themselves 
were the result of social changes that had taken place during the Second World War 
which the naval leadership had failed to understand and account for in the post-war 
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period.  The Mainguy Commission, he contends, was necessary in order to socially 
modernise the RCN in order to make it an effective fighting force in the post-war 
period.
74
  
The second article of particular interest was written by Richard Leir.  In “Big Ship 
Time:  The Formative Years of RCN Officers Serving in R.N. Capital Ships,” he is the 
first to examine and analyse the impact of the long-standing practice of having Canadian 
naval officers learn their trade aboard Royal Navy ships.  He argues that the training 
received by Canadian officers in the Royal Navy was useful in providing the skills 
required for both wartime and post-war service.  The termination of this practice  in 1951 
robbed the RCN of these valuable skills, which the Canadian service educational system 
was not able to rapidly replace.
75
 
While the essays in The RCN in Retrospect focused primarily on social and 
organisational subjects, and not operational matters, naval operations were by no means 
ignored in the flurry of activity by naval historians in the 1980s.  Marc Milner’s North 
Atlantic Run,
76
 published in 1985, was the first in a series of volumes, which provided a 
much needed reassessment of Canadian naval operations during the Second World War. 
This, together with the follow-on works Canada’s Navy:  The First Century77 and Battle 
of the Atlantic,
78
 provided a long overdue review of the performance of the RCN during 
the Second World War.  Milner argues that the RCN in fact performed quite well during 
convoy escort operations.  The learning curve was extremely steep for the men of the 
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RCN, but Milner maintains that they mastered it very well, and by the end of the war 
were experts in anti-submarine warfare and were more than capable of playing a vital role 
in the eventual allied naval victory.   
In 1988, another collection of essays was published, The RCN in Transition
79
 
edited by W.A.B. Douglas, the leading Canadian naval historian at the time, marking the 
seventy-fifth anniversary of the RCN.    The essays in the volume deal with a variety of 
subjects, but tend to focus on the political and strategic considerations behind naval 
operations.  There are, for example, four papers examining anti-submarine warfare, both 
during the Second World War and in the post-war period, reflecting both the lessons 
learned by the RCN and its ongoing NATO role as an anti-submarine specialist navy.
80
  
These essays, and the conference that inspired them, represent an attempt by Canadian 
naval historians to move beyond the strictly operational elements of Canadian naval 
history, and identify a place for the RCN in a changing world. 
Of particular relevance to any discussion of the Mainguy Commission is Richard 
Preston’s essay “Marcom Education:  Is It a Break With Tradition?”81 in which he 
examines the educational system for naval officers both before and after the Second 
World War.  Preston argues that the Mainguy Report effectively changed the face of 
naval education in Canada, both by inspiring the end of the “big ship time” service by 
Canadian officers with the Royal Navy, and in requiring a university education for new 
                                                 
79
 W.A.B. Douglas ed., The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985, (Vancouver:  University of British Columbia 
Press, 1988. 
80
 Roger Sarty, “Hard Luck Flotilla:  the RCN’s Atlantic Coast Patrol, 1914-1918” in Ibid., pp. 103-125; 
Michael Hadley, “Inshore ASW in the Second World War:  The U-Boat Experience,” in Ibid., pp. 126-142; 
Marc Milner, “Inshore ASW:  The Canadian Experience in Home Waters,” in Ibid., pp. 143-158; Jürgen 
Rohwer and W.A.B. Douglas, “Canada and the Wolf Packs, September, 1943,” in Ibid., pp. 159-186. 
81
 Richard A. Preston, “Marcom Education:  Is it a Break With Tradition?” in Ibid., pp. 61-89. 
29 
 
officers.
82
  After some initial difficulties caused by the changes, he concludes that the 
RCN has managed to maintain the Royal Navy’s traditional emphasis on leadership, 
while successfully combining it with an emphasis on national service, which has been 
reinforced by making the RCN more “typically Canadian.”83  Preston’s view, then, is one 
of a well educated and highly professional naval officer corps, capable of meeting 
changes necessitated by the changing global situation. 
Although Tony German’s The Sea is at Our Gates.84 (1990)  purports to cover the 
entire history of the Canadian navy, its real focus is on naval operations during the 
Second World War.  German attempts, unlike Schull, to include political considerations 
in his discussion of Canadian operations.  He includes chapters on the political 
dimensions of Canada’s naval participation in the Second World War, as well as on 
Canadian post-war fleet aspirations.
85
  The expansion of the discussion beyond purely 
operational matters is a welcome addition in placing Canada’s naval contribution in the 
Battle of the Atlantic in a wider perspective. 
German's work is also the first general history to include a discussion of the post-
war period.  He argues that the Mainguy Commission was a watershed in Canadian naval 
history, and that the main problem with the RCN during the Second World War was a 
lack of education on the part of some of the naval officers, and a reliance on social status 
in place of leadership.  This reliance on social status, he contends, was the main problem 
and flew in the face of ‘Canadian’ values.  The lack of leadership, combined with 
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insufficient personnel to meet wartime commitments, led to the RCN enjoying less 
success during the war than might otherwise have been the case.
86
  In the post-war era, 
the lack of leadership continued and combined dangerously with poor pay and living 
conditions
87
 to create an unhappy fleet in which insubordination, once it began, was all 
but guaranteed to spread.  In opening up the discussion of naval history to include issues 
of pay, living conditions, and morale, German helped to usher in a new interest in the 
social dimensions of the RCN, adding to its military and political aspects. 
This trend continued with the publication in 1996 of A Nation’s Navy.88  This 
collection of essays represents the first concerted attempt to address the social and 
cultural aspects of the RCN and recognise the navy as a social institution with its own 
distinct identity.  Prior to this, the focus had been primarily on the operational aspects of 
naval warfare, with a nod to the political decisions that governed its employment.  With 
the movement towards the social history of the RCN, historians would start to examine 
the internal workings of the RCN in an effort to discover what made it work. 
Of particular importance in this regard is William Glover’s essay “The RCN:  
Royal Colonial or Royal Canadian Navy?”89  Glover describes the 1949 mutinies as “a 
savage assault on the prestige and pride of a navy that had seemingly come of age during 
the Second World War.”90  He argues that the mutinies resulted from a deliberate 
decision by the senior naval leadership to model the post-war RCN on the Royal Navy 
both operationally and in terms of naval culture.  This decision, made by senior officers 
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who had, for the most part, served their ‘big ship time’ with the Royal Navy, 
demonstrated either a failure or an inability to recognise larger Canadian social trends 
and the nature of the Canadian nationalism that was developing in the years following the 
war.  He contends that emulation of the Royal Navy’s culture flew in the face of these 
trends and was bound to cause problems.  In the final analysis, then, Glover concludes 
that the 1949 "mutinies" were the result of a failure of leadership at the highest levels.
91
 
James Goldrick, in his essay “Strangers in their Own Seas?,”92 draws a very 
interesting comparison between the RCN and the Royal Australian Navy.  He comes to 
many of the same conclusions as Glover concerning naval policy being out of touch with 
national sentiment, in this case in Australia.  He argues, however, that a closer 
cooperation between the R.A.N. and the Royal Navy in the 1920s and 1930s and 
following the Second World War, during which periods the R.A.N. actually manned and 
operated a number of capital ships, brought the differences in naval culture to light 
sooner, and allowed ‘incidents’ such as those which occurred in 1949 to be avoided in the 
R.A.N.
93
 
Michael Hadley approaches the idea of naval culture from a slightly different 
perspective.  In his essay “The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy,”94 he maintains that 
in its formative period the RCN had little choice but to borrow its naval traditions from 
another navy, and that borrowing from the Royal Navy was the logical choice.  During 
the Second World War, however, a conscious effort was made to create a Canadian naval 
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tradition and culture independent of that of the Royal Navy.  This was achieved, he 
argues, through the fostering of an irreverent and ‘devil may care’ attitude among the 
corvette crews, demonstrated by, among other things, the “gun shield graffiti” created by 
the crews which tended to make sport of the ships’ names.  The evidence of deliberate 
culture of creation is found by Hadley in the fact that naval trainees at HMCS Cornwallis 
and Stadacona were shown films such as “Corvette K225,” which depicted the RCN as a 
‘rough and ready’ organisation made up of rugged individuals.  So powerful was this 
creation that Schull, in The Far Distant Ships, sold this view of the RCN to the Canadian 
public in the first "official" account of the RCN in the Second World War.
95
  While 
Hadley’s essay is ostensibly about the public perception of the RCN, its conclusions can 
easily be adapted to any discussion of the RCN’s self-identification in the post-war 
period. 
Peter Hayden also deals with the concept of Canadian naval identity.  In his paper 
“Sailors, Admirals and Politicians:  The Search for Identity after the War,”96 he examines 
the Mainguy Commission and the ‘incidents’ of 1949 not as crises in themselves, but 
rather as symptomatic of a shift in the focus of naval culture.  He argues that in the post-
war period Canadian sailors came to view themselves more and more as North American 
rather than British.  This change in alignment, he contends, drew them increasingly 
towards a cultural identification with the United States Navy and drew them away from 
their Royal Navy traditions.  Canadian naval officers, on the other hand, maintained their 
cultural affiliation with the Royal Navy and its traditions.  The difference in viewpoints, 
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he argues, led to the frictions which culminated in the ‘incidents.’  The incidents and the 
Mainguy Commission were a part of the RCN’s quest for an identity.  The conflict would 
eventually be resolved with Canada’s increasing participation in NATO exercises in close 
cooperation with the U.S.N.
97
 
David Zimmerman also made an important contribution to the emerging 
discussion of naval culture and identity in “The Social Background of the Wartime 
Navy.”98  In this essay, Zimmerman analyses the social and educational backgrounds of 
regular RCN, RCNVR, and RCNR personnel.  He finds that, contrary to the prevailing 
attitude at the time, there was a social difference between the officers and the men of the 
lower deck, but that, rather than being based on wealth, it was based on education.  The 
overwhelming majority of the officers had at least some university education, whereas 
the vast majority of the lower deck did not.  Given that at the time, education was equated 
to social status, the social distance was just as real as that created by wealth.  
Furthermore, he finds a considerable difference between the education of the volunteer 
reserve officers, most of whom had some university education, and regular naval officers, 
who had been educated in the navy.
99
  The social differences that underpinned the 
findings of the Mainguy Report, according to Zimmerman’s analysis, had some 
grounding in fact. 
Social and political elements of naval history continued to be the focus of study 
following on from A Nation’s Navy.  In 1999 Captain (N) Wilfred Lund produced a 
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doctoral dissertation entitled “The Rise and Fall of the Royal Canadian Navy,”100 which, 
although it remains unpublished, is characteristic of the trend of naval historical research 
which has developed over the past two decades.  Lund incorporates into his research what 
he describes as the “new model” governing the study of naval history.  This new model 
goes beyond the study of operational matters and incorporates “the examination of 
personnel, administrative, technical, economic and financial” factors, together with the 
“socio-cultural background” of the decision makers into the study of naval operations.101  
He applies this “new model” to the detailed examination of RCN personnel and manning 
policy in the post-war period and concludes that the dominant problems faced by the 
RCN during this period were two-fold.  First, the RCN was being politically committed 
to too many tasks with too few resources.  The second problem, and related to the first, 
was governmental parsimony, and the consistent failure by Parliament to provide the 
funds necessary to address the first problem.
102
  These two difficulties had a negative 
impact on morale, and at least indirectly led to the ‘incidents’ of 1949. 
At almost the same time as Lund was writing, Richard Gimblett applied the “new 
model” of historical enquiry to the ‘incident’ aboard HMCS Crescent in his 
dissertation.
103
  He examined the social and political situation surrounding both the 
deployment of Crescent to China, and the circumstances surrounding the ‘incident’ itself.  
In reviewing the Mainguy Report, and the testimony regarding the Crescent incident, he 
finds that the Commission failed to fully understand the true nature of the problems 
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facing the RCN, and in fact got it wrong in their findings.
104
  The scope of the 
Commission was too narrow, he contends, to allow an investigation into conditions 
generally in the RCN, and therefore was flawed from its inception.
105
  According to 
Gimblett, the mere fact that the Crescent ‘incident," which was reasonably minor in its 
scope, received national attention demonstrates the degree to which the RCN had 
penetrated the national consciousness as a Canadian institution, and not as an adjunct to 
the RCN.
106
  Gimblett’s work is of great importance for two main reasons, firstly as a 
direct challenge to the correctness of the findings of the Mainguy Report, which had 
largely been accepted as truth, and secondly as the first detailed examination of the 
activities of the Commission. 
The first successful synthesis of the traditional operational analysis of naval 
history and the “new model” of study, incorporating economic, political and other 
considerations, was in the official history of the RCN during the Second World War, 
compiled by W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Hadley and others and spanning two 
considerable volumes.
107
  Although on its face this work is an operational history, it 
provides considerable detail on the political, economic and technological factors that 
affected the performance of the RCN during the Second World War.  It is also one of the 
few works that covers Canadian participation in the war in the Pacific, an aspect that is 
ignored in many of the operational histories.  The picture of the RCN that emerges from 
this work is not one of dogged determination, but rather one of triumph; the navy 
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successfully adapted to a rapidly changing tactical and strategic environment with 
intelligence and determination and created itself essentially out of whole cloth, rising 
from obscurity to become a significant wartime naval force.  This view is sharply at 
variance from the picture presented by Schull and German. 
While No Higher Purpose and Blue Water Navy do an excellent job of bringing 
together the operational, strategic, tactical and political aspects of the RCN participation 
in the Second World War, they are, at their foundation, an operational history, and do not, 
to their credit, pretend to be anything else.  As an operational history, there is very little 
attention paid to the development and maintenance of naval culture and morale in the 
RCN.  These topics were left to more specialised studies. 
The most recent of these is Betrayed
108
 by Richard Mayne, a well researched and 
well argued examination of the tensions between officers of the regular RCN and those of 
the RCNVR which form the backdrop to the Mainguy Report.  The examination has led 
him to the conclusion that there were, operating in the RCN during the Second World 
War, several groups “of well connected ‘hostilities only’ officers”109 in the RCNVR who 
viewed the regular RCN officers with suspicion.  These various groups had disparate 
agendas, from modernisation of the RCN to discrimination against V.R. officers and the 
effect of the attitudes of the Royal Navy on morale.  All of them, however, were 
comprised of well educated reserve officers, and all agreed that the regular RCN officers 
in positions of responsibility were poorly educated and hampering the effectiveness of the 
RCN.  Mayne concludes that these groups conspired to use their political connections to 
engineer the removal of Vice-Admiral Nelles as the Chief of the Naval Staff, effectively 
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ending his career, not as the result of any incompetence on his part but rather as a result 
of his refusal to listen adequately to them.
110
 
The type of social and political analysis of naval history done by Mayne and 
others is part of an ongoing trend internationally in the field of naval history.  As 
previously mentioned, N.A.M. Rodger performed an excellent analysis of the Georgian 
navy to discover the truth to the commonly held view of that institution as a harsh and 
draconian environment.  In addition to this work, Tom Frame and Kevin Baker have 
produced two studies of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), both of which examined the 
development of its culture and identity.   
Together with Kevin Baker, Tom Frame in Mutiny! examined several mutinies 
which occurred in the RAN and Royal New Zealand Navy, both in peace time and in 
war.
111
  They argued that navies, and in particular the navies of Australia and New 
Zealand, lack an effective vehicle by which sailors can raise complaints about service 
life, secure in the knowledge that they will be taken seriously, without triggering 
repercussions.  The absence of such a system leaves, they conclude, mutiny as the only 
means available to the sailors by which they can exercise any effective agency.  The way 
to reduce the incidence of mutiny, therefore, is to provide such a vehicle.
 112
  Mutiny, 
then, traditionally has been an essentially part of naval culture. 
In his book Cruel Legacy, Frame examines in detail the process and results of the 
Commission established to investigate and incident which has become known as the 
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“Voyager tragedy.”113  While the book focuses more on the behind the scenes political 
machinations than on the hearings themselves, it does provide an interesting insight into 
the relationship between a government and its navy.  While the RAN initially assumed 
that it would be conducting the inquiry into the collision between HMAS Voyager and 
HMAS Melbourne in 1964, Frame argues that it was rapidly disabused of that notion.  
Instead, a formal Royal Commission into the incident was established, in which the RAN 
played no formal role.
114
  What is interesting about this development is the removal of 
naval matters from naval purview.  After the HMAS Voyager inquiry, the RAN would no 
longer be in a position to determine its own procedures. 
Canadian naval historiography, then, has progressed a long way in a reasonably 
short time.  In spite of the importance of the RCN’s contribution in the Second World 
War, there was initially very little historical interest shown in the RCN  Perhaps this was 
due, as Marc Milner has suggested, to the fact that up until the Second World War, not 
much happened from a Canadian naval perspective.
115
  The RCN, unlike the Canadian 
Army, had no Vimy Ridge moment to galvanize public support and to fire the 
imagination of military historians.  Instead the RCN appeared to plod along in relative 
obscurity. 
What is remarkable, however, is not the slow start to Canadian naval 
historiography, but rather the speed with which it caught up with developments in naval 
history in other nations.  From an initial focus on operations, which had a tendency to 
view the RCN as a tool to be used in the prosecution of warfare, Canadian naval 
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historiography has expanded to include studies of the RCN as an institution comprised of 
people with its own culture, beliefs and value systems, much like any other organisation.  
In doing so, a more complete and detailed picture of the RCN, in all of its complexity and 
subtlety, has emerged.  Increasingly the RCN can be understood on its own terms as a 
unique and distinctly Canadian institution. 
The present work contributes to this understanding.  An examination of the 
hearings of the Mainguy Commission and its subsequent report is, in effect, an 
examination of the culture of the RCN that Canadians know today, from its moment of 
inception and is a snapshot into a point in time when the RCN was undergoing a 
transition from a wartime to a peacetime role.  The Commission represents a direct 
discussion about the organisational culture that would govern the RCN going forward, as 
it broke away from cultural dependence on the RCN and stood on its own two feet.  Who 
participated in that discussion, and just as importantly who didn’t, and what conclusions 
were reached about morale in the RCN are important questions if Canadian naval policy 
in the post-war period is to be fully understood. 
This study begins by examining how both external and internal factors influenced 
the public perception of the "incidents" and the range of options available to the RCN in 
dealing with them.  This is followed by an examination of the efforts made by the RCN 
following the war to address the issue of morale in the RCN as it manifested itself 
through increasing wastage and recruiting difficulties up to the occurrence of the 
"incidents" themselves.  These three chapters provide the context in which the "incidents" 
occurred and within which they must be viewed.  Once the "incidents" had taken place, 
an examination of the options available to Brooke Claxton in dealing with them is 
40 
 
necessary so that the option actually chosen can be understood, followed by a review of 
the evidence presented at the hearings themselves.  The study concludes with a discussion 
of how the press and the government responded to the report generated by the Mainguy 
Commission and what this means for its interpretation by historians. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A Changing World 
 
 
 By the end of the Second World War, the stock of the RCN was on the rise.  
Having been created essentially from whole cloth at the beginning of the conflict, 
Canadians had every reason by the end of it to be proud of the navy that carried their 
ensign in every theatre of operations.  It had become, in an astonishingly short period of 
time, one of the largest navies afloat, had acquitted itself well in the arduous, sometimes 
frustrating, and ultimately successful Battle of the Atlantic, and had thereby played a 
pivotal role in protecting Great Britain’s vital supply lines.  To add lustre to its 
achievements, a Canadian, Rear-Admiral L.W. Murray, had been made Commander in 
Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command, becoming the only commander of an 
Allied operational theatre in the Second World War who was neither British nor 
American.  By the end of hostilities, then, it appeared that the RCN had “come of age” 
and assumed its place in the international arena.
116
   
 In the immediate post-war period, however, the RCN’s stock came back to earth 
with, if not a crash, a significant thud.  The hard won respect that the RCN had earned 
with the lives of Canadian sailors would be challenged by a number of factors, some of 
which it was directly responsible for, and some which were beyond its control.  The 
result was a navy that, by 1949, had lost much of the esteem in which it had been held by 
the Canadian public.  This loss of esteem would, in turn, place the RCN in a significantly 
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more vulnerable position in the wake of the 1949 "incidents" than would otherwise have 
been the case.  This vulnerability would compromise the ability of the senior Canadian 
naval leadership to pursue its vision of the RCN’s position in the post-war world. 
 The RCN, in fact, began spending its hard-won public relations capital before the 
Second World War had even ended.  Both the V-E Day riots in Halifax and the 
controversial decision made by the crew of the HMCS Uganda to remove itself from the 
Pacific Theatre of Operations served to erode public confidence in the RCN.  To some 
extent the RCN itself was responsible for both of these occurrences.     
 The announcement of the victorious end of the war against Germany and its 
European allies was made over civilian radio at 1030 hours on 7 May 1945.  As this was 
a Monday, the Government decided that, in celebration of the victory, the remainder of 7 
May and the following day, Tuesday 8 May, would both be national holidays, and 
civilians would be given the days off of work.  The Nova Scotia Liquor Commission had 
decided as early as April 1945, in anticipation of the eventual victory of the allies, that 
the liquor stores which would normally have been open would remain closed for the 
duration of the holiday.  In addition, all restaurants and cinemas would remain closed 
until 9 May.  To exacerbate the problem, Captain H.W. Balfour, the Commanding Officer 
of HMCS Stadacona,
117
 the main navy base in Halifax, had decided to close the canteens, 
save for a brief period during the evening of 7 May, for the duration of the 
celebrations.
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 While the decision to essentially close down the country to allow a war weary and 
jubilant population to celebrate the end of hostilities against Germany may have had little 
impact elsewhere, in Halifax the situation was very different.  As the major RCN port on 
the Atlantic seaboard, Halifax was home to more than its share of sailors.  On VE Day, 
this was particularly true, as there were some 18,000 RCN personnel present in Halifax 
over the 7-8 May period, representing approximately 23% of the RCN’s total 
complement, an unusually high percentage.
119
  Many of these personnel had been 
engaged in a gruelling and dangerous five-year campaign against the U-Boats, and there 
could be no doubt that with the end of the war they would be ready and more than willing 
to celebrate.  For the sailors in Halifax, as in most other naval communities, that meant 
drinking, and lots of it. 
 The “exuberant and drunken” celebrations began in the naval canteens on the 
evening of 7 May, and continued, one can only imagine with much enthusiasm, until the 
canteens closed.  Large numbers of naval personnel then left the base and moved towards 
downtown Halifax, which was only a short walk away.   With all outlets for celebration 
closed to them they became, perhaps understandably, increasingly frustrated, violent and 
destructive.  The gathering crowd of sailors began to loot liquor stores and physically 
engage both the civilian authorities and the navy’s own shore patrol.  They were aided in 
this by a deliberately promulgated shore patrol policy which allowed large crowds to 
gather, and prohibited the arrest of drunken personnel.
120
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 While there appears to have been a brief lull in the rampage during the morning of 
8 May, by the afternoon the riot had again picked up its tempo.  The sailors had been 
joined by numbers of soldiers, airmen, merchant seaman and civilians as they continued 
to loot liquor stores.  The looting had, however, become far more general.  Department 
stores and similar establishments were targeted as well.  By 1800 hours the mobs in 
Halifax had become so violent and unruly that the mayor of Halifax, supported by Rear-
Admiral Murray, announced that the celebrations were over and imposed a military 
curfew.  The rioters responded by moving briefly to Dartmouth, across the harbour from 
Halifax, but by 2300 hours discipline had been restored and the curfew was in force.  The 
riot was over, but the damage caused by the rioters had been substantial.
121
 
 While the RCN was experiencing its difficulties in Halifax, a drama of another 
sort was taking place half a world away, in the Pacific theatre of operations.  Prior to May 
of 1945, the RCN’s participation in that theatre had been extremely limited.  The naval 
staff, however, believed that, once Germany had been defeated, Canadian participation in 
the Pacific was essential in order to allow the RCN to take its rightful and prominent 
place among the allied navies.  The commitment initially envisioned by the Canadian 
naval planning staff included 25,000 personnel together with all of the RCN’s large fleet 
units and the vast majority of its smaller ships.  Prime Minister Mackenzie King, 
however, had substantially different ideas, and after an acrimonious argument with the 
naval staff, the eventual commitment that the RCN was to make to the Pacific was 
capped at 13,000 personnel and substantially fewer ships.
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When the dust settled, the decision was made to send HMCS Uganda and HMCS 
Ontario to the Pacific to participate in operations against the Japanese.  They would be 
joined eventually by the RCN’s four Tribal class destroyers and two Fleet Vs, the most 
modern destroyers available to the RCN.  In addition there were plans to deploy eight of 
the RCN’s Castle class corvettes and thirty-six River class frigates to the Pacific to 
perform escort duties.  While this was not as large a commitment as naval service 
headquarters had initially wanted, the dispatch of the RCN’s two newly acquired cruisers, 
among its largest and most modern units, represented a considerable commitment to the 
war in the Pacific in terms of its striking power, if not in terms of raw numbers of 
personnel.
123
 
 It was at this point that things began to go decidedly wrong for the RCN.  Both 
HMCS Uganda and HMCS Ontario represented a considerable portion of the RCN’s 
hopes for a balanced, blue-water, post-war navy.  They had been acquired from the 
British Government following the QUADRANT conference in 1943.  Both were large by 
RCN standards, and relatively modern.  They would be ideal core units for the balanced 
naval strike force of the sort that the RCN envisioned for the post-war period.
124
 
 The dispatch of ships to the Pacific theatre had been a relatively straightforward 
matter when it was first planned in 1943.  With the end of the war in Europe, however, 
the situation changed dramatically.  By May of 1945 Mackenzie King and the 
Government of Canada were facing increasing difficulties recruiting enough volunteers to 
replace casualties and reinforce army, navy and air force units fighting in Europe and the 
North Atlantic.  Government ministers were forced to seriously consider conscription as a 
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means of remedying the manpower problem, at least for the Canadian Army.  It was not a 
remedy that Mackenzie King favoured, as it was politically divisive and would, in his 
view, prevent him from achieving his goal of bringing Canada out of the war as a strong 
and unified country.
125
   
The end of operations in Europe, while on its face solving the immediate 
manpower problem, raised an even greater one.  If Canada was to participate in the war 
against Japan in any meaningful way, a means would have to be found to break the news 
to thousands of "hostilities only" personnel serving in Canada’s armed forces that their 
service was not, in fact, over and that more fighting in far away places would be 
necessary.  It would also perpetuate the manpower crisis, and raise the spectre of 
conscription and all of its associated problems yet again. 
The solution arrived at by King was a compromise of sorts.  On 4 April 1945, the 
Government formally announced its policy on service in the Pacific.  It would be on a 
purely voluntary basis, and each member of the army, navy or air force, upon conclusion 
of hostilities in Europe, would be specifically asked to volunteer for service with 
Canadian forces in the Pacific.
 126
  Thus, whether Canadian service personnel would 
participate in the war against Japan would be left entirely up to them and the decision  
would be made on an individual basis. 
For the RCN this decision meant that the crews of Ontario and Uganda would be 
asked specifically whether they were willing to serve in the Pacific alongside the Royal 
Navy and the United States Navy, or whether they wished to be released from service 
following the surrender of Germany, which by that point was imminent.  As the RCN 
                                                 
125
 Ibid, p. 532.   
126
 Ibid.  
47 
 
was composed entirely of volunteers, it was assumed by both the government and the 
naval leadership that the result of the question was a foregone conclusion, and that both 
ships’ companies would volunteer en masse.127  For various reasons, however, this 
assumption would prove to be woefully incorrect. 
The two ships were in very different positions in the early part of May 1945.  
HMCS Ontario, under the command of Captain H.T.W. Grant, was newer than HMCS 
Uganda and carried more modern armament.  While similar in many ways to Uganda, 
she was considered to be technologically at least a year ahead in her anti-aircraft 
armament and radar capacity.  She had been completed in the early part of 1945 and was 
still finishing her working-up process when the ship's company was called upon to 
volunteer for continued participation in the Pacific.  When presented with the undertaking 
to volunteer for Pacific service on 1 May 1945, 512 officers and men, some 64% of the 
ship’s complement, accepted, while 388 refused.128  Fortunately for the RCN, HMCS 
Ontario had not yet been formally Commissioned or deployed to active operations.  
Replacing those personnel who had declined service in the Pacific could be undertaken 
prior to her deployment and would neither hamper operations nor cause public 
embarrassment to the RCN and the Government of Canada.
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In the case of HMCS Uganda the RCN was not to be so lucky.  When the policy 
requiring volunteer service was formally announced, she was already actively engaged in 
operations in the Pacific as part of the British Pacific Fleet.  She had participated in 
Operation Iceberg, the code name given to the amphibious assault on the island of 
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Okinawa.  Her role in that operation was the suppression of Japanese airfields in the 
Sakishima Gunto island group and the protection of the carriers supporting the assault.  
She was first engaged on 13 April 1945 and on 4 May participated in the bombardment of 
airfields on Myako Island, by all accounts performing well.
130
 
In early May the vote was taken aboard HMCS Uganda calling for volunteers for 
the Pacific war.  From the RCN’s perspective, the results were even worse than those 
aboard HMCS Ontario.  An overwhelming number of officers and ratings, 576 ratings 
and 29 officers, representing 80% of the ship’s company, chose not to volunteer for 
Pacific service.  On 17 May the results of the vote were put to Rear-Admiral Brind, the 
Royal Navy commander of the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, of which Uganda was a part.  
While his response was polite and understanding, he cannot have been pleased with the 
result.
131
  Thus HMCS Uganda, while actively engaged in combat operations in the 
Pacific, had effectively voted herself out of the war, certainly a unique event in the annals 
of naval history, but one of which the RCN could not be proud.  Uganda would have no 
choice but to go home to replace those crew members who had elected to end their 
service. 
On her way there, still as part of the British Pacific Fleet, she took part in 
Operation Inmate, the bombardment of Japanese positions on Truk Atoll.  Truk had been 
bypassed and left to “wither on the vine” in the progression of the Allied forces across the 
Pacific.  By the time of Operation Inmate, 15 June 1945, it was serving essentially as a 
target for gunnery practice by the British Pacific Fleet.
132
  There was not a great deal of 
risk to Uganda or her crew in this exercise, and she once again performed creditably.  By 
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the middle of July, she was headed home, both for a refit, and to put ashore those 
personnel who had declined to volunteer for continued service.
133
  The war in the Pacific 
would be over before she could return to action. 
The reasons behind the decision not to volunteer varied for each of the personnel 
put to the choice.  There are, however, several possible explanations which go beyond a 
failure of courage or patriotism on the part of the officers and ratings involved.  Of 
perhaps the greatest importance, after the difficulty of explaining to families, spouses and 
sweethearts that reunion would be postponed indefinitely, was the very real fear that the 
sailors would be late to the dance, as it were, in terms of post-war programs and benefits.  
As large numbers of naval personnel would be demobilising while Uganda and Ontario 
continued to serve, they would have a head start in obtaining post-war jobs and enrolling 
in programs designed to benefit veterans.
134
  Nobody wanted to return home after an 
indeterminate period of additional service to discover that their prospects for post-war 
prosperity had disappeared in favour of someone who had served less time on active 
duty. 
In addition to this very real fear, there was also a certain degree of umbrage taken 
to the question itself.  Several of the officers and ratings who declined to volunteer found 
the question itself offensive.  They had volunteered to serve for the duration of hostilities, 
which, in their minds, included hostilities against Japan.  Since they had already 
volunteered once, they felt that their integrity was being questioned by being asked to do 
so again.  Some of the officers, in particular, seemed to feel that asking them to volunteer 
specifically for Pacific service was offensive, as they were already bound to do so, and 
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implied that they were unreliable.  In its haste to comply with the Government’s policy, 
the RCN had, as it turned out, failed to consider carefully enough the way in which the 
call for volunteers was put to its personnel.
135
  The response to the RCN’s mishandling of 
the question was a perverse refusal to, in essence, volunteer for naval service twice. 
The final, and perhaps decisive, factors which bore upon the vote aboard Uganda, 
although not Ontario, had to do with the service conditions aboard ship.  When she was 
constructed, Uganda had been designed for service in the North Atlantic.  She had not, 
therefore, been equipped with the cooling and refrigeration systems that service in the 
much warmer temperatures of the Pacific theatre would necessitate.  The conditions 
aboard were, as a result, uncomfortable to say the least.  Fresh provisions were all but 
impossible to maintain in the tropical heat, and the diet of the men suffered accordingly.  
In addition the temperatures in the living and work spaces below decks often exceeded 
one hundred degrees Fahrenheit, requiring the men to sleep on deck where possible, or in 
sweltering heat when it was not.  Things were even worse in the engine room where the 
heat from the engines added to the discomfort.
136
  Life aboard Uganda was far from ideal 
and inevitably had a negative impact on ship’s morale.  This in turn translated, at least for 
some of the personnel, into a refusal to volunteer for continued service. 
Added to these physical discomforts was the discomfort of service aboard a larger 
ship.  While Uganda’s officers, including Captain, as he then was, Rollo Mainguy, were 
for the most part permanent force experienced men who had learned their trade in service 
with the Royal Navy, the story was entirely different for the ratings.  Approximately two-
thirds of them had come to Uganda out of service in corvettes.  These men were largely 
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volunteer reserve personnel who had no prior naval experience.  They had served the 
bulk of their time with the RCN aboard corvettes, where the shipboard routine was much 
less rigid and discipline less stringent.  They had considerable difficulty adapting to life 
aboard a larger ship where the daily routine was much more formal and where discipline 
was much more rigidly enforced.
137
  These difficulties were exacerbated when the crew 
were called upon to volunteer for Pacific service by Captain Mainguy, who spoke out 
against non-volunteers in terms that made his disapproval very clear, and which served to 
alienate many of the ratings who up to that point had viewed him very favourably, and 
seen him as a “sailor’s sailor.”138  For many of the crew, the difference in ship’s routine, 
combined with the uncomfortable physical conditions, must have tipped the balance in 
favour of going home.  Regardless of the validity of the reasons, however, Uganda was 
heading home, and the Canadian public would be left to make of that what they would. 
Both the riots in Halifax and the difficulties aboard Uganda occurred while the 
House of Commons was in recess for the summer, so there was no immediate reaction to 
either event in the House.  In the press, however, the reaction, particularly to the riots, 
was immediate and vigorous.   
As early as 9 May, Admiral G.C. Jones, the Chief of the Naval Staff, upon 
learning of the Halifax riots, promised an immediate and full enquiry into responsibility 
for them.
139
  This was not, however, enough to satisfy Alan Butler, the Mayor of Halifax, 
who needed no such enquiry to fix blame for the destruction visited on his city.  He 
immediately blamed the RCN for the entirety of the riots and was quoted in a Canadian 
Press story as saying “[i]t will be a long time before the people of Halifax forget that 
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great crime.”140  While the bulk of the negative comments about the navy and its conduct 
came from Halifax itself, the wide publication of these comments, through the Canadian 
Press news service, could not have gone unnoticed in the rest of the country.   
The situation was not helped by the publication of the findings of the Kellock 
Commission, which had been struck by the federal government to investigate the riots 
and to, essentially, assign blame for them.  Although Admiral Jones had promised a naval 
enquiry, the magnitude of the outcry was such that the government decided to take the 
matter out of the hands of the navy entirely.  In fact the order striking the Commission 
was issued on 10 May and hearings began immediately.  After several days of hearings, 
Justice Kellock produced his report at the end of July 1945.  In agreement with Mayor 
Butler, Kellock placed the blame for the riots squarely on the shoulders of the RCN, and 
more particularly on those of Vice-Admiral Murray, who he blamed for failing to take 
into account the potential for disorderly conduct and put in place measures to forestall it.  
Kellock furthermore specifically discounted claims that in part the riots had been 
motivated by the frustration of naval personnel with the high prices being charged for 
food and accommodation in Halifax, finding that there was no evidence to support those 
arguments.  Justice Kellock’s report justified the anger felt in Halifax and elsewhere 
towards the RCN and its personnel, and tarnished their hard won reputation.
141
  To make 
matters worse, Vice-Admiral Murray, who had earned the respect of both British and 
American naval leaders and of the Canadian men and women under his command, was 
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held responsible for the riots and relieved of his command, marking a sad ending to an 
illustrious career.
142
 
When Parliament resumed sitting in the fall of 1945 both the Halifax riots and the 
failure of a significant portion of the crew of Uganda to volunteer for Pacific service 
were raised in the House of Commons.  On 2 October 1945 Douglas Abbott, the Minister 
of National Defence for Naval Services, acknowledged, with apparent approval, the 
findings of the Kellock inquiry blaming the lack of discipline in the RCN for the riots.  
He also issued a plaintive plea to both the members of parliament and the Canadian 
people to forgive the navy and remember its admirable wartime service.
143
  For the 
Minister responsible to have to rise in the House of Commons and apologize for the 
conduct of the RCN must have been a galling experience for Abbott, and the fact that he 
felt it necessary to do so is indicative of the extent to which the RCN had fallen in the 
esteem of both the Government and the public. 
The comments in the House of Commons regarding Uganda, which arose at 
approximately the same time, were much more cursory but also indicated the extent to 
which the reputation of the RCN had been tarnished.  George Pearkes, the Member of 
Parliament for Nanaimo, indicated to the House that he had received a telegram “asking 
if the good name of the ships’ company of HMCS Uganda might be vindicated because 
of the slurring remarks that [had] been made regarding some of the men who had not 
volunteered for service in the Pacific.”  He went on to ask that the Government clarify the 
position of the men of Uganda and to confirm that they had initially volunteered to serve 
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anywhere, and had subsequently been given the option of volunteering for the Pacific.
144
  
While Pearkes did not clarify what precisely the nature of the “slurs” had been, it is safe 
to assume that they had called into question the loyalty and courage of those members of 
the crew who had not volunteered for Pacific service, and may have gone so far as to 
suggest that a mutiny had occurred and that there had been strife between those who 
volunteered and those who didn’t.145 
Abbott’s response to the concerns raised by Pearkes was brusque to the point of 
being dismissive.  He confirmed that he had received a similar telegram and that the men 
of Uganda had been offered the same option of volunteering for Pacific service as had 
the men serving in the army and the air force.  He then went on to dismiss Pearkes’ 
concerns about the reputation of the crew of Uganda, remarking that he felt “sure that the 
majority of the people of this country [were] under no illusions as to the status of the 
crew of Uganda or as to their suffering from any alleged slurs which may have been cast 
with respect to the nature of their service.”146  Abbott’s failure to defend the reputation of 
the crew of Uganda in more forceful terms was telling, and indicated the extent to which 
Abbott, as the Minister in charge of the RCN was displeased with the embarrassment that 
its conduct had caused him. 
Neither the Halifax riots nor the Uganda incident alone was sufficient to 
significantly damage the RCN in the long-term.  All else being equal they would have 
eventually been forgotten and remained as interesting footnotes to the history of the 
RCN.  In the post-war period, however, all else was far from equal and the combination 
of the two events served as the first small erosions at the foundation of the post-war 
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RCN.  They would eventually, in combination with other factors, leave the service 
vulnerable to challenge in 1949, but incapable of defending itself against increasing 
attempts to bring it to heel as the servant of Government policy. 
One of these other factors occurred completely outside the control of the RCN, 
but would serve as the motive power behind the establishment of the Mainguy 
Commission.  It, too, began in September 1945 when Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk with 
the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, defected.  He revealed the existence of a Soviet-based 
espionage ring involving a number of government employees, some of them quite senior, 
operating in Ottawa, who had been spying on the Government of Canada throughout the 
Second World War.
147
  The Gouzenko affair triggered a wave of anti-Communist hysteria 
in Canada.
148
 
Anti-Communist thinking was not, of course, new to the post-war period.  As Reg 
Whitaker has shown, the Government of Canada had been actively engaged against the 
political left in Canada since the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 and continued its 
campaign through the1920s and 1930s.  During the Second World War the preoccupation 
of the Government with Communist subversion continued.  This was at variance with 
propaganda that portrayed the conflict as a united front with the Soviet Union against the 
Nazi menace.  Communist supporters were interned, and publications sympathetic to 
Communist ideas were banned under increasingly powerful regulations.  In fact, Canada 
was the only nation to legally ban the Communist Party throughout the wartime alliance 
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with the Soviet Union.
149
  The Gouzenko affair, however, proved the fears that had 
motivated the repression of Communists to have been well founded and ratcheted up anti-
Communist sentiment to levels that had not previously been seen in Canada. 
One of the major foci of the anti-Communist sentiment in the post-war period was 
organised labour.  Since the 1930s some unions had become increasingly influenced by 
members who were also members of the Communist Party of Canada either as such or 
the Labour Progressive Party.
150
  During the Second World War many of these unions 
made significant gains for their membership in both wages and working conditions.  The 
heavy demand for war production placed them in a very advantageous bargaining 
position which they did not fail to exploit.  The post-war period, however, saw a number 
of strikes as the same unions tried to defend the gains they had made against the 
employers in the face of returning servicemen and an expanded labour pool and in the 
face of stiff opposition from employers, who took every opportunity to try to break the 
back of organised labour and reverse the gains that had been made.
151
 
It would, of course, be incorrect to brand all union members as Communists or 
even sympathetic to communist ideas.  The presence and influence of communist 
members in trade unions, and in senior trade union leadership positions was, however, 
well known to employers, judges and government officials and in the post-war period 
became a major difficulty facing organised labour as a movement.
152
  In the context of 
the growing fear of the Communist menace, the presence of any Communist influence, 
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particularly in union leadership, would serve to make an organisation the target of 
prosecution, regulation and investigation. 
One of the occupations most heavily involved in labour unrest during the post-war 
period, and the one most relevant to the present inquiry, was Canada’s merchant navy.  
This group included almost all sailors who worked on merchant ships, both on the Great 
Lakes and on ocean-going vessels, and had a history of labour militancy.  Collective 
action by merchant seamen had begun in earnest in 1935 in a series of disputes to reduce 
the length of the working day and to combat a steady decline in wages during the 
Depression.  These disputes culminated in an acrimonious strike and violent 
confrontations between striking seamen and replacement crews.  The strike ended very 
quickly due to the almost complete absence of effective union organisation, but the 
merchant seamen had learned their lesson.
153
  In 1936 the National Seamen’s Union and 
the Marine Worker’s Union of the Great Lakes amalgamated to form the Canadian 
Seamen’s Union (CSU),154 which it was hoped would prove, in time, to be a much more 
effective vehicle for promoting the interests of the seamen and provide them with the 
leadership that the earlier disputes demonstrated that they needed. 
The conflict between the CSU and the ship owners continued after the 
amalgamation.  In October 1937 the Maurice Duplessis government in Québec shut down 
the Searchlight, the magazine published by the CSU under that province’s “padlock law.”  
This law allowed the provincial government to shut down any “operation suspected of 
advocating communism.”155  Since the law itself only required suspicion of advocacy, it 
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was a valuable weapon in combating both the rising spectre of communism, and the trend 
towards organized labour and it was a weapon that Duplessis was not shy about using. 
In 1938 another series of strikes took place.  This time the merchant seamen were 
much better organised, and presented a more unified front than they had in prior disputes.  
The improved organisation in turn led to more success for the striking seamen in terms of 
collective agreements reached with the company owners.  The success, however, proved 
to be a mixed blessing.  The radical improvement in unity and organisation of the seamen 
led the owners to suspect that an outside communist influence was responsible and more 
pervasive than they had previously believed.  What had been a suspicion prior to the 1938 
strikes had now become a certainty in the minds of the owners, and the CSU would 
remain firmly in the cross-hairs of the Government and owners into the post-war period 
as a hotbed of communist activity.
156
 
During the war years the labour unrest in the merchant navy seemed to abate to a 
considerable degree.  There was certainly no shortage of work for merchant seamen, and 
both the owners and the seamen put aside their acrimonious relationship in the interest of 
working towards the common goal of winning the war.  In spite of this, however, low 
grade conflict continued and several of the CSU leaders were jailed under the Defence of 
Canada Regulations, ostensibly due to their membership in the Communist Party.
157
  In 
addition there were some instances of “job action” strikes aboard Canadian merchant 
vessels in which crews refused to perform their tasks until specific grievances were 
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met.
158
  None of these actions significantly impacted the ability of the merchant navy to 
supply war materials to Britain and her allies, but as the war progressed it became 
increasingly clear that any truce between the CSU and the owners of the merchant ships 
would be temporary. 
In the aftermath of the war tensions once again began to rise and were 
exacerbated by government policy towards Canada’s merchant navy.  Firstly, merchant 
seamen were not recognised as veterans.  This made them ineligible for veterans' 
pensions and for preferences given to veterans in post war employment, particularly in 
the civil service, and for subsidised training and education opportunities.
159
  Thus, while 
merchant seamen had fought and died alongside their RCN counterparts, they were to be 
treated, in their minds, as second class citizens when it came to their place in post-war 
Canadian society. 
To make matters worse, the Government of Canada, which had constructed a 
large fleet of “Park” class merchant vessels during the war, decided to get out of the 
merchant shipping business.  The ships were sold off for a fraction of their value, mainly 
to non-Canadian concerns.  The Canadian shipbuilding industry was essentially shut 
down.  The government had decided that, in the post-war world, Canadian merchant 
shipping could not compete effectively with foreign bottoms due to higher Canadian 
wages and a shorter work week for Canadian merchant seamen.
160
  Regardless of the 
reasons, however, the decision meant impending if not actual unemployment for a large 
number of Canadian merchant seamen. 
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The post-war tensions came to a head in what were essentially two interwoven 
strikes, one by the Great Lakes seamen which began in 1948 and a second by the deep 
sea seamen which began in March of 1949.
161
  By this time the Communist influence in 
the CSU had been well established in the minds of the Canadian government and people.  
In 1947 Pat Sullivan, the CSU president, had announced after years of denial that he was, 
in fact, a member of the Labour Progressive Party (in essence the Communist Party with 
a different name) and revealed to the public the extent to which Communists had taken 
over the leadership of the CSU.
162
  Both the strikes and Sullivan’s revelation played into 
the anti-Communist sentiment and ensured that the strikes, particularly the 1949 deep sea 
strike, would attract a great deal of attention.  Stories in the press rarely failed to mention 
the Communist affiliations of the CSU when the strike was reported on.
163
 
The strike in Canada was broken relatively quickly.  In April of 1949 the 
Canadian Government began to assist ship owners in escorting strike-breakers onto 
ships.
164
   The power of the CSU as a representative of Canadian merchant seamen was 
broken, and it was replaced by the Seamen’s International Union, a far less radical 
organisation without Communist ties.
165
   
By the time the strike was broken in Canada, however, it had assumed an 
international dimension.  A number of related unions, primarily in Britain, had declared 
their support for the CSU and actively supported the strike.  The Dockworkers union, for 
example, refused to unload any ships manned by strike breakers and essentially shut 
                                                 
161
 Green pp. 186-222. 
162
 Kaplan, p. 49. 
163
 See, for example, The Toronto Daily Star, July 18, 1949, p. 4; The Toronto Daily Star, July 20, 1939, p. 
2. 
164
 Ibid., p. 63. 
165
 Ibid., p. 70. 
61 
 
down the docks at several of Britain’s major sea ports.  The situation in Britain became 
so serious that on 11 July 1949 the British Government under Clement Attlee declared a 
state of emergency due directly to the dockworkers’ support of the CSU. 166  Similar 
sympathetic labour disruptions took place in other nations as well, notably Holland, 
Belgium and Norway.
167
   The response of the Attlee government was out of all 
proportion to the magnitude of the strike in Canada but by then the strike by the CSU had 
been re-cast as an attempt by the international forces of Communism to disrupt shipping 
and hinder the relief of the blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union.
168
 
The global nature of the 1949 deep sea strike served to make labour unrest in 
Canada and the Communist influence on the trade union movement appear to be much 
more serious and much more dangerous than they actually were.  In its convention of 
August 1949 the Trades and Labour Congress, demonstrating the extent to which anti-
Communist sentiment had penetrated even the bastion of organised labour, expelled the 
CSU from its membership based on the Communist affiliations of its leaders.
169
  While 
this move by the TLC may have been simple self-preservation in the face of increasing 
anti-Communist sentiment,
170
 its effect was to cut the very foundations out from under 
the CSU and to deny it the support it so desperately needed.  Having lost its major ally in 
the Trades and Labour Congress, the strike limped along until it finally ended on 15 
October 1949.  With the end of the strike, the CSU functionally ceased to exist and 
Canadian merchant seamen would be forced to look elsewhere for representation.
171
  
                                                 
166
 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
167
 Green, pp. 248-262. 
168
 Kaplan p. 70. 
169
 Ibid., p. 68. 
170
 The Toronto Daily Star, March 26, 1949, p. 2. 
171
 Kaplan., p. 287. 
62 
 
Regardless of its ultimate failure, however, the CSU deep sea strike would have 
implications far beyond the lot of the merchant seamen themselves. 
In light of the deep sea strike, and the allegations of Communist control levelled 
at the CSU, the "incidents" aboard Magnificent, Crescent and Athabaskan could not have 
come at a worse time for the RCN.  The association between the "incidents" and 
Communist subversion in the minds of Canadians, both in and outside of government, 
was all but guaranteed.  In the minds of civilians the differences between merchant 
seamen and members of the RCN were difficult to see and it did not require a great 
stretch of the imagination to conclude that if the merchant seamen were not politically 
reliable then neither were the RCN sailors.
172
   
In the House of Commons, while no overt connection was made between the 
"incidents" and communist subversion, questions were asked in the midst of bouts of 
soaring anti-communist rhetoric, made worse by the first testing of an atomic bomb by 
the Soviet Union and the fall of China to Mao's communists, both of which also took 
place in 1949.  Brooke Claxton, then acting under-secretary of state reported to cabinet 
that the CSU had begun using sit-down strikes to support its demands both in Canada and 
overseas.
173
  Mr. Diefenbaker, then Member of Parliament for Lake Centre, for example, 
saw the threat of communism on all sides and opined on 26 April 1949 that it was 
“undermining our nation in various places.”174  Solon E. Low, the MP for Peace River, 
went him one better, describing the spread of communism in the post-war period as a 
“red tidal wave,” and predicting a dire future for the world if the spread were allowed to 
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continue.
175
  All of this combined to place the loyalty and reliability of the RCN in 
doubt
176
, and in this atmosphere it was imperative for the government to put a quick end 
to discussion of the "incidents" lest it be perceived as being "soft" on communism. 
To make matters worse for the RCN they could not, in the wake of the riots in 
Halifax and the refusal of the crew of Uganda to serve in the Pacific, make use of a 
reputation of staunch reliability to brand the "incidents" as absurd and thereby deflect 
public scrutiny.  What was an absolute certainty by the summer of 1949 was that the 
RCN would not be permitted to conduct its own investigation into the "incidents" and to 
address whatever problems were revealed within normal service channels and away from 
political scrutiny.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Challenges From Within 
 
 
A rapid reduction in the size of the RCN combined with government parsimony, 
poor working conditions, changing rank and pay structures and changing governmental 
policy served to bring the navy, by 1949, to a state of crisis.  The crisis had been building 
for four years and the RCN had already weathered one storm following a series of similar 
‘incidents’ aboard its vessels in 1947.  Positive change, however, was slow in coming and 
morale in the RCN continued to worsen.  By the spring of 1949 the RCN’s internal 
vulnerability matched its external vulnerability, and again placed it in a position in which 
it would be unable to effectively defend itself against its critics.  It was, in short, not a 
happy fleet. 
The first major postwar challenge for the RCN was, ironically, exactly the 
opposite of the one which it faced in 1939.  When the war began the RCN had to expand 
as quickly as possible in order to meet the wartime demands for warships to escort 
convoys to Britain.  It had done this with remarkable success and by the end of the war 
comprised very nearly 100,000 personnel manning 250 seagoing warships, hundreds of 
smaller warships and auxiliary vessels and a large number of shore establishments.  
Almost immediately following the cessation of hostilities the RCN was directed by the 
Government of Canada to reduce its personnel complement almost as dramatically as it 
had increased it.  Simultaneously the purpose of the RCN changed and the number of 
ships was also to be dramatically reduced. 
65 
 
 Hopes for a smooth transition into the post-war period almost immediately ran 
into considerable difficulties, and from a somewhat unexpected quarter.  In formulating 
the post-war vision for the RCN, the Naval Staff had estimated that manning two battle 
groups would require approximately 20,000 personnel of all ranks, including crews for 
the ships and logistical and support personnel.  Admiral Percy Nelles, during his tenure as 
Chief of the Naval Staff  (1934-1944), had sought to secure for the RCN a significant 
place in the post-war world as an instrument of the government's international policy.  He 
was motivated by a fear that, as had happened after the First World War, the RCN would 
rapidly sink into obscurity once again.   
In the immediate aftermath of the war, it appeared that Nelles had been correct in 
his fears of history repeating.  Mackenzie King issued instructions to Douglas Abbott, 
who replaced Angus MacDonald as the minister responsible for the RCN, to pare the 
three military services to the bone.  King was anxious to get back to what he considered 
to be the traditional Liberal principles of “’economy, reduction of taxation and anti-
militarism.”177  The RCN was virtually excluded from the policy making process as 
External Affairs, which had forged a close partnership with the leadership of all of the 
armed services during the war, proved a fickle collaborator, and saw the post-war period 
as an opportunity to pursue its own vision for Canada and its place in the world.
178
   It 
was clear that the bad old days had returned and that the naval staff would have to fight to 
preserve the post-war vision that it had formulated. 
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 The vision itself had been in existence for as long as there had been an RCN.  As 
early as 1909, Admiral Sir John Fisher, then the First Sea Lord at Britain's Admiralty, 
advanced a vision for the participation of Britain’s dominions in the imperial defence 
system.  Using the protection of Britain’s Pacific dominions as the primary justification, 
Fisher advocated the direct participation of the dominions in the naval defence.  He 
advocated the creation by each of the self-governing dominions of small multi-purpose 
navies based on the battle cruiser as the primary vessel.  This would not only allow the 
dominions to become local powers through the creation of high-seas fleets, but would 
also provide Britain with a reserve of powerful naval units that were trained together and 
operationally ready to meet any contingency.
179
 
 Fisher’s proposals were in fact attuned to Britain’s self-governing Pacific 
dominions, Australia and New Zealand, and were instrumental in the creation of the 
Royal Australian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy.   In Canada, however, they 
proved considerably less convincing.  The perception in some quarters was that Fisher 
was offering his vision based on a very narrow reading of British interests, and not those 
of Canada.  While the Government of Canada managed to succeed in the creation of the 
Royal Canadian Navy as a national service, the political divisions threatened even that 
meagre achievement, and certainly could did not support the acquisition of powerful 
surface units and the budgets needed to sustain them.  There was also considerable fear 
that the creation of such naval units would draw Canada into Britain’s imperial 
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entanglements.
180
  As a result, the RCN at its foundation became a small coastal defence 
force. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Britain again attempted to 
promote its vision of imperial defence.  Earl Jellicoe of Scapa, on a visit to Canada in 
1919, repeated Fisher’s vision of the composition of dominion navies.  Jellicoe, like 
Fisher, promoted the need for the dominions to participate in the defence of Britain’s 
Pacific possessions, this time using the spectre of Japan as a motivating factor.  In 
addition, Jellicoe sweetened the deal, and in 1919-1920 Britain gave to Canada one six-
inch gun cruiser, two destroyers and two submarines, to form the basis for the 
development of a Canadian high-seas fleet.  Even this largesse, however, failed to sway 
the Canadian Government.  When Mackenzie King became prime minister in 1921, he 
slashed naval budgets so thoroughly that the RCN could not even afford to man the 
British gift ships.  All save the two destroyers were paid off and laid up.
181
  It became 
clear to the Canadian naval leadership at that time that they would have to continue to 
scramble for the foreseeable future simply to continue to exist.  Expansion and the 
creation of a serviceable fleet did not enter into the planning process in the interwar 
years, only survival did.
182
 
 The outbreak of the Second World War provided an opportunity for the Canadian 
naval leadership to rectify the years of neglect that it had endured during the interwar 
period, although it did not appear that way at first blush.  Mackenzie King’s initial 
position regarding Canada’s role in the conflict was based on participation as an 
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economic support for Britain, but fell short of a significant commitment of military force.  
While King was prepared in the late 1930s to allow British and Canadian naval officers 
to engage in joint planning for the defence of the heavy British and international shipping 
off Canada's shores, he refused to allocate the resources to the RCN that would be 
necessary to allow it to assume a significant role in naval operations against Germany.  
For his part, Admiral Percy Nelles, who had been named Chief of the Naval Staff in 
1934, did not operate under the illusion that the government which had left the RCN to 
languish in obscurity throughout the interwar period would suddenly be converted to a 
big-ship vision of the RCN.  He began, therefore, by proposing a modest expansion of the 
RCN by a number of smaller vessels designed for the support of Britain, but focused 
mainly on coastal operations in North American waters.  King was pleased with this plan 
as it focused on North American defence and would be unlikely to drag Canada into a 
global naval conflict.
183
 
  In spite of this rather inauspicious beginning, Nelles dedicated himself to reviving 
and achieving the vision for the RCN first put forward by Fisher.  While Nelles lacked 
“the deft touch and supple intellect needed to win the sympathy and confidence of those 
who wielded influence and power,”184 he was diligent and dedicated and managed in the 
years immediately prior to the outbreak of the Second World War to convince the 
Canadian Government to open the coffers and allow him to implement some moderate 
expansion of Canada’s naval capacity.  The expansion consisted of the acquisition of 
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seven modern destroyers, and was modest by any measure.
185
   It was, however, a step in 
the right direction, and the outbreak of hostilities with Germany was, in this context, an 
incredible stroke of luck for Nelles.  Persuading the decision makers to spend money on 
the RCN was no longer an issue, and the purse strings loosened exponentially.
186
  For the 
first time since the inception of the RCN, the naval staff found itself in a position to give 
life to the long standing vision of a blue water fleet for Canada. 
 Crucial to the successful implementation of Nelles’ vision was the support of 
Angus MacDonald, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.  MacDonald, 
himself from Nova Scotia, was a strong supporter of the “policy of 1910,” and the 
creation of cruiser squadrons capable of operations on the high seas.   In an address to the 
House of Commons in November of 1940, MacDonald clearly indicated his unstinting 
support for a strong and independent Canadian navy, stating that “the dignity of Canada 
demands that we should have a navy worthy of our importance in the world of nations, 
adequate to the needs of the great trading nation which Canada now is, and which she is 
bound to become in greater measure after the war; a navy sufficient to meet the 
obligations which rest upon us as members of the British commonwealth [sic], and as a 
country in close association with the United States in the matter of joint defence of this 
continent.”187  This statement is important both for its support of the RCN in the Battle of 
the Atlantic, and perhaps more significantly for its support of the long term vision of the 
RCN.  With such support in the government, Nelles felt understandably confident in 
advancing and promoting his post-war plans for the RN. 
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 Throughout the Second World War Nelles and his colleagues on the naval staff 
remained committed to making the most of the opportunity that the war presented, and 
used whatever means were to hand to pursue Canadian naval interests.  Nelles remained 
determined to make it clear that the RCN was a national service, and not merely an 
adjunct of the Royal Navy.  He was instrumental, for example, in the creation of 
Newfoundland as a separate Canadian naval command.  As the U-boats moved west and 
began operations against allied shipping in the area of the Grand Banks, the Royal Navy 
pressed Nelles to assume a greater responsibility for the protection of convoys between 
St. John’s and Iceland.  Nelles agreed to do this and to commit a significant portion of 
Canada’s escort strength to this task.  In return, however, he insisted that the new 
Newfoundland command be, firstly, separate from Halifax (where a British admiral 
directed major RN warships based there to support convoys), and, secondly, that there be 
a Canadian in charge.  The British acquiesced, and in June of 1941, Commander L.W. 
Murray took command of the Newfoundland Escort Force.  Murray enjoyed the 
confidence of both the RCN and the Royal Navy, and proved to be a very effective 
commander.  His force received the ships that the Canadian government chose to assign 
to it, and was therefore secure from undue influence by the Royal Navy’s Western 
Approaches command, based in Liverpool, as well as the British admiral at Halifax.
188
 
 In addition to securing the operational independence of the RCN, Nelles took 
several major strides towards securing the resources necessary to allow it to play a 
significant role in the post-war world.  Well aware of King’s views on military spending, 
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and perhaps attempting to forestall the inevitable arguments about expense, Nelles 
showed considerable determination and political cunning in convincing Britain, on 
several occasions, to offer to provide the warships necessary to put the RCN in an 
advantageous position in the post-war period.   By the middle of 1943 Nelles realised that 
the RCN held a card that could be played to its advantage.  The Royal Navy had begun an 
ambitious building program early in the war and by 1943 had a large number of ships 
coming into Commission at the same time.  Due to this timing, and wartime losses, it was 
desperately short of trained crews with which to man them.  This problem would become 
more acute, to the point of desperation, if a seaborne invasion of Europe was planned.  
This played directly into the hands of the Canadian naval staff which, through a near 
miracle of development, was in the position of having a manpower surplus.  The answer, 
to Nelles, seemed clear and would serve to satisfy both the Royal Navy’s needs and the 
vision of the naval staff for a blue-water post-war fleet.
189
   
 The QUADRANT conference in August 1943 provided Nelles with a golden 
opportunity to pursue his idea.  On 11 August he and Captain H. G. DeWolf, the RCN’s 
Director of Plans, met with Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, and Vice-Admiral Lord 
Louis Mountbatten, the Chief of Combined Operations, to discuss how the British surplus 
of ships and the Canadian surplus of manpower could be combined to the mutual 
advantage of the two navies.  The meeting occurred in some secrecy.  The British, for 
their part, did not want the other services to know what they were up to for various 
reasons.  Nelles and the Canadians were anxious to hide their activities from their 
Government.  Nelles knew, from past experience, that King would resist both the 
acquisition by the RCN of any ships larger than destroyers and the use of Canadian 
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manpower for other than Canadian purposes.  He also knew, however, that King had a 
history of acceding to requests that came from Churchill directly rather than through 
military staffs.  The parties quickly agreed, then, that any agreement negotiated would 
come from Churchill as a British plea for assistance and not through the Royal Navy.
190
 
 On 31 August a naval understanding was finalised and presented to Mackenzie 
King as a British plea for assistance.  In addition to the two cruisers to be manned by 
Canadians, mentioned in the last chapter, the RCN was also to provide personnel to man 
several flotillas of landing craft and at least two light fleet carriers.  At the cessation of 
hostilities with Germany, the ships manned by Canadians would be turned over to the 
RCN together with two modern destroyers.  While it was to appear that the arrangements 
made were designed to help the Royal Navy meet the increasingly heavy demands of 
convoy escort and orchestrating an amphibious landing of Europe, and while they 
undoubtedly would serve that purpose, they also set the RCN firmly on the path to a 
balanced post-war fleet capable of a variety of operational tasks.
191
 
 As expected, King, reluctantly, agreed to the arrangements.  He was not without 
his suspicions, however, and indicated to Nelles that he found the arrangements terribly 
convenient for the RCN's long-term plans.  At a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee 
on 8 September, King questioned Nelles about when and how much Nelles and Captain 
H.G. De Wolf, the director of plans at Naval Service Headquarters, had known of the 
British requests.  Nelles admitted to preliminary discussions with the Royal Navy early 
on at the QUARANT conference, which was true as far as it went, but when Nelles 
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advised King that he had not known of specific proposals to be brought forward, he was 
being, to put it mildly, disingenuous.
192
 
 By October of 1943 King was becoming even more suspicious than he had been 
at the end of the conference.  Admiralty representatives at a number of meetings seemed 
to know more than they ought to about Canadian post-war naval planning.  When he 
confronted Nelles on the issue he saw his suspicions confirmed.  He was, perhaps 
understandably, furious with Nelles and the naval staff, and viewed their machinations as 
an attempt to direct naval policy without government involvement.  While he was unable 
to go back on the agreement without losing face, someone had to pay for what he viewed 
as a deception.  True to form, he had Nelles removed as Chief of the Naval Staff and 
posted to London in a liaison capacity.  In January 1945, Nelles was retired, at least in 
part due to his deception at QUADRANT.  To add insult to injury, King had Nelles 
promoted to full admiral, but dated the promotion after the date of his retirement, so that 
his pension wouldn’t increase.193  Nelles had certainly paid dearly for his promotion of 
the post-war vision of the RCN.   
Even before the war ended, however, it had become quite clear that the post-war 
period would be characterised by economy and that the post-war complement of 20,000 
personnel would not be immediately realised.  Instead, the Naval Staff was forced to 
accept the government's allowance for an "Interim Force" of 10,000 personnel of all 
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ranks in the immediate post-war period.
194
  The balance of the personnel serving in the 
RCN would be demobilised at the end of hostilities. 
 The personnel ceiling of 10,000 did not cause immediate panic among the 
members of the Naval Staff.  It was, logically, assumed that the main problem facing the 
RCN at the conclusion of hostilities would be demobilising ninety per cent of the RCN, 
not retaining ten per cent for post-war service.  The 10,000 personnel remaining in the 
RCN would form an effective nucleus on which the full post-war naval complement 
could be built.  While this would, the Naval Staff estimated, take ten years to achieve, it 
would leave the RCN in good shape moving forward and would be able to achieve the 
Naval Staff's vision within a relatively short period of time.
195
 
 The dropping of the atomic bombs in August of 1945 ended the war in the Pacific 
sooner than had been anticipated by the naval staff, and the groundwork for the 
construction for the post-war fleet was incomplete.
196
  The process of demobilisation 
began before the RCN had had time to fully formulate policies by which serving 
personnel were to be induced to continue their service in the post-war period or to put 
into place any active campaigns to encourage such a continuation of service.  This 
situation was exacerbated by the speed at which demobilisation occurred.  Douglas C.  
Abbott, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, reported to the House of 
Commons that the reduction in strength of the RCN from nearly 100,000 personnel to 
10,000 personnel would be complete by the end of March of 1946.  To achieve this 
remarkable goal, 10,000 RCN personnel were being demobilised a month, and one major 
and two minor ships were being deCommissioned, de-stored and laid up per day, a 
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process which had begun shortly after V-J day.
197
  The pace of demobilisation left the 
RCN scrambling to retain personnel in the absence of any real opportunity to plan for the 
numbers and technical specialties that would be required to run the post-war fleet. 
 While the RCN may have been disappointed with the required compromise on its 
post-war strength, the reality of demobilisation was to prove more disappointing still.  As 
of 1 April 1946, the number of personnel had dropped to 696 officers and 4,111 ratings.  
This represented less than half of the authorised “Interim Force.”  To make matters 
worse, the vast majority of the experienced personnel who had been trained during the 
Second World War and had seen combat elected to leave the service rather than remain.  
For some the lure of post-war employment opportunities was just too much to resist.
198
  
For many of the officers, particularly those of the Volunteer Reserve, the war had been a 
temporary interlude in their chosen career paths.  The vast majority of them had, before 
the war, been either engaged in or training for professional careers in, for example, 
education, medicine, law and business.  These officers were also overwhelmingly 
(71.5%) well educated, most having attended or completed university prior to 
enlistment.
199
 A career in the post-war RCN would have held very little appeal to them, 
and they would have been anxious to return to the careers to which they had dedicated so 
much time and effort.  Having done their duty, these officers were understandably 
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determined to return to civilian life and to carve out for themselves a place in the post-
war world. 
 Although the reasons for leaving the service were understandable, the departure of 
so many experienced personnel caused a grave problem for the RCN.  The training of a 
seaman, even the most junior of ratings, was a process that took three or four years.
200
  To 
train the increasing number of technical specialists, particularly electricians and engine 
room personnel, took considerably longer.
201
  The departure of so many experienced 
personnel meant that not only was the RCN desperately short of the number of personnel 
necessary to man its post-war fleet, but that it also lacked a cadre of trained and 
experienced men to train the new entries.  To make matters worse, the higher pay grades 
for technical specialists in the supply, communication and engineering branches meant 
that new recruits tended to gravitate towards these branches and retained personnel 
tended to be members of these same branches.  The main shortage of personnel, therefore 
was in the seaman's branch, that is the personnel responsible for many of the daily chores 
involved in operating a warship and the maintenance of its weapons and detection 
systems.
202
  For a navy about to embark on its post-war mission, whatever that was to be, 
this was a completely untenable situation. 
 Some efforts were made to solve the problem, but they proved counter-productive 
in the long run.  When the extent of the personnel loss became apparent, the RCN 
postponed the demobilisation of some trade groups past the February 1946 end date for 
the process.  It was also decided to refuse to release from service those personnel who 
had enlisted in 1940 and 1941 for a seven year engagement.  At the time of enlistment, of 
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course, those who had joined the RCN for a seven year engagement had assumed that, if 
hostilities ceased before the seven year period was up, they would be granted their release 
from service, in essence making the seven year enlistment the equal of the 'hostilities 
only' enlistments offered later in the war.  They were to be sorely disappointed by the 
decision to require them to serve the full seven years, and due to both of these measures, 
morale in the RCN suffered.  While the measures did slow down the haemorrhaging, they 
did nothing but postpone the issue.  When the seven year enlistments eventually expired 
the vast majority of sailors left the service.  In the mean time the bad feelings and poor 
morale that the steps had created spread throughout the fleet.
203
 
 In the midst of the internal and external challenges confronting the RCN in the 
post-war period, it was also faced with another major change in the form of a new 
Minister of National Defence.  Brooke Claxton took over the Defence portfolio in early 
December 1946.  With the exception of an excellent biography of Claxton written by 
David Bercuson, he has remained largely in the shadows of Canadian history.  In his 
tenure as Minister of National Defence, however, Claxton would leave his indelible 
stamp on Canada's armed services and usher in a view that continues to influence 
Canadian defence policy.
204
 
 Brooke Claxton was born on 23 August 1898, the only son of A.G.B. Claxton and 
Blanche (neé Simpson).  A.G.B. Claxton was a reasonably successful Montreal lawyer 
and both he and Blanche were well connected in Montreal society.  Due to his parents' 
position and his father's profession, Claxton's early life was not one characterised by 
privation, and by all accounts both of his parents were doting and involved.  Claxton 
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attended the best schools, including Lower Canada College (then St. John the 
Evangelist's School) and McGill University.
205
   
 Claxton's studies, like those of many of his contemporaries, were interrupted by 
the First World War.  In April of 1916, at the age of 17, he left McGill, where he had 
completed one year of his five year program in law, to take a Commission in the Victoria 
Rifles of Canada.
206
  After spending some time essentially on guard duty, Claxton began 
to despair of reaching the front before the war ended, and in January of 1917 he resigned 
his Commission in the Victoria Rifles and joined the Siege Artillery Draft (McGill 
University) as a ranker, eventually serving with the 13
th
 Canadian Siege Battery (re-
designated 10
th
 Canadian Siege Battery in January 1918).  Claxton arrived in France in 
March 1918, and he saw combat with the Battery until the conclusion of the war the 
following November.  By all accounts Claxton was a good soldier, and he was awarded a 
Distinguished Conduct Medal for ‘meritorious service.’207 
 While Claxton’s active service lasted only approximately nine months, the First 
World War had a significant impact on his outlook both about Canada and about the 
Canadian military more specifically.  The most profound impact of the war on Claxton 
was its instillation in him of a strong sense of Canadian nationalism.  He very rapidly 
came to see Canada not as a pale image of Britain but rather as a proud and independent 
country which was different from Britain in definite but difficult to describe ways.  In his 
memoirs he would comment that “it has always been, I believe, a demonstrable fact that 
those who put Britain before Canada in their hearts were [sic] doing a disservice not only 
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to Canada but also to Britain.”208  His sense of Canadian nationalism, however, was 
based on a unique, and uniquely Canadian, destiny.  It was not as such either anti or pro 
British or American.
209
  In his subsequent career Claxton would show himself to be a 
Canadian patriot, placing Canadian interests foremost in his decisions, and remaining 
sensitive to anything that smacked of subservience to British interests or the aping of 
British attitudes and institutions. 
 Claxton also formed a less than glowing opinion of military discipline as a result 
of his service.  He noted that many of the officers seemed to relish the idea of catching 
the men committing minor offences and administering the punishments permitted by 
military law.  On one occasion while the battery was training at Witley, when Claxton 
was corporal of the guard, he noted that there were 43 men in the cells at the beginning of 
his watch, but 54 when he completed it with no discernible reason for the increase other 
than a string of petty offences against the minutia of military discipline.  His opinion of 
Canadian officers suffered a further setback at the end of the war.  After the armistice, 
and having been engaged in heavy fighting during the last hundred days of the war 
Claxton received orders to put the enlisted men through gun drill for four hours every 
day, in order to “’correct the faulty drill caused by service conditions.’”  The enlisted 
men balked at this order, as all that they really wanted to do was to go home.  To defuse 
the problem, Claxton advised the enlisted men to fall in for drill and then advised the 
other NCOs to simply march the men off of the parade ground without mentioning or 
performing any gun drill.  He assumed, correctly as it turned out, that the officers who 
had ordered the drill had no interest in observing its performance and would not notice if 
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it was not carried out.
210
  While in the latter case Claxton’s actions averted a possible 
mutiny by the enlisted men, he must have viewed the order to perform gun drill after the 
cessation of hostilities as a particularly foolish one. 
 Claxton’s experiences during the First World War would inevitably colour his 
views during the post-war period.  For the remainder of his life he remained a committed 
Canadian nationalist and fought tirelessly to promote his view of Canadian interests and 
Canada’s unique characteristics and position on the world stage.  In Claxton’s view this 
required the severance of the last institutional ties to Britain, and focusing on the unity 
and independence of Canada and her people.
211
  He also remained critical of military 
officers, particularly those of the naval variety, who believed that being officers made 
them leaders.  Claxton held the view that being good leaders made men good officers.  
These attitudes would come into sharp focus in his dealings with the RCN and the 
Mainguy Commission decades later. 
 In the immediate post-war period Claxton began his journey into public service, 
seeing it as his duty to do so, given his education, background and participation in the 
First World War.
212
 He began this journey slowly, contenting himself with participation 
in what became known as the “Canadian movement.”  He was an active member of the 
Association of Canadian Clubs, the Canadian League, the League of Nations Society and 
the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.  All of these groups met and discussed 
Canadian issues such as Canada’s place in the world, French-English relations, and a 
variety of other subjects.
 213
  These activities satisfied his desire to participate in public 
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life while he concentrated his efforts on building up a successful law practice in Montreal 
and providing for his new and expanding family. 
 In both his professional life and through the clubs in which he was a member, 
Claxton came, by the late 1930s, to know a number of senior bureaucrats.  Though his 
law practice, for example, he became acquainted with Arnold Heeney, and through 
Heeney he met, and eventually became very friendly with, J.W. Pickersgill, both of 
whom would eventually work in the Prime Minister’s Office and provide Claxton with a 
conduit to Prime Minister Mackenzie King himself.  Through his interest in the 
possibility of radio as a national unifying force, he met and got to know Leonard 
Brockingon, who would become the first Chairman of the CBC, and would play a 
significant role in the Mainguy Commission.
214
  When Claxton decided to formally enter 
federal politics in 1940 he was a successful and well connected man both socially and 
politically.  These connections would serve him well for the remainder of his career in 
public life. 
 Claxton’s rise to prominence in Canadian politics was rapid once he secured a 
victory in the 1940 general election for the riding of St. Lawrence-St. George in 
Montreal.
215
  On 6 May 1943, as a rookie MP, he was appointed parliamentary assistant 
to the Privy Council (i.e. King),
216
 and on 13 October 1944 he was named the Minister of 
National Health and Welfare, becoming the youngest member of cabinet.
217
 Entering the 
post-war period, Claxton’s political star was clearly on the rise, a fact that is more 
surprising given Claxton’s tendency to be “extremely impatient, intolerant and 
                                                 
214
 Ibid., pp. 92-94. 
215
 Ibid. p. 90. 
216
 Ibid., p. 110. 
217
 Ibid., p. 126. 
82 
 
judgemental with those he either disagreed with or thought of as less principled than 
he.”218 His political success was a tribute to his drive and ability if not his charisma. 
 Following a re-election victory in the 1945 general election, Claxton’s political 
prominence continued to grow.  He attended the Paris Peace Conference as a Canadian 
delegate and came face to face for the first time with the leaders of the Soviet Union.  
Through his observations at the peace conference, he became convinced that the 
Communist Bloc and the West were destined to be irretrievably at odds.  He became 
further convinced that the Soviet Union was not particularly interested in establishing and 
promoting a lasting peace in the post-war period.
219
  These views would inform Claxton’s 
position throughout his career when it came to communists and the threat that they posed 
to Canadian society. 
 In December 1946 Claxton was named Minister of National Defence, replacing 
D.C. Abbott.
220
  Under Abbott, National Defence had begun the process of 
demobilisation with the end of hostilities.  By default the goal of demobilisation was to 
create three smaller services capable of performing a number of different roles.  As they 
had been during the war, however, the three services remained rivals for scant resources 
rather than partners in a common enterprise.
221
  Given the unexpectedly sudden end of 
the war against Japan, it is hardly surprising that the planning process was somewhat ad 
hoc in nature.  It would be Claxton’s task to bring some order to the chaos of 
demobilisation. 
                                                 
218
 Ibid., p. 95. 
219
 Ibid., p. 150. 
220
 Abbott had replaced J.L. Ralston as minister in 1944 when Ralston resigned his position.  The 
resignation is somewhat questionable as Ralston had supplied a letter or resignation earlier which had not 
been acted upon but was suddenly accepted long after its initial proffer when King and Ralston disagreed 
on the conscription issue.  (Milner, Canada's Navy, p. 160). 
221
 Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
83 
 
 The Department of National Defence would be a very different place under 
Caxton than it had been during the Second World War, when each of the services had 
been represented by its own Minister.  These Ministers, Angus Macdonald in the case of 
the RCN, represented the interests of their respective services in the competition for the 
resources needed to fight the war.  In the case of the RCN, then, Angus Macdonald was 
very much the navy’s minister in government and to a great extent allowed the Naval 
Staff to dictate naval policy.  While the relationship was far from perfect, the RCN could 
count on MacDonald to lobby on its behalf and to protect its interests.
222
   
 When Claxton took over the defence portfolio, he came to the job with a very 
different mandate.  Mackenzie King had decided in the aftermath of the war to emulate 
the approach being taken by the British government and appoint one minister responsible 
for national defence overall, and do away with service-based ministries.  King also gave 
Claxton, as the new minister, specific directions as to what was expected of him.  He was 
to “reassert government control” over the military, integrate the three services where 
possible, and save money as much as possible without sacrificing Canada’s security.  
King also made Claxton aware of his strident opposition to aircraft carriers and his view 
that the RCN should be primarily a coastal defence force.
223
  With his marching orders in 
hand, Claxton proceeded to his new post determined to carry them out to the best of his 
ability. 
While the budgets for the services had been, for all practical purposes, unlimited 
during the war years, in the post-war period austerity became the new focus.  Claxton’s 
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first order of business was to cut the budgets of all three services as part of the overall 
government program to reduce military spending and increase spending on social 
programs designed to move Canada into a post-war society.  D.C. Abbott, who had 
become the Minister of Finance after being replaced by Claxton at National Defence, 
demanded an immediate reduction of more than fifty per cent in defence expenditures for 
the 1947-1948 budget year.  While there had been competition for resources during the 
war, the competition would become much more serious in the post-war period as the 
budgets allocated to the military became much more finite.
224
 
 Claxton’s first order of business was to impose the stamp of his personality on the 
services and their chiefs, particularly those of the RCN.  To accomplish this, his first act 
as Minister was to move his office into Naval Service Headquarters, which at the time 
was located in several temporary buildings on Elgin Street in Ottawa.
225
  By doing so, 
Claxton clearly indicated that, unlike Angus MacDonald, he would be directly involved 
in the daily operations of the RCN headquarters, and not simply a conduit for naval 
policies and requests.  He also sought to impress on the RCN leadership the fact that he 
was arriving as a leader, and would not visit them as a supplicant, a position that must 
have been very clear to the RCN leadership as Claxton became a daily presence in their 
lives. 
 The process of moving itself was also revealing.  While his presence in the 
building was not openly objected to, and he described his welcome as “warm,” his 
recollection of the event in his memoirs is telling.  When he arrived at his new offices, he 
was congratulated on “joining the Navy.”  Upon suggesting that the move could be 
                                                 
224
 Lund, p. 117. 
225
 Claxton Papers, Memoirs, MG32 B5, Vol. 221, pp. 837-838. 
85 
 
accomplished with minimal disruption by “moving a few ‘partitions’” he recalled that 
“the naval brass fainted at the use of such a land-lubbery word as ‘partition.’  When they 
recovered they rose saluting in their quaint naval way saying ‘Bulkheads, sir, 
bulkheads.’”226  By his own admission, this demonstrated that the “Navy was in a 
different world from the army.”227  The description of the event, however, also indicates 
that while Claxton was prepared to acknowledge the unique culture and traditions of the 
RCN, he had a reasonably low opinion of them, and would not permit himself to be 
bullied by the naval chiefs.  He would, in his subsequent career as Minister of National 
Defence, make this abundantly clear on numerous occasions and particularly in his 
handling of the 1949 "incidents." 
 With a new minister came new policies.  While the RCN had been dreaming of a 
balanced post-war fleet capable of a variety of operations, Claxton had a very different 
view of what the post-war RCN would look like.  Given the budgetary constraints that he 
faced in the aftermath of the Second World War, Claxton saw the RCN as more of a 
training organisation rather than as an operational fleet.  The simple reality of the post-
war budgetary allocation process was that there simply were not sufficient funds 
available to the RCN to upgrade its training and living facilities and to crew and maintain 
the post-war fleet that the naval staff had envisioned.  Mackenzie King and his successors 
as Prime Minister, quite understandably, were anxious to switch their spending priorities 
from the military to social programs in order to speed recovery from the privations of 
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war.  All of Canada’s armed services would be affected by this decision, but none more 
than the RCN.
228
 
 The most immediate and obvious impact of the post-war budgetary constraints 
was, of course, in the size of the fleet that the government deemed sustainable.  The 
extent of the new limitations became apparent in the preparation of the naval estimates 
for 1947.  From the balanced fleet envisioned in the immediate post-war period, the RCN 
would be reduced to a "rump" of its former self.  It would now consist of one light fleet 
carrier (HMCS Magnificent acquired in March of 1948), one cruiser and fewer than five 
destroyers.  From Claxton’s perspective this force would be sufficient to fulfil the RCN’s 
new primary role as a training fleet.  From an operational perspective, the RCN would 
occupy largely the same function that it had during the war, and would be specialised in 
anti-submarine, coastal defence and escort functions.
229
  The grumbling from the naval 
staff was loud both over the size reductions and over the absence of any clear operational 
mission beyond training reserves and escort duties.
230
  What was clear, however, was that 
there was new leadership in the RCN and that changes were going to come. 
 Claxton’s changes did not end with a smaller fleet and a new mission.  In an effort 
to make Canada’s military more efficient, he also continued the process of unifying the 
command structures of the navy, army and air force and in rationalising the rank 
structures of all three, as King had instructed.  This process had been started by Abbott 
and continued apace under Claxton’s watch.  Although the army and air force had quite 
closely harmonised their non-Commissioned rank structure in the immediate post-war 
period in line with the army’s seven-tier rank structure, the navy had resisted this change 
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and retained its five-tier system.  The chief difference between the two structures was that 
the army/air force had two levels for the sergeant (petty-officer) rank and two for the 
warrant (chief petty-officer) ranks.  The navy initially resisted harmonising its rank 
structure as the naval staff believed that the traditional five-tier rank structure provided 
their personnel with the training and skill that produced good leaders.  The naval staff felt 
that by having fewer non-Commissioned ranks, those promoted to them would have had 
the opportunity to develop the skills they would need to perform effectively in them.
231
 
 The post-war changes in the military budgeting structure, however, caused the 
naval staff to reconsider its position.  During the war each service had submitted its own 
budget for consideration by the government.  The post-war move including all three 
services under the overall umbrella of the Ministry of National Defence meant that only 
one budgetary estimate would be submitted for all three services.  Each service would 
then receive a share of the total amount granted.  In terms of budgeting for personnel, 
however, this created an inequity.  The three services would submit one estimate for the 
costs of personnel salaries and benefits.  The amount eventually approved by the 
government, almost always less than the amount requested, would be then divided 
between the three services.  With a larger number of non-Commissioned ranks, and 
consequently of non-Commissioned personnel, the army and air force received, at least in 
the view of the naval staff, a disproportionately large share of the budget for paying 
salaries as the army and air force would require more of the available funds just to 
maintain their existing structure.  This realisation led the naval staff to move to an 
adoption of the seven-tier rank structure for non-Commissioned personnel in the 1946-
1947 budgeting year.  While there is no evidence that this change of mind resulted from 
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Claxton’s direct involvement, he would certainly have approved of and been pleased with 
the decision, as the navy thereby moved one step closer to unification with the other two 
services.
232
 
 While the decision to move to the seven-tier structure made sense in the short 
term, it had longer term ramifications that would prove significant over the long run.  
Unlike the army and air force, naval vessels had a finite personnel capacity.  In short, 
there are only so many men that can effectively fit on a ship before they begin to get in 
one another’s way.  The institution of the new rank structure led to the promotion of a 
large number of leading and able seamen to the new junior non-Commissioned ranks, and 
the corresponding promotion of existing non-Commissioned personnel to more senior 
ranks.  This combined with a dearth in new recruits entering the navy created a situation 
in which there were far too many non-Commissioned officers aboard RCN ships, and not 
nearly enough able and ordinary seamen.  Given the crucial role of the able and ordinary 
seamen in performing many of the daily mundane tasks required in the running of a ship, 
this was not a tenable situation.
233
 To make matters worse, many of the personnel newly 
promoted to supervisory roles lacked the training and experience necessary to make them 
effective supervisors. 
 Another area in which Claxton’s influence was keenly felt was in the area of 
naval education.  Claxton believed that the traditional methods by which naval officers 
were educated was poorly suited for the post-war RCN.  While undoubtedly well 
intentioned, Claxton was directly challenging the way in which the senior naval 
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leadership had been trained and educated.  It was, he believed, inadequate and in need of 
address.
234
 
 Since its inception the RCN had enjoyed a somewhat complicated relationship 
with the issue of the formal education of its officers, more particularly in terms of how 
much was required.  The Naval Service Act, which founded the RCN as an institution in 
1911, required the establishment of a naval college in Canada for the training of 
Canadian naval officers which was to be similar in structure and function to the Royal 
Naval College in England.  The Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) was duly 
established and began its task of training future naval officers in 1918.
235
 
 The curriculum at the RNCC was designed to be completed in two years to be 
followed by service aboard RN ships to round out the training.  It featured a variety of 
subjects including history, English, French and German in addition to mathematics and 
navigation.  The most important course taught was seamanship, as the primary purpose of 
the RNCC was the training of naval officers who would serve afloat.  Given the fact that 
the fledgling RCN was designed to parallel the RN, it is not surprising that RN methods 
and traditions dominated the RNCC.  Following the formal portion of the training, the 
prospective naval officers would complete their education through a lengthy 
apprenticeship served aboard an active ship.
236
 
 The RNCC continued to operate until 1922.  In that year, due to severe budget 
cuts, the government made the decision to close the facility and once again to rely on the 
                                                 
234
 Bercuson, p. 181; William A. March, "A Canadian Departure:  The Evolution of HMCS Royal Roads, 
1942-1948," in Crickard, Huebert and Hadley eds.  A Nation's Navy:  In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, 
(Montreal:  McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), pp. 297-299; Claxton Speech to Senior Naval 
Officer's Conference, 1 November, 1949, MG32 B5 Vol. 199. 
235
 Ibid. 
236
 Ibid., pp. 299-300. 
90 
 
RN to be solely responsible for the education of Canadian naval officers.  During its 
existence the RNCC trained one hundred fifty-eight officers.  Of these sixty were still 
serving at the outbreak of war in 1939.  They provided the nucleus around which the 
rapid expansion of the RCN was based, and it is hard to see how it would have been 
possible without them.
237
 
 In 1940, with the wartime expansion of the RCN, Admiral Nelles and the naval 
staff decided that the time was right to open a new naval college.  The motivation behind 
this decision was largely based on self-preservation.  Having witnessed first-hand the 
near extinction of the RCN, Nelles realised that in order to ensure survival after the war 
the RCN would have to remain a larger force with more ships and more shore 
establishments.  Well trained officers would be needed to run them and Nelles and his 
colleagues believed that a naval college was necessary to achieve an appropriate level of 
training for Canadian officers.  The war meant that the RCN could no longer rely on 
overburdened RN facilities for training and would have to conduct it domestically.
238
 
 As a result of Nelles' lobbying and Angus Macdonald's willingness to listen, 
HMCS Royal Roads was Commissioned in October of 1942.  The new training 
establishment was to function much like the RNCC and would by necessity and by design 
be based on the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth.  Macdonald and the naval staff hoped 
that Royal Roads would continue to train Canadian naval officers for the foreseeable 
future.
239
 
 By 1945, however, problems began to arise.  In October of that year questions 
were raised in Parliament concerning, among other things, the degree to which the RCN 
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acted in conformity  with the RN in matters of tradition and discipline.
240
  Since 
discipline and particularly tradition were learned in the naval college, the criticism was 
aimed directly at the system of naval education. 
 As a result of continual pressure, and because it meshed with his goals of creating 
a tri-service structure for the Canadian military, Claxton changed the orientation of Royal 
Roads away from its naval roots and towards a more general educational function for 
military officers.  To this end, then, it was re-opened in September of 1947 as a combined 
RCN-RCAF training facility.  Both the navy and air force supported the idea of getting 
trainees into service conditions as quickly as possible in order to maximise their useful 
service career.  Both services therefore resisted the requirement of a university degree as 
a prerequisite for non-technical officers.  By 1948 Royal Roads had again been 
transformed into a combined services college and was offering cadets, who were entering 
at a much later age than they had at the RNCC, an education that was the equivalent to 
that available at a university.  Only cadets who had selected the executive branch for their 
service went to sea after two years.
241
 
 Resistance to a formal educational structure and to the university degree as the 
base standard for education was not to say, however, that the RCN was in any way anti-
intellectual.  It is also an error to view the training structure as a mindless parroting of the 
RN.  The reality is, of course, much more nuanced.  In resisting the requirement of a 
university education for all officer cadets the RN was focusing its attention on the 
practical problem of manning an operational fleet as quickly and efficiently as possible.  
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The cadre of experienced personnel that it had been relying on had not materialised as 
reserve officers re-entered civilian life.  New officers were going to have to be trained 
from scratch, and for officers in non-technical areas the naval staff felt that the best way 
to learn how to run a ship was to run a ship.  Thus, for non-technical personnel, senior 
officers felt that advanced formal education made little sense.  The decision was made to 
focus on sea time over classroom time.  In the circumstances this decision was rational 
and made considerable sense.
242
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Soul Searching 
 
 
 In addition to the internal and external challenges in perception and policy which 
faced the RCN in the aftermath of the Second World War, there was mounting evidence 
in the immediate post-war period to suggest that morale within the RCN itself was failing 
rapidly.  A critical manifestation was difficulty in recruiting and retaining personnel.  It 
was also clear that the problems would have to be addressed if the RCN was going to 
remain combat ready and able to perform even the more limited role as a training cadre 
envisioned by Claxton.  The manner in which Canada's senior naval leadership responded 
to these challenges would set the stage for the 'incidents' of 1949 and the Mainguy 
Commission that followed. 
 The first hint of trouble initially seemed to be reasonably innocuous.  On 8 July 
1947 Commander E.W. Finch-Noyes, the commanding officer of HMCS Stadacona, 
which was the main east-coast training establishment, reported a surprising reluctance of 
instructional personnel to attend a gunnery course offered in Britain: four of the six petty 
officers and chief petty officers eligible for the course had expressed a desire to withdraw 
from it. On 25 July 1947 a similar report was sent by Acting Captain D. L. Raymond, the 
Director of Weapons and Tactics, regarding the withdrawal of three of the six eligible 
94 
 
candidates for a gunnery course on the west coast.
 243
  The officers involved were 
understandably alarmed that a course that was, in the words of Captain Raymond, "at one 
time...considered the peak of the seamen profession and was the goal of all gunnery 
personnel -- now...is not sufficiently compelling to draw 50% of the eligible 
candidates."
244
  This posed a serious problem for the RCN, as the instructors who refused 
the course had acquired their knowledge of gunnery during the war and it had since 
become considerably outdated with advances in technology.  To compound the problem, 
the demands on instructors meant that they did not have time to upgrade their skills.  To 
make matters worse, the shortage of gunnery instructors was symptomatic of an acute 
shortage of trained instructors in all branches of the navy.
245
   
 The reasons provided by the participants themselves for refusing the course were 
telling.  Commander Finch-Noyes, who appears to have spoken to the men involved, 
identified three main reasons for the withdrawals.  First, the gunnery course was 
scheduled to last at least one full year, and yet no arrangements were made to allow for 
the dependents of the married men attending the course to accompany them.  Secondly, 
upon completion of the course, the candidates would enjoy considerably greater 
responsibilities in training and supervising their comrades, but would only receive a 
modest ($8 per month) increase in pay, making the effort in taking the course hardly 
worth the financial reward.  The final reason for the withdrawals was linked to the 
creation of armourers, who maintained rather than operated weapons, as a trade group 
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within the RCN.  Armourers had considerably less responsibility than gunner specialists, 
a higher trade group pay structure and were trained in Canada.  Considering the 
circumstances it is no surprise that senior members of the lower deck chose that branch as 
a path of advancement.
246
  While the lack of enthusiasm for the gunnery course was not 
in itself a major crisis for the RCN, the senior naval leadership correctly interpreted it, 
when combined with the poor recruitment and retention numbers, as the harbinger of very 
serious difficulties. 
 In fact the memoranda written by Raymond and Finch-Noyes had sparked a flurry 
of activity at Naval Service Headquarters.  Captain H.F. Pullen, the Director of the Naval 
Reserve, expressed his alarm in a memorandum of his own to the Chief of Naval 
Personnel dated 11 August 1947.  He fixed the blame for the morale problems that 
appeared to be plaguing the RCN squarely on the new pay structure which had been 
recently introduced.  In Pullen's view the new pay structure, with its differentiation 
between the "user" branch (i.e. those personnel who actually used the equipment) and the 
"maintainer" branch (i.e. the technical specialists who ensured that the equipment worked 
as it was intended) placed far too much emphasis on the "maintainers" by rewarding them 
with higher pay based on their technical ability.  This was done at the expense of the 
"user" branch which was responsible for leadership and actually fighting the ship.
247
   
 On the same date Lt. Commander W.H. Wilson, the officer in charge of seamen 
personnel, penned his own memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel 
concerning the "low morale known to exist" in the RCN.  While he did not specifically 
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identify the new pay structure as the problem, he argued that pay and working conditions 
were behind the problems both in maintaining morale and in recruiting personnel to fill 
the RCN's requirements.  According to Wilson, the pay and working conditions in the 
RCN did not compare favourably with civilian jobs.  Navy pay had not kept up with the 
high cost of living on both coasts, where conditions were still more difficult because of 
an acute housing shortage and the lack of naval quarters for married personnel.
248
  The 
loss of special allowances and badge pay and the lack of any travel assistance for 
personnel traveling home on leave, left the average sailor in a position at or near the 
poverty line.  Wilson was prescient in pointing out that, because of the efforts by the men 
to earn more money, the structure of the RCN had trended towards a large number of 
higher rates, which left fewer people to perform the seamen's and domestic duties aboard 
ship.  Thus, while the amount of work necessary for the maintenance and upkeep of the 
ship had remained the same, it was being shared by fewer and fewer of the junior 
personnel.  This, Wilson suggested, was bound to be the source of problems.
249
  
 Commander William Strange, the Director of Naval Information, also weighed in 
on the morale issue.  Strange, tasked with maintaining the public image of the RCN, was 
concerned with the potential impact of a collapse in morale on the RCN's recruiting 
efforts and more broadly on the general perception of the RCN as an institution.  In a 
memorandum dated 12 August 1947, he correctly argued that maintaining a positive 
public image of the RCN was more difficult in the post-war world than it had previously 
been.  During the war the purpose of the RCN was clear and the need to spend money on 
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defence was unquestioned, but there was no obvious need for a capable navy post-war, 
not least because of the need to slash defence expenditures for economic recovery from 
the war.
250
  As there had been essentially no RCN to speak of in the inter-war years, the 
challenges of maintaining a public and institutional sense of purpose for the RCN and of 
encouraging spending on the naval defence of Canada were beyond the practical 
experience of Canada's post-war naval leadership.   
 What Commander Strange's memorandum made abundantly clear was that from a 
public relations perspective, the morale issue had to be addressed immediately.  He 
pointed out that the "present condition of brittle, if not actually low, morale [could] not be 
concealed indefinitely," and expressed concern that the morale conditions in the RCN 
would become widely known.  The Montreal Standard had, he warned, had written an 
article on the state of morale in the RCN but had been persuaded not to print it.  He held 
out little hope that disclosure could be delayed indefinitely, and correctly cautioned that 
once the morale problems in the RCN became public knowledge, it would no longer be a 
matter of whether the reports could be refuted: irreparable damage would have been done 
by the reports themselves.
251
 
 Commander Strange suggested that the RCN stop recruiting publicity based on a 
comparison between navy careers and civilian jobs.  He argued that such a comparison 
was both impossible and unrealistic.  Instead, he advocated placing more emphasis on 
patriotic duty and the sense of purpose that being a member of the RCN could provide.  
He noted that both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy used this approach with 
some success and that both of them experienced increased resilience as a result.  He also 
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urged the production of an indoctrination booklet for new recruits which would both give 
the recruits an idea of what to expect from their officers and would reinforce for the 
officers their responsibility for the welfare of the men under their command.
252
 
 Strange further recommended that ongoing communication between the naval 
leadership and the lower deck be improved.
253
  He suggested the production of a monthly 
magazine for the lower deck.  This magazine would include information from the naval 
leadership, presumably through the Office of Naval Information, concerning efforts being 
made to improve the living and working conditions in the navy.  In addition the magazine 
would include news releases from smaller regional newspapers to allow the men of the 
lower deck to remain connected to their home-towns.  In doing so, Strange believed, the 
sense of isolation experienced by men far from home would be alleviated.
254
   
Lt. Cmdr. P.D. Taylor, the former Executive Officer of HMCS Givenchy, 
weighed in on the morale problems in a memorandum of 22 August 1947.
255
  Lt. Cmdr. 
Taylor’s comments are of particular interest given his recent exposure to shipboard 
conditions and the views of the lower deck aboard Givenchy.  He identified a number of 
causes of discontent among the members of the lower deck, agreeing with the comments 
made by his staff colleagues.  Substandard living conditions, particularly aboard ship, the 
removal of the bonus pay for good conduct badges and the lack of travel concessions for 
personnel going on leave all combined, in his view, to create an overall decline in the 
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morale of RCN personnel.  This decline was exacerbated by the poor communication of 
naval policy to the sailors of the lower deck, so that even if steps were being taken to 
alleviate the problems, the members of the lower deck remained completely unaware of 
them.  Interestingly pay issues, according to Taylor, were not an immediate issue.
256
 
 The failure to address  the issues which concerned the men of the lower deck, or 
at the very least to keep them posted about the efforts being made, were having a 
grievous impact on the lower deck, in Taylor’s view.  The failures of the naval staff had 
led to a fear that the RCN was being permitted to lapse back into the doldrums of the 
inter-war period.  The fear among the ordinary sailors was that the failures were 
symptomatic of governmental indifference to the RCN and that they were in the initial 
stages of a long slow slide into obscurity and irrelevance.  This made it difficult for the 
RCN to both recruit new personnel and to retain those personnel who had either remained 
in the RCN or joined it after the war.  If they were destined to be unemployed five or ten 
years down the road, then the pursuit of a naval career increasingly seemed to the men of 
the lower deck to be a waste of time.
257
  In the long run this situation would lead to the 
loss of trained and experienced personnel who could form a cadre on which a larger navy 
could be based if necessary. It would also limit the quality and ability of new recruits to 
whom a naval career would appear attractive. 
 One of the most comprehensive of the early reports was that prepared by Acting 
Captain D.L. Raymond, the Director of Weapons and Tactics, in response to instructions 
that had been sent to each staff director to comment on the possible causes of wastage in 
the RCN.  He divided his report into eleven separate sections and provided comments and 
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recommendations on each.  He also went so far as to include comments by his officers, 
who he had canvassed for their views, even in cases where he did not agree with them.  
All of this, Raymond hoped, would foster discussion and allow for the improvement of 
the "present critical situation."
258
 
 The first area addressed by Raymond, living conditions aboard ship, was one 
which had not been raised by any of the previous memoranda.  Describing living 
conditions both ashore and afloat as being "of a low standard," and acknowledging that 
redesigning and modifying the ships currently in service was impractical, he argued that 
there were a number of things that could be done to improve the habitability of the ships.  
Given the general good health of the naval personnel serving afloat, these changes were 
not critical to the physical wellbeing of the crews, but were "serious...in as far as they 
affect morale [emphasis in original]. "  The simple fact was, in Raymond's view, that the 
average rating was unable to maintain the level of cleanliness and enjoyed less appetizing 
food than he received at home.  This had a corresponding negative impact on morale.  "If 
the conditions of living are right ashore and afloat [however] the sailor will be happy in 
his lot."
259
 
 The solutions that Raymond proposed to improve the habitability of the ships 
started with a recommendation that requests for Alterations and Additions (As and As, 
that is changes to the equipment and structure of the ships) regarding habitability be more 
efficiently and positively considered.  As it was, such requests invariably ran into a 
                                                 
258
 "Memorandum from D.L. Raymond A/Capt. to ACNS, 5 September, 1947," RG 24 Acc. 83-84/167, 
Vol. 1596,  (14 pp.). 
259
 Ibid., p. 2. 
101 
 
miasma of bureaucratic red tape and were never approved.  This amounted to effectively 
ignoring habitability issues.
260
 
 Raymond recommended a number of minor alterations immediately be made to 
the ships which would pay dividends in morale improvement that would render any 
expense worthwhile.  The bathroom facilities, for example, should be modernized to 
include stainless steel or porcelain wash basins with running water, replacing the tin 
basins to which hot and cold water had to be carried for every use.  More adequate 
laundry facilities should be provided to replace the one washing machine and one dryer 
currently provided on cruisers for a crew of 700 men.
261
  He recommended that efforts be 
made to improve kit stowage arrangements so that wet clothing (a common occurrence at 
sea), and particularly great coats, could dry properly and would not need to be replaced as 
often, at the expense of the rating.  Finally, he argued for the provision of free movies to 
the men serving aboard, perhaps with the insertion of a short training film at the 
beginning to provide the maximum benefit to the RCN.
262
  All of these recommendations 
were reasonably minor in nature in the grand scheme of things, but would render the life 
of the ordinary seaman much more bearable. 
 In a similar vein, Raymond suggested improving the communication of orders and 
instructions, which "pour out at a speed beyond most limits of understanding," to allow 
for a simpler communication of them to the officers and men they affected.
263
  He also 
recommended an expansion of the existing canteen system, both ashore and afloat, to 
increase the range of goods offered at prices affordable to the average Canadian sailor.  In 
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this he looked to the American PX system as an example.
264
  Both of these measures 
were designed to make life in the navy a more affordable, less confusing, and generally 
more positive experience. 
 On a broader level, Raymond also addressed changes in the duties of the seaman 
which he felt made the position unattractive to new recruits.  In addition to his ordinary 
duties in working the ship, the seaman also was required to act as the messman for the 
senior ratings, officers and others, to act as messenger when required, to perform most of 
the sweeping duties for the heads and bathrooms, and to perform other duties that he 
categorized as "dogs' body" work.  While these duties had always existed aboard ship, the 
increase in number of the technical complement, who did not share in these duties, had 
grown in proportion to the seamen, leaving the vast majority of such duties to a small 
portion of the ship's complement.  As Raymond eloquently summarized the problem:  "it 
is difficult to explain to seamen and stokers that they are the only men in the complement 
possessed of the correct lack of intelligence, qualifying them for these duties."  If morale 
were to be maintained, Raymond recommended that such duties be shared reasonably by 
all branches.
265
 
 Raymond's memorandum was the first of the early analyses to focus on the 
leadership issues confronting the RCN.  In his own words: 
 Officers receive their training during their first five years of naval service and 
then are branded as good officers (meaning to a certain extent good leaders), promising 
officers (meaning they will become good leaders), or poor officers who will never be 
anything very much.  The last group, the bad ones remain (no matter how bad) in 
positions of leadership until they reach the age of forty five [sic] at least.  In this way the 
service may have poor leaders in positions where good leaders are required for as long as 
twenty years.  
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His recommendation for those officers who lacked leadership ability was, not 
surprisingly, that they be removed from the RCN, or at the very least moved to positions 
where they would do no harm to the morale of the men.
266
  He further recommended that 
more be done to track the progress of new entries into the seaman branch in order to 
identify those men who possessed the leadership and other qualities required of an 
officer, with a view to regularising the promotion of men from the lower deck into 
positions of increasing responsibility.  In suggesting this he advocated the view that every 
new entrant be considered as a potential officer until he proved himself incapable of 
being one.
267
  These ideas, while sensible from a morale point of view, were bound to be 
seen as revolutionary in some quarters. 
 Coincidentally, Raymond's views received immediate support from a number of 
first-hand observers of service conditions.  On 5 September 1947, the Commanding 
Officer of the destroyer  HMCS Nootka, Lieutenant-Commander L.G. Stirling, forwarded 
to the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (Rear-Admiral Taylor) reports from three 
individuals who had recently been at sea either aboard HMCS Nootka or her sister ship 
HMCS Haida.  These men were Lt. R.W. Timbrell and Chaplain J.L. Graham, both in 
Nootka, and Surgeon-Lieutenant Robinson in Haida.  Graham's report pointed out that 
the major problems affecting morale in the lower deck were the living conditions 
(including cramped quarters, the low quality and poor presentation of the food and the 
lack of a drying area for wet gear), the lack of travel warrants (meaning that the men 
could not afford to go home on leave) and inadequate married quarters ashore.
268
  These 
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concerns were echoed by Robinson, who included in his report the recommendation that 
dependents of naval personnel receive medical and dental care, and that a Post Exchange 
system be instituted.
269
  Lt. Timbrell also identified the poor living conditions as the chief 
issue for the men serving afloat, but added the lack of information about future plans and 
insufficient training in the "traditions, pride and responsibilities" of the RCN to the list.
270
  
Thus, the first recommendations based on actual conversations with serving ratings 
matched very closely the problems identified by Raymond.   
 Of even more interest in the reports of Graham, Robinson and Timbrell are their 
comments on the effects of officer leadership on the morale of the men.  Both Graham 
and Robinson were emphatic in stating that the officers aboard Nootka and Haida were 
not the source of any morale problems.
271
  Timbrell in his letter is entirely silent on the 
issue of the officers' attitudes.  For his part, Rear-Admiral C.R.H. Taylor, commanding 
officer, Atlantic coast, in a memorandum to the Naval Secretary in January 1948 
dismissed the comments of both Graham and Robinson, finding both men to be 
"unqualified to offer any meaningful comment." It can, however, be argued that, when it 
came to commenting on the ships' officers, they may have in fact been the most qualified.  
It is highly unlikely that the men of the lower deck would have spoken to Lt. Timbrell, a 
serving RCN officer, freely and openly about the conduct of his colleagues.  Surgeon-
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Lieutenant Robinson and Chaplain Graham, on the other hand, would have been viewed, 
because of their specialised positions, as almost outsiders.  The men of the lower deck, 
then, would in all probability have been more comfortable speaking openly to Graham 
and Robinson about their grievances, regardless of Rear-Admiral Taylor's views of their 
qualifications. 
 The initial reaction of the RCN's senior leadership to the crisis in wastage was 
well intentioned but scattered and disorganised.  Each of the various department heads 
and senior officers had their own ideas about what lay behind the morale crisis and how 
to solve it.  While there were some disagreements on minor points, and while some 
sought to blame lack of discipline in the home or the wives of serving personnel,
272
 what 
was clear was that considerable effort was being made to address the issues.   
 The chief difficulty in solving the problems was, however, the simple fact that 
nobody had really asked the men of the lower deck what they thought the problems were.  
As Acting Captain G.A. Worth, the Director of Signals, pointed out in a memorandum of 
16 September 1947, the Naval Staff was out of touch with conditions afloat, with no 
effective way of gaining the information they needed about the living conditions aboard 
ship.  His recommendation of the appointment of an Inspector General of the Navy,
273
 
while unquestionably a good idea in the long term, was not something that would help to 
solve the immediate problem. 
 While a detailed survey of the lower deck may not have been possible, some of 
the confusion was alleviated by a detailed memorandum prepared by Rear-Admiral 
Houghton who was the vice-chief of the Naval Staff.  This memorandum distilled the 
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recommendations made by the various division chiefs and was designed to provide a 
starting point for solutions.  In his handwritten notes accompanying the memorandum, 
Vice-Admiral Houghton emphasised the urgent nature of the problem.  He acknowledged 
that "action in the matter [of morale improvement] has been very slow" and hoped that 
the collation of the various reports would help to hasten a solution.
274
 
 Houghton's report was as comprehensive as it was possible to make it without 
soliciting a direct contribution of the men of the lower deck, and incorporated many of 
the recommendations made by the senior naval staff through their various memoranda.  
There are, however, a number of additions which are Houghton's alone and which either 
expand upon the recommendations of others or are new ideas that had not previously 
been raised.  In presenting his findings, Houghton divided his comments into four broad 
sections:  (i) instability in the service as part of the "normal aftermath of war;" (ii) pay 
and allowances; (iii) post-war changes in service conditions; and (iv) the training of 
officers and men.
275
  It is worth considering each of these in some detail. 
 One of the problems arising with the end of hostilities was a shortage of decent 
housing for married ratings.  In many cases "ratings and their families are living in 
upstairs garrets with bathroom privileges and no culinary facilities other than a hot plate."  
This, combined with the frequency of postings of personnel to different areas of the 
country, led to pressure being exerted on naval ratings to obtain their discharge from the 
service.  While he acknowledged that the service could do nothing directly to alleviate 
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the dissatisfaction of these "young wives," he recommended an increase in the housing 
allowance for married ratings as an effective measure to address the problem.
276
 
 In a similar vein, Houghton emphasised the poor living conditions throughout the 
RCN , both ashore and afloat, which he argued was a particular difficulty given  that the 
ratings had been "repeatedly" assured that they had been brought into line with civilian 
conditions.
277
  The cheerfulness with which the men of the lower deck were prepared to 
put up with privations in time of war no longer appertained in the post-war period, and 
some urgent action was necessary if the dissatisfaction was to be contained.
278
  Failure to 
do so would not only reduce the morale of the serving sailors, it would also exacerbate 
the retention and recruiting problems the RCN was experiencing. 
 One of the areas in which Houghton's memorandum was in accord with those of 
the department heads was in the area of messing facilities.  He strongly favoured the 
cafeteria-style messing arrangements used by the United States Navy.  While this was 
impractical in the ships as they were configured at the time, he recommended that it be 
incorporated in future construction.  While the change represented a break from the 
tradition of the Royal Navy, Houghton was not wedded to that tradition and argued that 
the cafeteria system was more suited to the expectations and tastes of Canadian ratings.  
He also pointed out that such a system had been successfully implemented in the RCN's 
larger shore establishments and to a limited extent aboard HMCS Warrior.
279
  Houghton 
at least, who as a senior officer had received his early training with the Royal Navy, was 
prepared to consider changes to the RCN's way of doing things that defied RN tradition. 
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 Houghton agreed with earlier recommendations concerning laundry facilities and 
facilities for the stowage of kit, particularly greatcoats.  He also agreed with the 
comments made concerning the washing and bathing facilities for the men.  He expressed 
frustration that requests for improvements in that area had "been turned down 
consistently for reasons unknown through apparently some curious theory of economy."  
He recommended the immediate provision of tiled washrooms with hot and cold running 
water.  It was unreasonable to expect the ratings, he argued, to take pride in their 
appearance and their uniform when it was virtually impossible to keep both themselves 
and their kit adequately cleaned.
280
 
 Overall Houghton’s report is a model of objective synthesis.  While there were a 
number of questionable conclusions and recommendations made in the various reports he 
considered, he included them regardless of his personal views.  What the report most 
clearly demonstrates, however, is the desire of the RCN to identify and address the 
growing morale crisis which was manifesting itself in the failure of serving personnel to 
continue their service after their enlistments expired and to seek opportunities for 
advancement in the RCN.  In a system which lacked a centralised structure designed to 
address service conditions, the exercise was by necessity scattered and at times barely 
coherent.  What is clear is that an effort to identify the issues was clearly and 
energetically being made. 
 The response of Vice-Admiral Horace Grant, the CNS, was cautiously supportive.  
In his handwritten notations, Grant indicated his agreement with most of the 
recommendations made.  Prior to passing them on up the line to the minister, however, 
                                                 
280
 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
109 
 
Grant indicated his desire to first pass on his own preliminary paper.
281
  While this 
appears to be a curious statement given the completeness of Houghton’s report, a reading 
of the ‘preliminary report’ in question immediately clears up Grant’s motives. 
 Grant’s report of 8 October, 1947, received by Claxton’s office the next day, 
began innocuously enough.  It identified the chief causes of discontent, including issues 
with pay and the trade group structure, the quality of accommodation and the travel cost 
issues.  The report also confirmed the construction of new and improved accommodation 
ashore in the 1948-1949 naval estimates.  He also acknowledged that habitability afloat 
would have to await new construction, which while appearing reasonable, did clearly 
indicate that new ship construction was something that the RCN would request and 
sooner rather than later.
282
 
 At this point, however, Grant’s memorandum becomes significantly more sinister.  
Grant characterised the crowded conditions aboard RCN ships and lack of amenities as a 
good breeding ground for discontent, "particularly if fostered, as there is reason to 
believe, by paid agents.”  He went on to argue that the elimination of said paid agents 
could only be achieved by the “loyalty of the men themselves and in the absence of a 
higher living wage it [was] essential to consider other amenities.”283  Grant’s reference to 
‘paid agents’ was, of course, a thinly veiled reference to communists and was designed, 
given Claxton’s well known anti-communist position, to get the Minister’s attention, and 
perhaps to frighten him into loosening the purse strings. 
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 The most curious thing about Grant’s ‘paid agent’ argument is that he appears to 
have created it out of thin air and with no supporting evidence.  The idea that paid agents 
were somehow responsible for sowing discontent appears only in Grant’s memorandum 
and is never mentioned in the hundreds of other pages of notes, letters, memoranda and 
documents concerning morale in the RCN.  It appears that the idea had completely failed 
to occur to any other senior naval officer.  While it is impossible to assess why Grant 
included the argument in his memorandum to Claxton, some reasonable speculation is 
possible.   
 Grant, like the rest of the naval staff, dreamed of a blue-water navy for the post-
war period.  Achieving this dream would, of necessity, require the construction of new 
vessels which, with declining military budgets, had become increasingly unlikely.  By 
linking habitability to morale, and indirectly to new construction, Grant hoped that 
Claxton would be sufficiently alarmed to cause him to view the construction requests that 
the Naval Staff was going to propose more favourably.  In these circumstances it made 
perfect sense that Grant send his own ‘preliminary’ report to Claxton before forwarding 
Houghton’s report, which made no mention whatsoever of ‘paid agents.’  Apparently the 
lesson of Percy Nelles’ attempt to end-run the political leadership had not been properly 
learned by the Naval Staff. 
 Perhaps to bolster their position the Naval Staff, in November of 1947, 
Commissioned another report on morale issues affecting the RCN.  Unlike prior reports 
which had been submitted on an ad-hoc basis by well-meaning officers acting on their 
own initiative, the new report would be a comprehensive study of morale issues and 
would be closely directed by the Naval Staff.  Commodore A.M. Hope, the commanding 
111 
 
officer of HMCS Stadacona, was chosen to prepare the report, which was to be submitted 
to the Naval Staff for consideration rather than being widely circulated.
284
 
 The terms of reference under which Commodore Hope was to operate were 
extremely broad.  First he was to examine all of the reports that had been prepared to date 
and to make recommendations as to the improvement of the morale and welfare of the 
officers and men.  Second he was to examine the trade structure and recommend 
alterations which would be acceptable, although not applicable, to the Army and the Air 
Force.  In undertaking his investigations, Commodore Hope was authorised to visit any 
naval establishment, and interview any personnel he thought necessary, and co-opt the 
services of any officer that he believed would be helpful.
285
 Unlike his colleagues, then, 
Commodore Hope was to be given the broadest possible mandate in getting to the bottom 
of the morale issues plaguing the RCN.
286
 
 After what can only have been an extremely busy two months, Commodore Hope 
submitted his completed report to Vice-Admiral Grant on 12 January 1948.  The report 
provided the first direct evidence of input from both junior and senior ratings and officers 
on both coasts.  Hope also provided a useful synthesis of prior reports and, perhaps most 
importantly, an objective pair of fresh eyes.  Hope had just returned from a two-year 
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secondment with the Royal Navy
287
and was new to the issues he was investigating.  As 
such he had no particular ideas or solutions to advocate. 
 Hope divided his findings into three broad sections: officers, senior ratings and 
junior ratings.  With regard to the officers, he began with the assertion that the backbone 
of the service was the cadre of senior officers who had served in the pre-war navy.  Their 
small numbers had, however, drawn the vast majority of them into administrative 
positions, which, he argued, operated to the detriment of the service.  While the group of 
junior officers who had entered the service during the war and the immediate post-war 
period were gradually being absorbed into the naval culture and learning their 
responsibilities with regard to the ratings under their command, they received too little 
guidance from more senior officers.  The senior officers in turn were too buried in 
paperwork to mentor the junior lieutenants.
288
 In Hope’s view, then, the problem was not 
that the junior officers were callous as to the welfare of the lower deck, but rather that 
they had too few senior officers to provide guidance about how the welfare of the ratings 
could be protected and promoted effectively. 
 Among the senior ratings (able seamen and leading seamen) the two main 
problems that arose were pay and living conditions.  Hope focused on the almost 
universal dissatisfaction with the extant trade group structure and support for its 
abolition.  The problems caused by the reorganisation of trade groups had, he found, been 
exacerbated by the withdrawal of travel concessions and pay for good conduct badges.  
This combination left many senior ratings, particularly married ones, having to work 
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second jobs simply to make ends meet.  Similarly, for ratings on sea duty, there was a 
taxable benefit for their living allowance, which seemed absurd to the ratings, given that 
their living space consisted of eighteen inches of hammock space and a place at a table.
289
 
 In terms of living conditions, two findings stand out in Hope’s report.  First the 
majority of senior ratings complained about overcrowding and cramped living spaces 
aboard ship.  Hope concluded that this was due to an increase in the amount of technical 
equipment being carried in hulls never designed to carry it, combined with the increasing 
number of technical specialists aboard to operate the new equipment.  The overcrowding 
issue, in Hope’s view, was urgent and needed to be addressed immediately.290 
 The other major complaint from the senior ratings was, predictably, the food.  
While the quality of the ingredients was good, the quality and quantity of the meals was, 
in Hope’s words, “far from popular.”  It was so unpopular that many of the senior ratings 
he interviewed gave credence to the “unsubstantiated” rumour that the food was better in 
the Halifax jail than in the RCN.
291
  It appeared that navies did in fact sail on their 
stomachs. 
 The morale issues raised by the junior ratings were, for the most part, similar to 
those of their seniors, but Hope did find some unique elements particular to the junior 
ratings.  Many of the junior ratings, particularly new entries, came from “war-broken 
homes,” and were unused to discipline generally, let alone service discipline.  They 
therefore resented taking orders from officers and petty officers that they viewed as 
incompetent, and tended to express that resentment more openly than the senior 
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ratings.
292
  The senior ratings had learned, through experience, how to deal with bad 
officers, the juniors had not. 
 The other issue for the junior ratings was, not surprisingly, pay.  Again, however, 
there were qualitative differences in the complaints of the junior and senior ratings.  For 
the junior ratings the chief problem with the pay scale in the RCN was that it did not 
compare favourably with the pay for similar jobs in ‘civvy street.’  While the pension and 
job security options of a naval career were superior to those in the civilian market,
293
 the 
junior ratings were concerned with the more immediate differences in pay between the 
RCN and similar jobs in a prosperous and expanding civilian marketplace.
294
 
 For married personnel across all three groups Hope discovered another set of 
issues that undermined morale.  Hope found that the quality of accommodation for 
married personnel was poor and expensive compared to the accommodations provided 
both in general and when compared with the married quarters available for personnel in 
the army and air force.  To make matters worse, there were not enough married quarters 
available to meet the demand, leaving many service families at the mercy of civilian 
landlords who charged exorbitant rates for what could generously be called substandard 
accommodation.  To make matters worse no medical care was provided for the 
dependents of service personnel and they were forced to shop for groceries in an 
expensive marketplace.  The failure of the government and the RCN to deal with these 
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issues led to the pervasive sense that the RCN did not care about the welfare of its 
married personnel.
295
   
 Hope’s examination of the trade group structure made plain its universal 
unpopularity among service personnel, particularly in the seamen’s branch.  The poor pay 
scales led many senior ratings to move to the newer trade groups where the pay was 
better, as the highest trade group rating was only available to technical and artisanal 
specialists and was not available to seamen.
296
  This movement led to a shortage of 
experienced ratings in the seamen’s branch, and therefore fewer people to teach new 
entries the seamanship skills necessary to effectively operate the RCN’s ships. 
 To make matters worse, the trade group structure was having a negative impact on 
the division of labour aboard ship.  Members of the technical and artisanal branches were 
increasingly occupied with the specific and specialised tasks and performing fewer and 
fewer of the routine tasks, such as painting and general maintenance.  The general 
maintenance of the ships, then, fell increasingly to the seamen’s branch, out of all 
proportion to its numbers.  If the situation was not addressed, Hope feared, the seamen’s 
branch would become nothing more than “hewers of wood and drawers of water” for the 
technical branches.
297
  This would further deepen the resentment already felt by the men 
of the seamen’s branch and would make recruitment of new members into this branch 
increasingly difficult. 
 The discontent caused by the trade grouping system was, Hope found, so serious 
that he believed that breaking "away from the present inter-service system...[was] a must 
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"[emphasis in original].  There were, as he saw it, two possible alternatives.  First was a 
revision to the traditional system of pay and allowances, including the wartime rank and 
pay structure.  The second alternative was to adopt a system similar to the one used by 
the United States Navy.  Under that system all recruits entered as ordinary seamen and 
were trained for technical specialisation based on interest and aptitude, but only after they 
had learned the seamanship and daily tasks of the seamen's branch.  The recruits were not 
divided at that point based on trade group, nor was pay calculated on that basis.  Pay and 
other compensation were only based on the substantive rates.  Hope himself favoured the 
second alternative as one that was "safe, sure and popular and achieves the object with 
the minimum of paperwork."
298
 
 Attached to Hope's report as an appendix was a report prepared by Admiral M.M. 
Denny of the Royal Navy.  Denny had also been charged with investigating morale and 
service conditions and Hope had become familiar with his report while on secondment to 
the RN.  Hope saw a great deal of similarity between the morale issues of the RN and 
those of the RCN.  He believed that the RCN was dealing with them comparatively well, 
but that there was much to be learned from the experience of the RN.
 299
 
  Denny's report was, like those prepared by Canadian naval officers, an 
unsolicited report.  It was widely distributed to the RCN’s senior leadership.300  The 
comments were so detailed that it would come to be widely referred to as the “Denny 
Report” by senior naval leadership; a designation ordinarily only used for studies 
specifically requested by the Naval Staff.  The fact that Denny would spend the time and 
                                                 
298
 Ibid. 
299
 "Morale, Welfare and Trade Grouping in the Royal Canadian Navy," 12 January, 1948, RG 24 Acc.83-
84/167 Vol. 1596, pp. 8-18. 
300
 “Reconstruction of Naval Personnel,” 29 August, 1947, RG 24 Acc. 83-84/167 Vol. 1596. 
117 
 
energy required to prepare a memorandum of such size and scope was indicative of the 
importance he placed on the morale crisis.  His concern was not unfounded. 
 Denny began with a general criticism of the way personnel decisions had been 
made by the naval staff in the immediate post-war period.  He correctly pointed out that 
during the process of demobilisation, personnel issues in the RN had been dealt with on a 
crisis by crisis basis.  Policy decisions were made quickly and without adequate 
consideration of their overall impact on the efficiency of the RN as a whole.  No effort 
had been made to get to the root of the difficulties being experienced in attracting and 
retaining personnel, at least in part due to the departmental system of naval staff 
organisation.  Policy directives were not responded to in a coordinated and rational way, 
in Denny’s view. There was no central body that dealt with the implementation of 
personnel policy and ensuring that the implementation of personnel policy did not collide 
with the implementation of other policy directives.
301
  The result was the creation and 
implementation of policies on an ad hoc, and frequently contradictory, basis. 
 Very little time was spent by Denny discussing things like living conditions and 
travel allowances, which he seems to have viewed as peripheral to the problem.  He 
argued, instead, that the cause of the morale problems was the pay code.  At its core, 
Denny believed that the changes to the pay code for naval personnel, and the concomitant 
creation of new trade groupings to match those in the army and air force, was an attempt 
to balance “two fundamentally antagonistic views.”302  These views boiled down to the 
question of whether the pay code should drive the structure of the fighting organisation in 
the name of harmonisation, or whether the pay code and service structure should function 
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as the servant of fighting efficiency.  Denny came down squarely on the side of fighting 
efficiency as the primary concern of the RN, and called for a review of the pay code to 
make it more reflective of the naval organisation which was necessary to ensure a fleet 
that was at maximum efficiency as a fighting force.
303
  By abandoning the traditional pay 
structure, the RN had been forced into a position in which the pay structure left it short of 
personnel necessary to adequately fight and maintain its ships. 
 Denny saw no sense in the distinction being drawn in the pay code and the 
organisational structure aboard ship between users of equipment and maintainers.  The 
distinction between the two functions led to many ratings, by virtue of technical 
specialisation, being exempt from participating in the daily work routine about ship.  He 
argued that the user/maintainer distinction should be eliminated and that all ratings 
should participate in the daily chores and tasks required in running a ship.  This would 
create a more efficient fighting organisation and eliminate artificial distinctions between 
ratings.  In addition he recommended the creation of the Quartermaster’s Branch to focus 
on seamanship and leadership as distinct specialisations.  He referred with approval to the 
practice prevalent at the time in the United States Navy, in which the pay received by the 
sailor was based only on the substantive rate of the individual, with the aim being the 
creation of equal conditions of service and prospects in every branch of the service.
304
 
 The similarities between the issues described by Admiral Denny as confronting 
the Royal Navy and those being experienced by the RCN are remarkable.  At any point in 
his report Denny could have been writing about the RCN and Denny's observations were 
certainly relevant to the RCN's situation. 
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 Vice-Admiral Grant saw in Hope's report the opportunity to revisit the rank and 
trade group structure that had rankled for so long.  On 24 January 1948 he fired off a 
memorandum to Brooke Claxton requesting his "concurrence" to the appointment of 
Captain Peers to strike a committee to examine the issue of pay and advancement and to 
reorganise the extant structure if necessary.  It was clear, Grant argued, that the attempt to 
have a parallel pay and advancement system for all three services had failed after a 
twelve month trial.  Morale was suffering.  Grant proposed the inclusion of a 
representative of the USN on the committee, as well as a Treasury Board member.  He 
further proposed that the USN approach to pay structure be used as a model for 
discussion.
305
  Grant believed that he had to move quickly to address a problem that was 
becoming serious both in terms of both morale and operational capability. Grant's 
response was no simple knee-jerk defence of naval tradition, as is evident from his 
willingness to consider American alternatives, but was driven by his concern for the RCN 
as a whole and for its future effectiveness. 
 The ministerial response to Grant's proposal was cool at best.  The Deputy 
Minister of National Defence, Charles Mills Drury, recommended the outright rejection 
of Grant's "request" for a committee to "explore" naval pay and advancement, arguing 
that the government had only just finished harmonising the pay structures, and that there 
was no point reconsidering the principle of harmonisation unless the government was 
willing to do so as a matter of policy.  He also argued that it was "impractical" for one 
service to act alone and that the Army and Air Force were fine with the structure.
306
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 In fact, Grant had not made a "request" at all and had definitely not asked for 
permission to form a committee, but rather for Claxton's "concurrence" in its formation.  
Similarly the proposed committee was not, if Grant's memorandum is read carefully, to 
explore re-structuring; it was to achieve it.  Given that both the Minister and Deputy 
Minister had been lawyers, a profession in which concise and precise language is valued, 
the differences in phrasing between Grant's memorandum and their response were in all 
probability deliberate.  While the differences appear minor on the surface they are 
indicative of a running battle being fought between the Naval Staff and the Department of 
National Defence over the political control of the navy and its future.  Grant would have 
to continue to fight this battle in addition to dealing with the myriad other issues that 
appeared to be plaguing the RCN.  His position was not one to be envied and neither 
Grant nor the Naval Staff, it appeared, was prepared to go down without a fight. 
 As a mark of the man, and regardless of the cool reception that his memorandum 
had received, Grant persisted.  At a 27 January 1948 meeting of the Naval Board received 
their agreement to the terms of reference for the formation of a committee to review 
advancement and conditions of service in the RCN.  The mandate of the committee was 
to report as to why the extant Trade Group system was unsatisfactory to the RCN; to 
report on whether the service would be best served by a system which "facilitated" 
equality of pay and advancement to men of all branches of the RCN; and whether a 
system similar to that employed by the USN would be an appropriate model.  The 
guiding principles that the committee was to rely on included the desire to increase the 
specialisation of the seamen's branch, and that the 'user' duties aboard ship should be 
more equitably shared between the technical and seaman's branches.  The committee was 
121 
 
to be established and chaired by Commander Peers.
307
  The establishment of the 
committee was a clear signal to the Department of National Defence, and Claxton in 
particular, that in this instance Grant and the Naval Staff were not prepared to take 'no' 
for an answer.   
 By March, Peers' committee
308
 had already prepared its first interim report.  The 
Committee concluded that the dissatisfaction with the system was the result of three main 
factors.  Firstly the navy was more rigid in its application of substantive rates and trades 
than were the Army and Air Force.  Secondly, the system did not recognize certain 
groups, such as Able Seamen, in the trades structuring.  Thirdly, the trade group structure 
did not account for particular naval specialisations.  The third factor led to situations in 
which some naval personnel would have qualified for two or more trade groups under the 
Army and Air Force structures, but were only paid for one.
309
  The speed with which the 
Committee apparently investigated and arrived at these preliminary conclusions is 
indicative of their long familiarity with the issues.  A suspicious mind would argue the 
conclusions were the ones that they were expected to draw. 
 Identifying the problems and solving them, however, proved to be two entirely 
different things.  The trick was going to be to make changes that would fit into Claxton's 
mandate of inter-service harmonisation of pay scales.  Peers and his colleagues did this 
very cleverly, arguing in their second report that the problem was not that the naval pay 
scales needed to be in some way unique, but rather that the initial harmonisation in 1946 
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had been done incorrectly, leading to the RCN becoming the lowest paid service. The 
essence of the argument was that the Army and Air Force simply had more ranks, 
particularly among the non-Commissioned officer ranks, than the Navy.  Thus when the 
systems were harmonised a number of naval ratings who were filling the same functions 
as Army and Air Force non-Commissioned officers, were left out of the calculation.  The 
Committee recommended the implementation of an eight rank structure by creating, 
essentially, additional grades of seaman and petty officer to bring the naval system more 
into line with the realities of the Army and Air Force.
310
  This conclusion would allow 
Claxton to make the changes required while remaining true to his policy of inter-service 
consistency.  It appears that the idea of replicating the practice of the US Navy had fallen 
overboard, as it was not a factor in Peers' interim reports. 
 The Committee's recommendations were sent for comment and approval to the 
senior officers on both coasts and to the C.O. of HMCS Magnificent.  They were also 
sent to Claxton for his views.
311
  All three senior naval officers approved the changes, but 
all three recommended caution in advising naval personnel of the proposed changes until 
all of the details had been worked out and all of the enabling regulations had been 
drafted.
312
  This would, in hindsight, prove to be an unfortunate recommendation. 
 Claxton, however, was not prepared to wait for the comments of the senior 
members of the RCN, perhaps reflective of his position that, while he was prepared to 
take advice from the Naval Staff, all decisions would be his.  In June of 1948 he 
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requested formal approval of the new rating structure.
313
  In October the changes were 
approved by the Treasury Board.
314
  The senior naval officers were advised of the 
changes a few days later.   
 While this appeared to meet the requirements of the Naval Staff, there was a 
catch.  For 'administrative reasons' the implementation of the new structure was to be 
delayed until 1 February 1949 with pay adjusted to 1 July 1948.
315
  Unfortunately it was 
promulgation of the new structure, rather than just implementation as had been suggested 
by the naval staff, which was delayed until February of 1949.
316
  The reason for this 
change is unclear and could have been the result of a simple misunderstanding.  What is 
clear is that, as a result, the men of the fleet, and particularly those of the lower deck, 
were unaware of the pending changes to the pay structure at a time when morale in the 
fleet continued to decline.  While the 'administrative reasons' for the delay were no doubt 
legitimate, the failure to promulgate the changes at the earliest possible date meant that 
progress being made in resolving the pay issue was to be kept secret from the very men 
who would be most interested in knowing about it, allowing a festering problem to grow 
even worse. 
 An examination of the records makes it abundantly clear that throughout the 
immediate post-war period the RCN was acutely aware of its morale problems, and was 
making a concerted effort to address them.  In doing so they were faced with a number of 
difficulties that would make the solutions difficult if not impossible.  Perhaps the greatest 
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challenge facing the officers of the post-war RCN, and the Naval Staff in particular, was 
their inexperience in dealing with the particular requirements of a peacetime navy any 
larger than the handful of destroyers and auxiliary vessels of the 1920s-30s.  This 
inexperience, combined with the requirements of shrinking a large wartime navy into a 
smaller peacetime one proved too much for a Naval Staff with no practical experience. 
 The inexperience was exacerbated by the absence in the RCN of an Inspector-
General.  Inspectors-General were common in older and more experienced navies and 
provided a vital conduit between the fleet and the naval staff, particularly in the areas of 
morale and conditions of service.  Between the exigencies of the Battle of the Atlantic 
and the astonishing growth during the war years, the RCN had not appointed anyone to 
fill that function.  In the post-war period the appointment of an Inspector-General was 
recommended by one senior officer as early as September of 1947,
317
 but the suggestion 
appears to have been lost in the flurry of reports and studies.  While there were 
Directorates of Service Conditions and Welfare and of Pay and Advancement, neither 
had the necessary comprehensive authority to deal with all of the issues.  There was no 
central repository for reports and memoranda and, as can be seen from the number of 
reports, memoranda and studies that were produced, the issue of morale was dealt with on 
an ad-hoc basis.  An Inspectorate-General would have had the necessary authority to act 
on the reports generated and address the issues. 
 Some progress was, however, being made in addressing the issues raised in the 
various reports.  Commander A.F. Pickard, the Director of Service Conditions and 
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Welfare,
318
for instance, reported that progress was being made towards the completion of 
3,210 additional units of accommodation ashore, particularly for married personnel.  
Similarly some movement had been made in the reimbursement of travel costs, with fifty 
per cent of the annual costs being reimbursed.  While this was not nearly sufficient to 
ease the financial burdens of the lower deck, it was progress.  The same could be said of 
the improved recreation facilities for the men, on-base grocery stores (similar to the Post 
Exchange system used by the U.S. Navy), the creation of a Quarter-Master's branch to 
focus on seamanship issues
319
 and, of course, the review of the pay structure.
320
  All were 
progress, but none by themselves would prove sufficient. 
 The period between 1945 and 1949 was not one characterised by ignorance or 
lassitude on the part of the Naval Staff.  The number and variety of reports, papers and 
memoranda produced during this period demonstrates clearly that the senior leadership of 
the RCN made earnest efforts to discover the causes of the discontent in the RCN and to 
address them, although they have been largely overlooked in the historical analysis.  
Tony German and more recently Marc Milner, for example, draw a straight line between 
the memoirs prepared by participants in the war, such as Eastman, and the report of the 
Mainguy Commission.  The report was taken at face value and it was assumed that the 
problem with the RCN was that it was too British and rigid in its discipline.
321
  This made 
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sense in light of the memoirs written by Easton, Lamb and Lawrence, among other 
participants in the Battle of the Atlantic, which portrayed the corvette crews as rough and 
ready and inimical to British discipline, and somehow uniquely Canadian.  The reality 
was that, as Lund has established, by 1949 most of the men who had participated in the 
Battle of the Atlantic had either left the RCN or had moved into more senior positions.  
They were not the ones involved in the "incidents" so the intervening investigations into 
morale conducted by the RCN become critical in establishing the context for the 
Mainguy report.  The reality of the situation was that, unfortunately, the creation of a 
stable and happy peacetime fleet was not something that had ever been done before in 
Canada, nor was it an issue that the naval leadership had had the luxury of contemplating 
during the Battle of the Atlantic.  By the time the Naval Staff had begun to get a firm grip 
on the problems and their possible solutions events had overtaken them.  The "incidents" 
do not represent a failure of the senior naval leadership, as Glover argues,
322
 as much as a 
basic lack of experience and the absence of any inspectorate designed to deal with the 
general happiness of the men.  The naval staff certainly attempted to come to grips with 
the morale issues facing the RCN, but they lacked the experience necessary to do so 
effectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Choices 
 
 
 By the spring of 1949 time had run out on the RCN’s efforts to address the 
growing morale crisis in the fleet.  The "incidents" aboard HMCS Athabaskan, Crescent 
and Magnificent had demonstrated that whatever the causes of the morale issues plaguing 
the RCN, the solution would not wait for further study.  The morale issue had moved into 
the realm of the political and would be dealt with as a political, rather than strictly 
military, or naval, issue. 
 The prime mover behind the political involvement in the resolution of the morale 
problems came in the form of a letter, penned anonymously by one of the sailors aboard 
HMCS Athabaskan, which outlined the ‘incident’ aboard that ship.  This letter was sent 
to the Vancouver Sun and reported on in the 5 March 1949 issue on the front page above 
the fold.
323
  Further coverage appeared on the front page of the Sun on 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 
14 March.
324
  All of the stories downplayed the incident and treated it as a bit of a "family 
upset."  Commander M.A.  Medland, the commanding officer of Athabakan, was almost 
dismissive, summing up the incident as "the men asked some questions and I answered 
them."
325
  The story was picked up by the Globe and Mail
326
 and even the New York 
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Times carried a small article on the incident.
327
  By 21 March the Sun was reporting that 
Admiral Grant had declared the incident "closed" and that no further action would be 
taken.
328
  By this time, of course, Grant would have been aware of the Crescent incident 
and must have known that Athabaskan could not be passed off as an isolated incident or 
"family squabble." 
 A mere five days after the "closure" of the Athabaskan incident, the incident 
aboard Magnificent hit the press.  In an article entitled "Trouble Reported on Another 
Warship" the Vancouver Sun linked the Athabaskan, Crescent and Magnificent and again 
the story was picked up by the Globe and Mail.
329
  While the press coverage outside of 
Vancouver was not extensive, Claxton was forced to address questions by the media and 
more particularly, to address the issue of subversive Communist influence in the RCN.
330
  
While he managed to deflect the attention of the media to a degree and denied 
categorically that any subversive elements were operating in the Navy, the Canadian 
people were becoming aware that something was wrong with the RCN. 
 To make matters worse, Claxton was also facing questions about the incidents in 
the House of Commons.  On 7 March 1949 he was questioned in the House about the 
Athabaskan incident by Mr. John Probe, the CCF member for Regina City.  Claxton 
characterised it as a "minor incident" which had been successfully dealt with.
331
  He took 
a similar position with regard to the Crescent incident two weeks later.
332
  By 29 March, 
however, it had become clear that attempting to deflect attention from the incidents was 
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not going to work, and Claxton, again in response to a question from Mr. Probe, 
promised the formation of a committee to investigate the incidents.  He ruled out, 
however, the formation of a Parliamentary Committee as "inappropriate" and indicated 
instead that the committee would be formed of members outside the service
333
 and by 
implication the government. 
 The urgent need for a resolution was exacerbated by the ongoing discussions 
surrounding the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In the 
post-war period a number of new political realities became clear to the Government of 
Canada.  Firstly it was apparent that British power was waning, and doing so quickly.  
The war had exhausted Britain both politically and economically to the point where the 
British Government was forced to call on Canada and other members of the Empire to 
assist in post-war occupation duties.  This became even more important when the British 
were in effect forced out of India in 1947.
334
  The decline of Britain as a world power 
meant that Canada would have to look elsewhere for support and would have to take 
responsibility for the development of its own defence policy if it wished to remain a 
significant player on the world stage. 
 The second new reality faced by the Canadian Government was the rise of the 
Soviet Union as a major military power.  The division of the world into two armed 
camps, together with the decline in British military and political influence left the 
Government in a difficult position.  While Canada had inarguably punched above its 
weight during the Second World War, simple economic reality dictated that this would 
not be possible indefinitely.  To ensure security against an increasing Soviet threat 
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defence partnerships were essential.  No longer able to rely on Britain to provide this 
security, the Canadian Government had no alternative but to look to the United States to 
provide it and to focus more on a North American defensive plan than on an imperial 
one.
335
 
 Drawing closer to the United States was not a difficult decision for the Canadian 
Government.  Many of the cabinet ministers were staunch Canadian nationalists, and part 
of their nationalism involved severing economic, military and cultural dependency on 
Britain.  They were also, however, pragmatists and were not eager to trade one unequal 
partnership for another.  Moving forward, then, the Canadian Government would 
conceptualise its defence requirements both in terms of North American and North 
Atlantic security.  It was under these conditions that talks began in 1947 about the 
creation of a North Atlantic alliance to provide collective security against the perceived 
Soviet menace.  The challenge from a Canadian perspective was to negotiate an alliance 
that allowed it to remain relevant and involved in the military decision making process, 
while making a contribution to defence that would, by necessity, be smaller than that 
being made by the United States.
336
 
 For Claxton the negotiations which would lead to the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation in April of 1949 required a re-assessment of Canada's post-
war military role.  Claxton had been in favour of closer military cooperation with the 
United States since 1940, when he was a member of the "Committee of Twenty," an 
informal group of well connected individuals from both inside and outside of government 
who met to discuss the future of Canada's national defence.  They all advocated closer 
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military ties with the United States and a North-American perspective on defence issues.  
They also believed, however, that Canada must participate in the leadership of any North-
American defensive arrangement to preserve Canadian national identity and avoid being 
subsumed by American interests.
337
  From a legislative perspective the process of 
drawing away from Britain militarily had already begun.  With the passage of the Naval 
Service Act of 1945, the RCN became the first of Canada's three military services to have 
its disciplinary provisions brought wholly under exclusively Canadian legislation.
338
 
 As NATO came closer to becoming a reality, Claxton had to decide what 
Canada's military position was going to be in the new alliance.  From a naval perspective, 
the Americans wanted to focus on anti-submarine warfare and the protection of 
communications as an area of specialised interest.  This meshed with Claxton's view of 
naval development as part of the burden of North-American defence in which Canada 
could participate.
339
  If Canada were to take a lead role in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
it would mean an end to the naval staff visions of a balanced fleet with large fleet units 
like cruisers and a switch to smaller, faster ships capable of hunting and if necessary 
killing submarines.  While the Naval Staff was generally in favour of closer cooperation 
with the United States
340
 it would have seemed unlikely to Claxton that they would 
willingly accept the change in focus that it would require.  All of this, however, would 
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have been rendered moot if the Americans came to view the RCN as unreliable, so the 
incidents had to be dealt with quickly and effectively. 
 One of the options that Claxton had in dealing with the "incidents" was to make 
use of military laws and regulations to discipline those involved.  The most obvious 
solution of this sort to the problems raised by the "incidents" was to charge the 
ringleaders and those involved aboard the three vessels with the crime of mutiny.  The 
offence of mutiny was set out in the Naval Discipline Act, which was incorporated into 
use by the RCN through the Naval Service Act of 1910
341
 and reiterated in the Naval 
Service Act of 1944.
342
  Sections 57 and 58 of the Naval Service Act outlined mutiny as a 
punishable offence, both when it occurred with violence and when it occurred without 
violence.  Section 61 made incitement to mutiny and the holding of ‘mutinous 
assemblies’ punishable offences.343  The sentence for the ringleaders of mutinies was 
death if the mutiny were treasonous, imprisonment if it was the result of cowardice and 
dismissal from the service if the mutiny was the result of negligence.
344
 The Act, 
however, is silent on determining the motivation behind the mutiny. 
 Section fourteen extended the punishment for mutiny to any personnel who 
attempted “to make or endeavour to make any mutinous Assembly.”  Section fifteen, in 
something closely resembling an accessory provision in civilian criminal law, rendered 
liable to punishment any individual who knew of a mutiny and "wilfully concealed it."
345
  
Ironically, this latter provision could have rendered any of the three captains, each of 
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whom entered into informal discussions with the putative mutineers, guilty of an offence 
and liable to imprisonment. 
 While the prosecution of those involved in the "incidents" on a charge of mutiny 
was certainly an option available to Claxton and the Naval Staff, there were some serious 
difficulties with its exercise.  The most glaring problem was the absence in the Naval 
Service Act, or any of its predecessor legislation, of any workable definition of what 
constituted a mutiny.  The Act seemed to rely on a sense of common understanding of the 
term amongst sailors.  To paraphrase Justice Stewart of the United States Supreme 
Court
346
, the Act relied on the fact that while it could not (or did not) tell sailors what 
mutiny was, they would know it when they saw it. 
 The common understanding that the Act relied upon, however, was undermined 
by the inclusion of insubordination as a separate offence.  The Act did define 
insubordination to include, among other things, the willful refusal to follow an order and 
made it quite clear that it was an offence separate from mutiny.
347
  It is a long-standing 
canon of statutory interpretation that Parliament, in drafting any piece of legislation, does 
not repeat itself and, therefore, that each provision in a given statute has a distinct 
meaning.  In practical terms this meant that mutiny had to be something beyond a simple 
failure to obey an order and had to include some other component.  The Act, 
unfortunately, gave no assistance in determining what this additional component was.   
 The failure to define the term 'mutiny' left the RCN's incidents somewhere 
between a minor failure to obey an order and the situation facing the RN at Invergordon 
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in 1931.  In that situation a substantial number of Royal Navy sailors, while at anchor at 
Invergordon in Scotland, had refused to put to sea unless issues surrounding their pay 
were met.  In that instance the British Government had, as part of its austerity measures 
during the Great Depression, cut the pay of British sailors by twenty-five per cent.  The 
outraged sailors on a few of His Majesty's ships took matters into their own hands and 
simply refused orders to put to sea until their grievances had been addressed.  There was 
no report of violence, and by all accounts the officers aboard the affected ships had been 
treated well and with all courtesy due their ranks, except of course the following of their 
orders.  The dissent rapidly spread to seven ships at anchor at the time, including some of 
the best known and most powerful ships in the RN.  The subsequent inquiry into the 
actions of the sailors discovered that there was some communist influence at work at 
Invergordon, and as a result several of the ringleaders behind the uprising were dismissed 
from the service.
348
 
 The second significant issue with the use of the mutiny provisions of the Naval 
Discipline Act was over the burden of proof required.  Again the Act provides very little 
guidance on the issue, but given that the punishment for mutiny, either with or without 
violence, was death, it is reasonable to assume that in pressing the charge of mutiny, it 
would have to be proven to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt or something close 
to it.  It is also reasonable to assume, although again the Act is of very little assistance, 
that mens rea would also have to be established.  This meant that it would have to be 
proven not only that the ratings involved in the "incidents" refused to obey orders, but 
also that they did so with full knowledge that their actions constituted a mutiny.  Since 
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the Act did not define mutiny it would be a very ironic argument for the Judge Advocate 
of the Fleet to have to argue that the ordinary rating was expected to know more about 
naval discipline and regulations than he did.  In the public spotlight that would 
accompany any trials connected to the "incidents," failure, as the saying goes, was not an 
option for the RCN. 
 The final difficulty with using the Act to address the incidents is closely related to 
the other two, and was one of precedent.  Rather than being a set of isolated occurrences, 
the "incidents" of 1949 were, in fact, part of a much larger mutinous tradition in both the 
RCN and the RN.  The first example of a mess-deck refusing en masse to fall in when 
piped occurred aboard HMCS Skeena in 1936.  The issue in that case was the delay on 
the part of the captain in adopting the tropical work routine.  This routine was common to 
ships operating in southern latitudes and essentially started and ended the work-day 
significantly earlier, leaving the men free during the hottest part of the day.  At the time 
of the incident aboard Skeena she was alongside in Acapulco.  The Skeena trouble was 
followed by a similar action by the men of the lower deck aboard HMCS Assiniboine in 
the late spring of 1940, the causes of which have unfortunately been lost.
349
 
 The intensification of hostilities, as the RCN became fully engaged in the Battle 
of the Atlantic, did not seem to stop the junior ratings from expressing themselves 
through lock-ins.  In November 1942 there was a similar action taken aboard the armed 
yacht HMCS Reindeer over the increasing mental instability of her captain.
350
 In July 
1943 approximately 190 sailors aboard HMCS Iroquois barricaded themselves in the 
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mess decks and refused to report for ordinary duties.  In that case the putative cause of 
the disturbance was the cancellation of shore leave until a uniform crest 'liberated' from a 
German prisoner had been returned by the rating who had taken it.  The real root cause, 
however, was a rigid and harsh captain who was unpopular with the ratings.  At the time 
of the lock-in Iroquois was returning to England after escorting a Gibraltar convoy and 
was very much on active service in the face of the enemy.
351
  In July of 1944 a lock-in 
occurred aboard HMCS Chebogue, although little is known of the details, and on 10 
January 1945 the crew of HMCS Riviere-Du-Loup failed to obey orders to fall in when 
they learned that due to the illness of her captain, she would be taken to sea by her 
executive officer, in whose competence they had no faith.
352
   
 In the immediate post-war the occurrences of mass disobedience continued.  
Aboard HMCS Micmac, on 5 December 1946, one of the leading seamen, after a dispute 
with the executive officer over shore leave, attempted to encourage other junior ratings to 
refuse to report for duty.  The object of the exercise was to force a "make and mend"
353
 
out of the executive officer.  While it remains unclear as to how successful he was, the 
sailor in question maintains the dubious distinction of being the only sailor of the RCN to 
have faced court-martial for anything close to mutiny.  He was sentenced to ninety days' 
confinement for his actions.
354
  Given the range of sentences available for mutinous 
actions, which included death, the relatively light sentence is indicative of the lack of 
seriousness with which his offence was perceived by the officers. 
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 The final major incident to occur prior to those of 1949 took place in June of 1947 
and involved sailors aboard HMCS Ontario.
355
  The junior ratings in that instance were 
all new to the ship, and most were new to the service. They had become aware of recent 
signals from Naval Service Headquarters regarding the formation of Welfare Committees 
aboard RCN ships and restricting early releases from the service, which had "provoked 
much mess deck discussion."
356
  While Ontario lay at anchor preparing for further crew 
training, a number of the junior ratings requested an interview with the ship's Executive 
Officer, Commander J.V. Brock, to discuss a number of issues with him, including the 
ship's routine and the wearing of more formal uniforms for work details, rather than 
dungarees.  The junior ratings seem to have taken the instructions regarding Welfare 
Committees as indicative of their right to engage in discussions on such matters.  
Commander Brock apparently vehemently disagreed.  After the interview the junior 
ratings in question locked themselves in their mess decks and added the removal of 
Commander Brock to the list of items that they wished to discuss.
357
  While no clear 
record exists of exactly what Commander Brock said to the men, it clearly wasn't to their 
liking as it precipitated the lock-in. 
 Captain J.C. Hibbard, Ontario's commanding officer, on hearing of the action, 
reacted quickly and intelligently.  Rather than order the "out pipe," which would have 
placed the ratings involved in a clear state of mass insubordination, if not mutiny, he first 
addressed them over the ship's loud-speaker system.  While his exact words are lost to 
history, the upshot of them was to ensure obedience to the order 'clear lower decks' when 
it was given a short time later.  Within a few days Commander Brock was transferred off 
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of Ontario, with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the then Flag Officer Pacific 
Coast, Admiral Rollo Mainguy.
358
 
 The series of "incidents" similar to those which took place in 1949 is remarkable 
in both frequency and timing.  What they clearly demonstrate is that, throughout the war 
years and into the post-war period, the collective refusal to obey orders was seen as a 
legitimate method by which members of the lower deck exercised some degree of agency 
over their surroundings, working conditions and superiors.  Bill Rawlings has argued, 
with considerable success, that the use of the lock-in as a vehicle of protest was accepted 
as legitimate by the officers and men of both the Royal Navy and the RCN.
359
  This is in 
line with the conclusion drawn by Richard Gimblett who argues, however, that rather 
than being an inheritance from the RN, the use of lock-ins as a vehicle of protest was 
more likely the product of traditions of liberal democracy shared by both Britain and 
Canada.
360
  What is clear is that some degree of collective protest had historical 
antecedents and was considered a legitimate method by which the lower deck could 
exercise some degree of agency.  The view of the protest as legitimate was, of course, 
contingent on it being done without appearing organised.  Thus, on Ontario for example, 
the commanding officer was careful not to put the ratings in a position of wilful 
disobedience to orders, as to have done so would, together with the obvious organisation 
of the ratings involved, have placed them beyond the pale of what constituted an 
acceptable protest. 
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 It is, however, possible to give too much weight to the conclusions drawn by 
Rawlings and Gimblett.  In gathering together the incidents of disobedience they tend to 
make them appear more ubiquitous and powerful than they actually were.  There was no 
evidence presented in any of the hearings that, outside of the Ontario incident the ratings 
were aware of prior instances of lock-ins.  The instances relied on by both Gimblett and 
Rawlings in fact took place over a relatively long period of time and were not necessarily 
something that the average rating would have been aware of.  They were, rather, part of 
the lore of the RCN, of which the ratings were aware but which was not discussed 
consciously and the prior "incidents" had much more of an impact on Claxton's decision 
making than they did on the decisions made by the men of the lower deck. 
 For Claxton, in whom the ultimate response to the 1949 incidents rested, the 
tradition of collective disobedience all but completely ruled out the use of the Naval 
Discipline Act in addressing the actions of the ratings.  To prosecute the men involved 
would have drawn attention to the conditions of the service in a way that may well have 
drawn considerable sympathy from the Canadian public.  To punish young men for 
appearing only to demand what ordinary Canadian civilians would have considered basic 
rights, such as decent food and accommodation, may well have had a considerable 
political cost.  It could also have led to a clamor for further spending, particularly in 
upgrading ships, which King, and by extension Claxton, were reluctant to engage in. 
 The second and far more dangerous potential consequence of punishing the 
ratings involved was the potential for establishing a precedent.  A series of courts martial 
under the Naval Discipline Act would, by necessity, be administered by the RCN.  
Claxton would have no control over either the process or result of the proceedings.  
140 
 
Given the tradition of the lock-in, and particularly the relatively light punishment handed 
down in the Micmac incident it could certainly have been argued that the RCN had 
traditionally condoned mass disobedience as a form of protest.  There was the reasonable 
possibility that the courts martial would have either dismissed the cases or handed down 
similarly light punishments.  The legal approval of collective disobedience as a valid 
vehicle of protest was the last thing that the Minister of National Defence would have 
wanted to take place on his watch. 
 With the military justice system unavailable in any practical sense, Claxton was 
left with a public hearing as the only viable means of addressing the "incidents."  While a 
formal Royal Commission was certainly a possibility, it could not have been a 
particularly attractive one for Claxton.  In addition to being expensive and time 
consuming, a Royal Commission would, by necessity, have been overseen by a sitting or 
retired judge.  The difficulty with judges, particularly retired ones, was (and is) that they 
can tend to be independent-minded.  Claxton had been privy to the internal investigations 
done by the navy prior to the "incidents" and at some level knew full well that the issues 
confronting the RCN boiled down to money.  Money for new ships with better messing 
and berthing facilities; money to allow for the re-vamping of the trade-group structure; 
money for married quarters at the bases at Halifax and Esquimalt.  A Royal Commission 
would have made all of this a matter of public record, and stood to embarrass the 
Government for having allowed the RCN to get to the state it was in. 
 Claxton was a loyal government member, if nothing else.  When he was 
appointed Minister of National Defence in 1946 his mandate had been to "cut the armed 
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forces down to size and not become a mere messenger for the military."
361
  Nothing had 
altered his mandate and spending money flew in the face of what he believed that to be.  
What he needed was a method of investigating the incidents that served two purposes.  
Firstly, it had to be enough in the public view to satisfy concerned Canadians.  Secondly, 
it had to at least appear to investigate the issues while allowing Claxton to control the 
result of the process. 
 In the Inquiries Act
362
 Claxton had the ideal vehicle.  Part II of the Act provided 
specifically for the conduct of "Departmental Investigations," which could be initiated by 
the minister presiding over any department of the Civil Service of Canada.  The scope of 
the permitted investigations was extremely broad and essentially permitted the 
appointment of one or more commissioners to investigate any matter touching the 
department that the appropriate minister tasked them to.
363
   
 The commissioners, under the Act, held the power to retain counsel if they 
wished
364
 and to compel the attendance and testimony of witness at their discretion.
365
  
There were no indications contained in the Act as to how the sweeping powers given to 
the commissioners were to be used or how the hearings were to be conducted.  There 
were no procedural safeguards contained in the Act to protect witnesses, with the only 
exception being some protection if the witness' individual conduct was the subject of the 
investigation.
366
  Overall the Act provided any minister who used it with a great deal of 
investigative power subject to virtually no oversight. 
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 While the language of the Act suggests that its application to the military was not 
in the contemplation of the drafters, Claxton would have been inclined to read it quite 
generously.  It allowed him to investigate the Department of National Defence and 
section 5 of the Naval Service Act specifically brought the "control and management of 
the Naval Service and all matters pertaining thereto."
367
  As Claxton would have 
understood it, by logical extension that would include the RCN.  While it could be 
convincingly argued that the RCN was not part of the Civil Service as it was commonly 
understood, the term was not defined in the Act, and in the circumstances it was unlikely 
that anyone would raise the objection. 
 With the procedure decided upon, it remained for Claxton to select the 
commissioners.  Admiral Horace Grant, the chief of the naval staff, appears not to have 
objected to the process.  He did, however, feel strongly that the Commission should be an 
entirely naval affair staffed by naval officers.
368
  Given the tradition of mutinous action in 
the RCN his view comes as no surprise.  While disconcerting, the "incidents" must have 
appeared relatively minor to the Naval Staff.  For all practical purposes they had been 
dealt with quickly and efficiently.  The underlying morale issues, as has been seen, were 
under study and would be addressed in the normal course of events.  Staffing the 
Commission with naval officers would allow Grant to put the "incidents" to rest quickly 
and quietly. 
 Louis Audette, who had been approached by Claxton to serve on the Commission, 
had quite a different view.  As will be seen, Audette had his own axe to grind with the 
RCN, and he was adamant that the Commission of Enquiry be entirely civilian in its 
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composition.
369
  While his reasons for the objection are unclear from the documentation, 
it is likely that he felt that the inclusion of naval personnel on the Commission would turn 
the exercise into a defensive one.  This in turn would undermine the process of 
discovering the truth behind the morale and other issues plaguing the RCN.  What is clear 
is that Audette believed he knew what these problems were long before any witnesses 
were called.
370
 
 In the end, a compromise of sorts was reached.  The Commission would be 
chaired by a serving naval officer.  The other two members of the Commission would be 
civilians.
371
  This was, for the RCN, a double-edged sword.  While a presence at the 
hearings would allow it to save face and at least appear to have some control over its own 
destiny, it would also ensure that the RCN would have to support whatever conclusions 
the Commission reached or risk breaking ranks with the minister.  Claxton's willingness 
to compromise was in reality a bit of a trap for the RCN, and one which it had no choice 
but to fall into.  The alternative was to allow the Commission to continue with no input 
from the RCN whatsoever. 
 As the RCN representative and Chair of the Commission, Claxton selected Rear-
Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy, the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast.  He was an 
interesting choice.  Mainguy had enjoyed a long and distinguished career in the RCN.  
During the Second World War he had commanded the destroyer HMCS Ottawa on 
convoy escort operations and participated in the sinking of the Italian submarine Faa di 
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Bruno, the first submarine kill made by the RCN.
372
 He subsequently served as Captain 
(D) Halifax from August to November, 1941 and Captain (D) Newfoundland
373
 from 
November 1941 to September 1942,
374
 and as the commanding officer of HMCS Uganda 
from 1944-1945.    He was in fact commanding Uganda when her company voted to 
remove themselves from the Pacific Theatre.
375
  While the Uganda incident did not end 
his wartime service on a particularly high note, it did provide him with valuable 
experience both in administration and leadership. 
 After the war, he was appointed Commanding Officer Pacific Coast.  In this 
capacity he had dealt directly with the 1947 incident aboard HMCS Ontario.  He had also 
been responsible for the transfer of the Executive Officer of that ship, Commander Brock, 
in response to the complaints of the men.  By 1949 Mainguy had established himself as a 
capable senior officer and was moving towards the pinnacle of any naval career, an 
appointment as Chief of the Naval Staff.
 376
 
 Mainguy had a reputation as a "sailor's admiral."  He was happiest while at sea 
and was "larger than life, charismatic [and] loved and admired by those who served under 
him."
377
  Illustrative of his concern for the men under his command, he had established 
the "Crow's Nest" while he was Captain (D) Newfoundland, a club where officers could 
unwind while in port.  He was also behind the creation of recreation facilities for the men 
of the lower decks of the corvettes.  While commanding Uganda he established a series 
of 'town hall meetings' during which any member of the ship's company could air any 
                                                 
372
 Sarty, No Higher Purpose, p. 110-118. 
373
 The commander of the destroyer and frigate flotillas based in Halifax and Newfoundland respectively. 
374
 Ibid., pp. 642-643. 
375
 Wilfrid G.D. Lund, "Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy:  Sailor's Admiral," in The Admirals, Michael Whitby 
ed. (Kingston, Ontario:  Dundurn Press, 2006), pp. 190-191. 
376
 Ibid. 
377
 Ibid. 
145 
 
grievances or concerns that they had on any subject.
 378
  The selection of Mainguy as the 
chair of the Commission ensured that any complaint by the men of the lower deck would 
get a sympathetic hearing and is indicative of the view that Claxton took regarding the 
complaints. 
 For Mainguy, however, the appointment was at best a mixed blessing.  While on 
the surface it indicated a degree of confidence in his abilities, in reality it placed him in 
an impossible position.  If he came down on the side of the naval leadership and found 
that the RCN bore no direct or systemic responsibility for the morale problems, he would 
be accused of "whitewashing" the problems.  If, on the other hand, he authored a report 
that was critical of the RCN and its leadership, he risked being seen as a turncoat by his 
fellow officers.  Mainguy would be faced with this dilemma throughout the hearings, and 
solved the predicament by remaining relatively quiet both during the hearings and in 
authoring the resulting report which bore his name.
379
 
 Joining Admiral Mainguy on the Commission were Leonard Brockington and 
Louis Audette.  The media described them as "two Ottawa lawyers."
380
  The description 
was at best disingenuous.  Both Audette and Brockington had long-standing connections 
both with the Government and with the RCN.  While they were both technically civilians, 
they were far from disinterested in the outcome of the Commission. 
 Leonard Brockington was, from Claxton's perspective, a known quantity.  He was 
a career civil servant and had worked closely with Claxton in the past.  They had worked 
together even before Claxton's entry into politics, including during Brockington's tenure 
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as the first chairman of the Board of Governors of the CBC.
381
In 1947 Brockington had 
chaired a Commission of Inquiry into a series of strikes in the merchant marine, and 
while his report in the end was favourable to the Canadian Seaman's Union,
382
 he was 
aware of the apparently increasing influence of communism on Canadian society.
383
  He 
was also to some degree familiar with the RCN.  One of his sons had served in the RCN 
during the Second World War and on D-Day, 6 June 1944, Brockington had witnessed 
the landings from an RCN destroyer and had broadcast his experiences to the Canadian 
public.
384
  As a senior bureaucrat and confidant of both Mackenzie King and 
Claxton,
385
Brockington would have certainly known what was expected of him as a 
Commissioner. 
 Louis Audette, the third Commissioner, was in many ways the most interesting, 
and was certainly the most involved of the three.  Born on 7 April 1907 in Montreal, his 
father was the Honourable Justice L.A. Audette of the Exchequer Court of Canada.  His 
life, therefore, was one of considerable wealth and privilege.  As was expected of 
members of his social class, he attended the University of Ottawa for his Bachelor of Arts 
and the Université de Montréal for his law degree.  He was called to the Bar of Québec in 
1931 and practiced with the firm of Audette and O'Brien (later Audette and McEntyre).
386
  
While there is little direct evidence that Audette and Claxton (who was also from 
Montreal) knew one another socially, they would certainly have travelled in the same 
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social and political circles before the war.  It is quite likely that if they did not actually 
know one another, they knew of one another. 
 On the outbreak of the war, Audette left his practice and volunteered for service 
with the RCN in 1939.
387
  After initial training at Kingston's Royal Military College he 
proceeded to Halifax for further training.  His first sea appointment was aboard HMCS 
Saguenay.  As a junior officer aboard Saguenay he was, among other duties, responsible 
for acting as a censor, a job which he found "distasteful" but which provided him with 
insight into the lives of  "distinctly lower class men."
388
 He was, in fact, aboard Saguenay 
on 1 December 1940 when, at 04:00 she was torpedoed and, in essence, blown in half 
with 21 dead and 18 wounded, Audette among them, having suffered a badly broken 
ankle.
389
 
 Upon his recovery, Audette proceeded to rise through the ranks of the Royal 
Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve, ending with command of HMCS Coaticook from July 
of 1944 to the end of hostilities.
390
 Throughout his service, he received consistently 
excellent evaluations from his superiors.  Commander Pullen (as he then was) described 
him in August 1941 as "loyal, capable and trustworthy" and "energetic, zealous and 
[demonstrating] initiative."
391
  Horace Grant, as Captain (D) Newfoundland, commented 
that Audette was described as "capable and knows his ship's company" and "a most 
capable officer."
392
 In a similar vein his assessments of 3 May and 31 October 1943 both 
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point out how solicitous Audette was of the welfare of his crew.
393
 Overall, the official 
picture was of a competent officer who was concerned with the welfare of his men. 
 Audette's memoirs, however, paint a different picture.  They reveal that this 
concern was heavily tinged with a paternalistic attitude towards the men of the lower 
deck.
394
 Although well meaning, Audette was in essence a snob.  He was a firm believer 
in the privileges and obligations arising from his social and, by extension, educational 
status. 
 This snobbery was not restricted to the lower deck and was, if anything, more 
virulent when directed at his fellow officers.  Throughout the war he was involved with 
several other RCNVR officers in active political agitation concerning a number of issues 
that he perceived as plaguing the RCN.  There were several groups of these officers 
operating throughout the War.  While the specific concerns of the groups varied, the one 
thing that they had in common was the background of the members.  They tended to be 
university educated professionals who came from politically and socially well connected 
families.
395
  They were comprised, in short, of the scions of Canada's social elite and used 
their political connections to raise complaints outside the chain of command about how 
the RCN was being run by the regular officers. 
 The membership in the groups was fluid, and the issues that concerned them 
diverse, covering everything from modernisation to morale.  The common issue shared 
by all of the various groups was dissatisfaction at their treatment at the hands of the 
regular RCN officers.  Few were more vocal on this issue than Louis Audette.  He felt, 
along with his RCNVR compatriots, that the regular RCN officers viewed themselves as 
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the "professionals" and looked down on the RCNVR officers as nothing more than 
enthusiastic amateurs.  The Volunteer Reserve officers understandably bridled at being 
treated with what they perceived as contempt.
396
   
 The contempt, however, flowed both ways.  The Volunteer Reserve officers were 
almost universally possessed of more formal education than their regular RCN 
counterparts and tended to view them as uneducated and ignorant.  Audette, in his post-
war memoir, eloquently encapsulated the view of the Volunteer Reserve officers when he 
wrote "during the war to be in a Wardroom was intellectually to be slumming."
397
  For 
Audette the lack of formal education in the regular RCN officers led to failures of 
leadership.  These failures were characterised by a lack of imagination and the inability to 
deal with the "great responsibilities thrust upon them" by the war.
398
  For Audette, then, 
any success that the RCN enjoyed during the Second World War, and there is no doubt 
that he was proud of his service, was enjoyed in spite of rather than because of the efforts 
of the regular RCN officers.
399
 
 As his memoirs make clear, Audette did not get over the supposed slights he 
received at the hands of his regular RCN colleagues.  They also make clear that, in spite 
of his later protestations, Audette was as much of an elitist as he perceived the regular 
RCN officers to be.  His chief difficulty was in their failure to acknowledge the 
superiority of Audette and his colleagues and their university education and throughout 
his wartime and post-war career he "maintained an attitude of contemptuous intellectual 
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snobbery" towards serving naval officers.
400
  The Mainguy Commission would provide 
him with the ideal vehicle to make clear which Canadian elite should be in charge of the 
RCN and to make the regular RCN officers pay for their wartime temerity. 
 Audette's anti-communist credentials were also excellent.  During the war, when a 
group of "Russian" ships put into Londonderry, Audette, also in Londonderry at the time, 
refused to go to any of the usual parties or receptions held for their officers.  He was also 
supportive of the denial of shore leave to the Russian sailors, with a view to preventing 
the "contamination" of Canadian sailors by proximity.
401
  While on the surface this may 
not seem like much, it is quite telling, as the rest of his memoir suggests that he had an 
enormous fondness for parties and thoroughly enjoyed attending them.  To give up the 
chance to socialise with his colleagues during an all too brief sojourn in port was, for 
Audette, quite a sacrifice. 
 In the post-war period his suspicions of communism and its influence continued 
apace.  In 1946, a pamphlet entitled "Labour and the State," produced by the Socialist 
Labour Party of Canada, was delivered to his house.  Audette immediately sent the 
pamphlet to the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which dealt 
with communists and other subversives.
402
  While many other people would have 
discarded or ignored the pamphlet, Audette was loath to allow communism to gain even 
the slightest toe-hold. 
 Also in 1946, while he was acting as commanding officer at the RCN 
establishment at Dow's Lake in Ottawa, a group of citizens, prominently led by self-
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professed communists, seized and occupied the buildings.  During the war Dow's Lake 
had been a Volunteer Reserve training establishment, and it had been largely vacant since 
the cessation of hostilities.  The seizure of the buildings was more akin to squatters 
finding shelter than an armed takeover of government property.  Nonetheless Audette 
was unwavering in his demands that the occupants immediately leave the property if 
violence was to be avoided.  While he was instrumental in ending the occupation without 
excessive violence, the manner in which he dealt with the occupiers of the buildings was 
marked by contempt for their communist values.
403
  In the end, violent action was not 
necessary to end the occupation.  It is safe to assume, however, that Audette would not 
have hesitated to use force to remove the occupants had it proved necessary. 
 In addition to his naval service and anti-communist credentials, Audette was 
familiar with both the senior naval leadership and Ottawa's political establishment.  He 
had assisted Admiral Murray in defending himself during the Kellock Commission into 
the Halifax V-E Day riots and while doing so had been "arrogantly snubbed" by Captains 
Miles and Hibbard, both of whom would be closely involved in the 1949 "incidents."
404
  
While he remained fond of Murray personally he maintained that taking responsibility for 
the riots had been foolish on Murray's part.  The events, Audette believed, were the result 
of ill-considered directives from Murray's superiors and Murray had essentially fallen on 
his sword to protect the senior naval leadership.  Audette never forgave Murray for doing 
so and he did not hesitate, when Murray enquired after an ambassadorship, in refusing to 
provide his support and recommendation.  The ostensible reason for the refusal was 
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Murray's "complete Britishness,"
405
 but it is probable that the real reason was Audette's 
belief that Murray lacked character.  What can be said for certain is that Audette did not 
particularly like the senior naval leadership on a personal level and felt he had been 
treated badly by them. 
 In November 1945, Audette  joined the Department of External Affairs as First 
Secretary in the legal division.
406
  While there he would have crossed paths with many of 
Ottawa's prominent political figures such as Hume Wrong, Lester Pearson,
407
 Arnold 
Heeney, and Brooke Claxton.  Given his relative pre-war obscurity, Audette's 
appointment could only have been the result of reasonably powerful political connections 
of his own.  While serving at External Affairs he no doubt made many more such 
connections, and Audette, Claxton and Brockington  were all members of the Rideau 
Club.
408
  Certainly, for Claxton, Audette would have represented a known quantity. 
 Overall, then, Claxton had carefully selected, from his perspective, a first-rate 
group of commissioners.  Mainguy was essentially trapped in an impossible position and 
if pushed would come down on the side of the lower deck.  Brockington was a reliable, 
intelligent and experienced civil servant who was familiar with Claxton.  He would know 
what was expected of him.  He could be counted on to produce a report that stayed on 
topic and dealt with the items on Claxton's agenda.  That left Audette, whose position on 
naval leadership was well known and who would be the leader of the Commission 
through strength of personality if for no other reason.  Audette maintained that he had 
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been Claxton's third of fourth choice for the position but that the others had refused.
 409
  If 
this is indeed true, and there is no documentary evidence to suggest that it is, it was the 
luckiest third or fourth choice that Claxton could possibly have made. 
 Having selected the commissioners, it remained to set the terms under which the 
inquiry would take place.  In setting these Terms of Reference, Claxton gave the 
commissioners an enormous scope within which to operate.  In a memorandum sent to 
the commissioners, Claxton indicated that the purpose of the enquiry was two-fold.  The 
primary purpose was to find out exactly what took place during the "incidents" aboard the 
three ships, and secondly to suggest any steps that should be taken to rectify the problems 
discovered.
410
  No restrictions were placed on the issues into which the Commission 
could enquire, nor were limits placed on the recommendations that could be made.  
Perhaps to emphasize the point, in the event that the Terms of Reference proved to be 
insufficiently broad, the commissioners were specifically given leave to depart from them 
at their discretion and to inquire into any issue they chose.
411
  It could certainly not be 
argued that the inquiry would be hampered by governmental interference, and in some 
ways the breadth of the Terms of Reference can be seen as indicative of the confidence 
that Claxton reposed in his commissioners. 
 The wide-open nature of the subject matter of the inquiry also extended to 
process.  The commissioners were empowered to summon any serving member of the 
RCN to give evidence before them.  They were also given the latitude to hear from any 
other witness, whether or not that person was a member of the RCN, although the power 
to compel attendance of members of the public was never specifically granted.  In 
                                                 
409
 Audette, Naval Recollections, p. 280. 
410
 "Notes on Inquiry," undated, MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 3. 
411
 Drury to Audette, 8 April, 1949, MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 1. 
154 
 
addition the commissioners were permitted, essentially, to advertise for witnesses and to 
consider any evidence they found helpful, whether placed before the inquiry or not.
412
  A 
broader range of sources of evidence is difficult to imagine. 
 Claxton did, however, provide a small measure of guidance regarding the 
collection of evidence.  As the willing cooperation of serving naval personnel was crucial 
to the success of the inquiry, he suggested that the witnesses be advised at the 
commencement of their testimony that no charges were contemplated in connection with 
the "incidents."  He also suggested that witnesses be advised that the testimony they 
provided would be treated as absolutely confidential and that nothing that was said could 
or would be used against them later.  During questioning only the commissioners, their 
counsel, Commander Hurcombe the Judge-Advocate of the Fleet, Mr. Wickwire, the 
Commission's counsel and the stenographer were to be present as a way of further 
preserving the confidentiality of the testimony.
413
  Claxton hoped that these measures 
would encourage the witnesses, particularly one imagines the men of the lower deck, to 
speak freely and to give their honest opinions about the incidents and more generally 
about what was wrong with the RCN. 
 As a final measure, the sources available suggest that there was to be no written 
record of the testimony retained beyond the publication of the written report.  Destruction 
of the transcripts was not specifically mandated, however the direction that no person 
other than the commissioners should know the evidence given by any witness certainly 
suggests that once the findings of the hearings were made public the record would be 
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destroyed.
414
 The anonymity of the witnesses was thereby to be ensured even in the event 
that direct reference was made to particular testimony in the body of the report.  By 
taking these steps to preserve anonymity, Claxton argued that he hoped to protect the 
careers of junior naval officers and shield them from any repercussions their testimony 
might attract.
415
  While the confidentiality protections did undoubtedly achieve Claxton's 
stated aim, they also ensured that the validity of the conclusions could never be tested 
against the evidence actually given. 
 Considerable care was also taken to outline the physical confines in which the 
hearings would take place.  Again ostensibly to place the men giving evidence at ease, 
the physical arrangement of the hearing room was to look as little like a courtroom as 
possible.  The commissioners and witnesses were to be seated around a table and the 
hearings were to be treated more as a conversation than as a formal inquiry.
416
  While this 
may have put the men more at ease than they would have been in a more formal setting, it 
is also entirely possible that the informality of the proceedings served to detract from the 
seriousness of the inquiry and encourage more 'grousing' about the Navy than considered 
reflection and thought.  In this context the presence of Admiral Mainguy, well known as 
a sailor's sailor, would have been encouraging. 
 The final, and rather unusual, step taken by Claxton was to provide the 
commissioners with a list of 'suggested' questions to be put to the witnesses.
417
  In an 
inquiry with as broad a scope as it appeared the Commission had been given in this case, 
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this was truly an extraordinary measure.  While he did not go so far as to mandate the use 
of his questions, the provision of a list clearly indicated to the commissioners the 
direction that Claxton thought the inquiry should take.  Given the fact that all of the 
written reports produced had been provided to the commissioners, and further given their 
combined experience in legal and naval matters, they hardly needed Claxton's assistance.  
The provision of "suggested" questions was in fact an attempt to deftly and subtly control 
the direction in which the hearings proceeded and the findings it eventually made. 
 The questions themselves are interesting more for what they exclude than the 
questions themselves.  The focus of the suggested questions was on the issue of 
subversion, an idea that had essentially been put in Claxton's mind by Grant,
418
 living 
conditions and the effectiveness of the grievance procedure.  There were no suggested 
questions concerning the "Canadianization" of the RCN and nationalism generally.  More 
importantly there were no suggested questions concerning pay and pay scales.  Claxton 
clearly did not want these dealt with by the Commission either on questions of principle 
or on the question of the sufficiency of the pay being received.  While nothing could 
prevent witnesses from raising any of the issues omitted by Claxton the list itself was a 
clear message to the commissioners of subjects that were to be avoided if at all possible.  
The senior naval staff had made its position on pay and advancement in the RCN quite 
clear through a series of very detailed reports.  The position of the Government on 
military spending was equally clear.  There could be little doubt about the side Claxton 
was going to take on the issue.  Money was not something that Claxton was prepared to 
discuss either with the senior naval leadership or with the Canadian public through a 
published report. 
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 While the final report would be written by the commissioners, Claxton made it 
very clear that the publication of the report would be done only by and through the 
Minister of National Defence.
419
  Thus the final product of the inquiry would remain 
firmly in Claxton's hands throughout the process.  The publicity surrounding the 
formation of the Commission had, however, made the publication of some report 
necessary if awkward questions were to be avoided in the press and in the House of 
Commons.  By reserving publication of the report to himself, Claxton made sure that the 
final draft of the report stayed on message and contained nothing that would prove 
embarrassing either to himself or to the Government. 
 By the time the hearings started then, Claxton had created the Commission that he 
wanted and had, with considerable subtlety, given it its mandate.  In Louis Audette he 
had found a clever and well educated leader who already held rather a dim view of 
Canada's senior naval leadership.  Audette already believed he knew what the main 
problem was with the RCN and was unlikely to be distracted from it.  In Leonard 
Brockington he had a loyal and able career bureaucrat with whom he had worked well in 
the past.  Brockington knew both how to write reports and how to follow instructions, 
both explicit and implicit.  Finally, in Rollo Mainguy he had a member of Canada's senior 
naval leadership who fully understood the impossible position in which he had been 
placed.  If Mainguy wanted his career to take its natural course and retire as Chief of the 
Naval Staff, he knew better than to make waves.  
 The hearings themselves were to be private and for all practical purposes 
unrecorded.  While this might well serve to put witnesses at ease, it would also ensure 
that the conclusions of the report could never be tested against the evidence presented to 
                                                 
419
 "Notes on Inquiry," undated, MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 3. 
158 
 
the Commission.  Overall, then, the Commission constituted something of a political 
masterstroke, allowing Claxton to appear to be doing something about the problems in 
the RCN and simultaneously allowing him to control the public perception of both what 
the problems were and the solutions that should be implemented.  
 
159 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Hearings 
 
 
 
 With the preliminary matters determined, the hearings themselves began with 
remarkable alacrity.  The hearings regarding the incident aboard Magnificent were set to 
begin on 11 April, followed by Athabaskan and Crescent through May and the early part 
of June.  The final session was to take place in Ottawa in the middle of June 1949 and 
involved mainly witnesses from the Naval Staff and its various supporting departments.  
During the course of the hearings there appeared 238 witnesses including 34 senior 
officers (commander and above), thirty-six other officers, forty-four petty officers and 
chief petty officers and one hundred five ratings.  Approximately fifty of the witnesses 
volunteered to appear, the remainder appearing at the "request" of the Commission.
420
  
The Commission was hearing from a broad spectrum of the service personnel. 
 The testimony itself was far-ranging and covered disparate topics.  While it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to outline every comment made by the witnesses, it is 
possible to see the emergence of several broad themes both in the testimony given and in 
the manner in which the questions were put to the witnesses by the commissioners.  The 
picture that emerges is of a Commission that is trying to get to the bottom of the morale 
issues in the RCN but that is also, to some extent, promoting its own agenda and pre-
established views as to the causes of the problems. 
 The first of the incidents dealt with was that aboard HMCS Magnificent.  
Ironically, this was arguably the least serious of the three as it involved the smallest 
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number of ratings; only the thirty-two aircraft handlers refused orders.  The aircraft 
handlers were responsible for the movement of aircraft to and from the flight deck during 
flying operations on the Magnificent.  As such they were required to be available 
whenever flying was taking place.
421
 
 The crucial difference between the aircraft handlers and the aircraft mechanics 
was in their categorisation.  While the two groups had the same substantive rates, the 
mechanics were placed in "Trade Group 1" whereas the handlers were part of the 
"Standard Trade Group."  This had two significant implications.  First the mechanics 
received trade group pay in addition to their substantive rate pay, while the handlers did 
not receive any trade group pay at all.  Second, as technical specialists, the mechanics 
were not required to perform seaman's duties, such as cleaning the ship, while the 
handlers were.
422
  The result of these differences was the presence on the flight deck of 
two groups of men working the same long hours but being treated very differently.  This 
difference in treatment would prove to be one of the motivating factors behind the 
incident. 
 On the night of 19 March 1949 the men of 3G mess (the aircraft handlers) had 
been engaged in flying operations until approximately 2200 hours.  The next morning 
they had to turn to very early to continue with flying exercises.  At 0530 it was 
announced that flying operations had been cancelled and the aircraft handlers moved the 
aircraft back to the hangars.  At 0645 the handlers were sent to breakfast with instructions 
to fall in at 0745 to "part ship," which required them to clean the decks around the 
"island."  Flying stations were to resume later in the morning.  This was somewhat 
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unusual according to Chief Petty Officer Green, as no cleaning beyond the mess and the 
heads was ordinarily required of the aircraft handlers during flying operations.  When the 
pipe "hands fall in" was duly made at 0745, the men of 3G mess failed to report.
423
  There 
is no evidence that any other flight deck personnel were to be required to part ship. 
 In response to the failure of the hands to fall in as required by the pipe, Petty 
Officer Haspeck was sent to the 3G mess to determine what the problem was.  While 
none of the men in the mess spoke to him or responded to his questions, he did observe 
them cleaning the mess and the washroom area.
424
  The decision to send P.O. Haspeck 
was intended to minimise the impact of the disobedience, as it was believed by 
Commodore G.R. Miles, Magnificent's commanding officer,
425
 among others that failure 
to obey a pipe was serious but less serious than the failure to obey a direct order from a 
superior officer.  As a result of this decision no officer was sent to the mess deck before 
Commodore Miles went down himself at 0805.
426
 
 Upon his arrival in the mess deck Commodore Miles told the assembled ratings 
that concerted action in disobedience of orders was not something he was prepared to 
tolerate.  He reminded the men of the correct procedure for lodging complaints 
(individually and one at a time) and told them he would see each of them individually 
later on to discuss any grievances that they had.  He then advised them that at 0900 
"flying stations" would be piped.  He did not solicit any comments from the men of 3G 
                                                 
423
 Testimony of Chief Petty Officer Green, Transcripts, Magnificent Part 1, pp. 491-513.  According to the 
testimony of Able Seaman Harkins there was some confusion as to whether the 0745 pipe was to apply to 
the aircraft handlers or just to the other members of the seaman's branch, but he was the only witness that 
expressed any such confusion.  (Transcript Magnificent Part 2.) 
424
 Testimony of Petty Officer Haspeck, Transcript Magnificent Part 2, pp. 38-52. 
425
 Commodore G.R. Miles had been associated with the RCN since his appointment as a cadet in 1916.  
During the Second World War he gained experience both afloat and ashore, as commanding officer of 
HMCS Saguenay and HMCS Sambro, and ashore as director of plans in 1943. (Transcript, Magnificent 
Part 1.) 
426
 Testimony of Lieutenant-Commander (Air) Watson, Transcript, Magnificent Part 1, pp. 220-225. 
162 
 
mess, nor were any offered.  By doing this Miles avoided any further escalation of the 
situation.  At 0900 "flying stations" was piped and all hands fell in as required.
427
  The 
entire incident lasted less than an hour and a half. 
 At the hearings a number of interesting points arose.  There was nearly universal 
agreement among the witnesses that the incident was spontaneous and involved no prior 
discussion among the ratings.  According to Able Seaman Cowie, for example, when the 
pipe sounded at 0745 the men of 3G mess, all of them aircraft handlers, all spontaneously 
decided not to respond.
428
  The idea, however, that 32 men could make an identical 
decision not to obey orders without any discussion either prior to or during the decision 
making process is simply not credible.  The men knew of the hearings well in advance 
and had clearly discussed their testimony prior to being called as witnesses.  The refusal 
of any of the men to identify any "ringleader" clearly indicates some trepidation on their 
part about giving evidence.  The assurances of confidentiality do not seem to have 
allayed their fears completely.  It is also noteworthy that this was the first time that the 
ratings had been asked for their input about the problems in the lower deck, so some 
trepidation is understandable. 
 It also became abundantly clear very early on that there was no underlying 
communist influence or subversion behind the incidents.  The cause of the discontent was 
the requirement that the aircraft handlers wash the decks after a late night and early 
morning of flying operations.
429
  For the aircraft handlers this requirement was the last 
straw in a series of minor complaints.  Some, for example, were upset that when 
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Magnificent put into various ports they were unable to go ashore in civilian clothes due to 
a lack of storage space aboard for any personal gear beyond the minimal requirements.
430
   
 There was also considerable discontent caused by leave arrangements when 
Magnificent put into Colon.  The plan there was for all of the crew members to get shore 
leave.  Due, however, to difficulties in transporting men ashore and a general shortage of 
ship's boats, only a few men managed to get ashore.  The vast majority of the crew 
received no shore leave in Colon  and many of them spent the entire afternoon waiting for 
boats that never arrived.
431
  After some time at sea and considerable hard work the failure 
to get shore leave must have been a bitter disappointment. 
 In terms of living conditions a number of complaints, each minor in nature, arose 
repeatedly.  One of the complaints of which Lt. D.D. Peacocke, the Divisional Officer for 
the aircraft handlers, was made aware concerned bedbugs in the cushions of the mess 
seating area.  Lt. Peacocke testified that he had reported the matter to the Medical Officer 
and that some fumigation had been attempted.  Unfortunately this did not solve the 
problem and the bedbug issue remained a sore point for the members of the mess.
432
  One 
can see how the presence of bedbugs would, over time and in crowded conditions, 
assume a disproportionate importance. 
 The bedbug problem was made more acute by some overcrowding in the mess.  
There were more men assigned to the mess than there was space.  As a result some of the 
men had to sleep on the infested seating areas.  The overcrowding also led to hot water 
shortages in the washing areas and delay in accessing the washing facilities.
433
  While 
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each of these issues would individually have been an annoyance, combined they served to 
magnify the overall level of discontent among the aircraft handlers.  It is significant in 
this regard that none of the other messes were involved in the incident, as none of the 
other messes suffered the particular constellation of problems that affected the aircraft 
handlers. 
 In the circumstances, then, no communist subversion was necessary to foster 
discontent.  There was however some evidence of small incidents of sabotage, most 
notably the appearance of a hammer and sickle painted at various places around the ship.  
In another instance one of the ladders was cut away and thrown over the side.
434
  When 
questioned directly by the Commission concerning potential "Red" influence, all 
witnesses dismissed the instances as a concern.  Leading Seaman Gurling attributed the 
vandalism to "someone with a nut loose in his head,"
435
 while Chief Petty Officer Clarke 
indicated that the possibility of subversion had never even entered his mind in spite of the 
vandalism.
436
  Leading Seaman Day referred to the suggestion of subversion as 
"nonsense"
437
 and to Seaman Brown it was "foolishness."
438
  The Master-at-Arms, Gillis, 
indicated that he had gone so far as to make inquiries about subversion following the 
"incident" but had found nothing to suggest any "Red" influence aboard the 
Magnificent.
439
  
 The Commission also examined the administrative issues aboard Magnificent that 
contributed to the general level of discontent among her crew.  There was a serious 
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manning problem.  While the 3G mess was overcrowded, Magnificent overall was 
undermanned by some two hundred fifty personnel.  Shortages of men in departments 
staffed by technical specialists were made up by loaning them men from the seaman's 
branch.  These loaned men had to perform their seaman's duties, such as cleaning up 
around the ship, on top of any additional duties that they were given.  The men of the 
seaman's branch became, in the words of Magnificent's Executive Officer Commander 
D.W. Piers,
440
 "the drawers of water and the hewers of wood" to a disproportionate 
degree.
441
  If the aircraft handlers felt put upon and unfairly treated, it was not without 
some foundation in fact. 
 The personnel shortages were particularly acute in crucial areas.  While 
Magnificent had 21 petty officers on complement, for example, there were just seven 
serving at the time of the "incident."  Similarly, the ship's complement called for forty-
four leading seamen.  The actual number of experienced and properly trained leading 
seamen was at most twelve.  The changes in the rank structure had moved some 
personnel to "acting" rank in the leading seamen and petty officer positions, but they 
lacked the training and experience to make up for what can only be described as a gross 
shortage of experienced senior non-Commissioned personnel.
442
 
 The lack of training and experience extended to the divisional officers aboard 
Magnificent.  The divisional officer occupied a crucial position in the maintenance of 
order, discipline and morale aboard His Majesty's Canadian Ships.  Each divisional 
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officer was responsible for a small group of seamen.  The officer would be available to 
deal with problems or concerns of the men, both personal and service related.  The 
divisional officer served as both a sounding board and problem solver for the men and as 
a conduit between the men of the lower deck and the captain and executive officer.  A 
properly functioning system of divisional officers would discover and address discontent 
among the crew before things got out of hand.   
 The key to the success of the divisional system was trust.  To gain the confidence 
of the men in his division, the officer would have to first earn their trust and respect.  
Unfortunately the manning shortages in the RCN in the post-war period made this 
virtually impossible.  The junior officers given divisional officer duty had little specific 
training in the leadership of men and the shortage of officers generally rendered any sort 
of mentoring by more senior officers impractical at best.
443
  The personnel shortage also 
meant that the complements of the various RCN ships were in a constant state of flux.  
Officers in particular would be appointed to a ship for a few months and then move on to 
their next posting.  The officers and men were not given the opportunity to know each 
other and the men of the lower deck were, understandably, reluctant to confide in officers 
they did not have the measure of.
444
  In these circumstances it is easy to understand how 
the "incident" took Magnificent's officers by surprise, and how the discontent of the 
aircraft handlers managed to fester.  There was simply nobody they felt comfortable 
complaining to. 
 The problem of inexperienced divisional officers would have been alleviated by a 
properly functioning welfare committee aboard Magnificent.  The idea for this type of 
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organisation had initially been implemented by Admiral Mainguy when he was 
commanding HMCS Uganda at the end of the Second World War.  He had instituted a 
series of "town hall meetings" at which all members of the ship's company were present 
and could raise any areas of concern or issues that they had with the ship or its routine.  
The meetings also allowed the captain to keep the crew informed as to the mission on 
which the ship was engaged, expected ports of call and other similar things.  This system 
had worked well and gave the men of the lower deck a sense of agency and of being part 
of a collective enterprise rather than just being cogs in a larger wheel.
445
 
 In the post-war period a naval directive was issued instructing that welfare 
committees be established on all RCN ships.  These committees were to be in addition to 
other ships' committees, such as the canteen committee (which dealt exclusively with the 
expenditure and use of the ship's fund), and were specifically to allow members of the 
crew to raise concerns and air any grievances that they had.  Members were to be elected, 
one from each mess, to represent the members of the crew.  The chairman of the welfare 
committee was to be the ship's executive officer, who would take the appropriate minutes 
and take matters raised up with the captain where necessary, or act on them where 
possible.
446
 
 Unfortunately aboard Magnificent things went wrong with the welfare committee.  
Although Commodore Miles, the commanding officer, believed that a welfare committee 
existed and was functioning,
447
 this was not the case.  As the executive officer it was 
Commander Piers' job to establish and run the welfare committee and his evidence was 
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that he believed welfare committees to be a good idea.  He also admitted that he had 
received the directive mandating the formation of welfare committees.  Where things fell 
apart, according to Piers, was in the absence of a general order or amendment to the 
King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions as a follow-up to the directive.  In his 
view, then, the directive never attained the force of an order.  In the absence of such an 
order, Piers, in spite of apparently believing them to be a good idea, did not feel it 
necessary to establish a welfare committee aboard Magnificent.
448
 
 The testimony concerning welfare committees provided one of the more 
interesting exchanges in the first phase of the hearings.  It is clear from Louis Audette's 
handwritten notes on the transcript that he did not like Commander Piers.  The reasons 
for this are unclear, although it is likely that they had come into contact with one another 
during the Second World War.  Regardless of the reason, Audette described him as 
"incredibly egocentric, arrogant and self-confident -- cold -- great charmer [sic]."
449
  The 
questions put to Piers reflect this dislike.  He was subjected to a rigorous cross-
examination with the goal being, apparently, to have him admit that the entire incident 
was his fault.  It was clear that the commissioners were firmly convinced that a welfare 
committee would have solved the problems that led to the 'incident,' and that Piers' failure 
to establish one for technical reasons was tantamount to gross negligence on his part. 
 At times, in fact, the questioning of Piers became downright unfair.  He was, for 
example, criticised for not issuing an order to the men to fall in.  When asked why he did 
not issue such an order he was told by the questioner, possibly Mr. Wickwire, counsel for 
the Commission, that there was evidence before the Commission that most of the men 
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would have fallen in if ordered to do so.
450
  This was a complete fabrication and no such 
evidence had been given.  In fact the evidence presented indicated that an order would 
have made no difference whatsoever to the conduct of the men.  The line of questioning 
was designed to embarrass Commander Piers and trick him into admitting responsibility 
for the incident.  This type of questioning would never have been permitted during a 
judicial procedure or formal hearing, and both Mr. Audette and Mr. Wickwire would 
have been fully aware of that fact. 
 Admiral Mainguy, for his part, allowed this to go on without interruption or 
apparent objection.  Commander B.S. McEwan, the Commander (Air) of Magnificent, 
had earlier testified that the response of the senior officers to the incident had been 
governed by signals received from Naval headquarters.  These signals directed a course 
of action designed to contain the seriousness of the incidents and to avoid making matters 
worse by directly engaging the disobedient crewmen.
451
  As Admiral Grant would 
subsequently explain, the failure to obey a pipe was disobedience of an order, so the 
issuance of subsequent orders was superfluous and would serve only to aggravate the 
situation.
452
  As Commanding Officer Pacific Coast at the time of the incidents Mainguy 
would have been aware of the signals and would have known that the questions with 
which Piers was being peppered were in a very large measure unfair.  Mainguy, however, 
chose to maintain his silence and to assume a passive role as chairman. 
 The absence of a welfare committee left the airing of grievances to the established 
complaint procedure.  This required that complaints about service conditions, living 
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conditions or any other matter be made one at a time in writing and sent by the divisional 
officer up the chain of command to the executive officer.  If the executive officer could 
not address the issue adequately, it was then sent on to the captain for response.  The 
evidence before the Commission was that this was an entirely ineffective process.  Many 
of the witnesses believed that using the complaint procedure to raise issues about ship's 
routine or habitability, or to raise concerns about a particular officer would lead to 
retaliation or to the man in question being branded a "trouble maker."
453
  The ratings 
were therefore, regardless of the truth of their beliefs, reluctant to make use of the process 
provided to air grievances.  
 What is perhaps most striking about the hearings on the Magnificent, in hindsight, 
is that, with one exception, the issue of the "Canadianization" of the RCN was not raised 
either spontaneously or when witnesses were asked to agree with specific propositions.
454
  
There was widespread agreement that the ordinary sailor in the RCN was better educated 
and more independent than his RN counterpart and that the average RN sailor was 
prepared to put up with more aloof and dictatorial officers because he was used to it.  
There was also considerable agreement that Canadian sailors were generally happier 
when they understood the reasons for orders given and were kept informed about the 
ship's operational schedule.
455
  What is missing from the testimony of the men of the 
lower deck, particularly those involved in the "incident" is any criticism of the officers or 
the way in which they handled the men.   
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 Overall, then, it is apparent from the transcripts and the evidence given that the 
"incident" aboard Magnificent was the result of a number of small, ordinary complaints 
about ship's routine and living conditions.  While none of these complaints would by 
itself have been sufficient to trigger mass disobedience the combination of them all was.  
This combined with an inefficient and ineffective communication network between the 
ratings and their officers to drive the men of 3G mess past their breaking point.  There 
was nothing more sinister behind the actions of the men than a desire to have their voices 
heard. 
 One week after the first round of hearings ended, on 27 April, the second round 
began on 4 May at Esquimalt.  The focus shifted to the "incident" aboard HMCS 
Athabaskan.  There were also a number of witnesses who appeared voluntarily, as had 
been the case during the first round of hearings. 
 The "incident" aboard Athabaskan was significantly more serious than 
Magnificent's had been.  Where events on Magnificent involved approximately thirty-two 
men, all from one mess, on Athabaskan there was collective action by ninety ratings from 
all parts of the ship.  This number represented nearly half of Athabaskan's full 
complement of one hundred ninety-six officers and ratings, and all of her personnel under 
the rate of leading seaman.
456
 
 At the time of the "incident" Athabaskan was on a southern training cruise as part 
of a larger task group led by HMCS Ontario.  The cruise had begun on 28 January and 
the first stops had been at San Diego and Magdalena Bay, the latter to facilitate the 
painting of the ship.  On 25 February, following some training exercises, Athabaskan was 
detached from the task group to allow her to put in at Manzanillo, Mexico, to take on 
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fuel.  She was to rejoin the remainder of the group the following day and proceed in 
company with Ontario and the other ships of the task group to Acapulco.
457
 
 Upon arriving in Manzanillo Athabaskan went alongside the fueling jetty.  As it 
was, at this point, close to mid-day, the crew were sent to lunch to fall in again at 1315 
hours.  When the pipe was duly sounded to fall in, as had been the case with Magnificent, 
virtually none of the  seamen responded.  The duty petty officer was sent to investigate 
and found that the crew had locked themselves in the forward upper mess deck.  When he 
enquired why they had not responded to the pipe, the men indicated that they would only 
speak to the captain.
458
 
 Commander  M.A. Medland,
459
 the captain, accompanied by the coxwain then 
went to the mess deck to speak to the men.  While there he noticed a piece of paper on 
one of the tables which appeared to contain a list of demands.  He placed his cap over the 
paper and pretended that he had not seen it.  He then advised the men of the proper 
method of stating a grievance and asked them what the problems were.  He was told that 
the men did not understand why they had not gone into tropical routine and why they 
were constantly being told by the executive officer to straighten their caps.  Medland told 
the men that he would see them individually later on to discuss the issues but that they 
would be piped to fall in in ten minutes.  He made it clear to the men that he expected 
them to obey the pipe, and that if they did not, he would consider the matter to be a 
mutiny and would clear the lower decks by force.  He was careful not to issue any direct 
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orders to the men and ten minutes later, at 1420 hours, "hands fall in" was piped.  All of 
the recalcitrant crewmen responded.
460
  The entire "incident" had lasted a little over an 
hour. 
 The number of men involved, while apparently large, is deceptive.  Unlike the 
case on Magnificent, the men involved on Athabaskan came from all areas of the ship.   
This should not, however, be interpreted as widespread discontent.  Throughout the 
testimony it became clear that the seamen were the driving force behind the "incident."  
Ratings from the specialised departments, such as the stokers and the electricians, 
overwhelmingly testified that they were involved in the "incident" as a show of solidarity 
with their shipmates and not as a result of any complaints of their own.  Several of the 
witnesses also testified that they were involved more or less by accident.  Following the 
lunch break several went to the mess deck, one of the largest on the ship, to rest, read or 
take a nap.  When they became aware of the large gathering it was too late, they felt, to 
get out.  If these witnesses are to be believed the level of discontent aboard Athabaskan 
was not as serious or as general as the numbers involved would suggest. 
 Similarly the list of demands poses a bit of an evidentiary problem.  None of the 
witnesses admitted to taking part in its creation.  In a similar vein while many of the 
witnesses testified that they were aware that there was a paper circulating, none of them 
admitted to having read it.  Given the time the incident took to resolve itself and the 
number of men involved, it is reasonable to assume that the list itself was created by a 
small sub-set of the men present and was not representative of the concerns of the 
majority. 
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 In covering up the list Commander Medland acted with prudence and successfully 
avoided aggravating the problem.  A meeting at which grievances were aired could be 
seen as ordinary, if concerted, griping.  Given the uncertainty surrounding what 
constituted a mutiny and the history of similar actions, this was a relatively minor event.  
Written demands, however, constituted an entirely different situation and looked more 
like an attempt to take some degree of control over the ship by coercion.   This would, by 
necessity, have required a swift and decisive response by the captain.  By acting as he 
did, and recognising the situation for what it was, Medland allowed the men the 
opportunity to extricate themselves from the situation they found themselves in and 
thereby avoided even worse damage to the perception and reputation of the RCN. 
 As with Magnificent, the Commission was unable to uncover any evidence that 
the lock-in was planned in advance.  There were no leading seamen or petty officers on 
the mess deck at the time of the "incident," but the evidence was that this was a 
coincidence and not the result of their having been warned in advance.  No testimony 
contradicted this view.
461
  Once again the men of the lower deck closed ranks to protect 
the ringleaders behind the lock-in. 
 On Athabaskan, as on Magnificent, the proximate causes of the lock-in were 
relatively minor and mundane.  There were essentially two things that pushed the men 
beyond the limits of what they were prepared to accept with equanimity.  The first was a 
failure on the part of the officers to put the ship into tropical routine.  It was common 
practice in tropical climes for the ship's routine to change.  The day would begin earlier 
for the ratings, with breakfast at 0530 rather than at 0700.  Work would be performed in 
the early hours of the morning and then end at mid-day for several hours.  Ordinary 
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duties would commence again late in the afternoon.  This was designed to avoid having 
the men working during the hottest part of the day. 
 When Athabaskan put into Manzanillo tropical routine had not yet been instituted.  
As a result the men had to perform the refuelling during the hottest part of the day.  
Refuelling was hard, hot and dirty work at the best of times, and under a tropical sun  
would be doubly so.  The failure to go into tropical routine, which the veteran members 
of the crew were expecting, struck the ratings as unfair and careless of their welfare.  
They placed the blame for this squarely on the shoulders of the executive officer, 
Lieutenant-Commander C.R. Parker, who they believed was responsible for setting the 
routine.
462
  In reality the ship's routine was set by the senior ship in the group, in this case 
HMCS Ontario, and not by the individual ships so, while he was blamed for the failure to 
change to tropical routine, it was beyond Lieutenant-Commander Parker's authority to 
make any changes to it.  Athabaskan would go to tropical routine when Ontario did and 
no sooner.
463
 
 Lieutenant-Commander Parker was also squarely the focus of the second general 
complaint.  Many of the ratings testified that he was distant with them and condescending 
to them.  There was widespread agreement that he did not speak to them "like men" and 
brooked no questions about his orders.  He was also, apparently, a stickler for detail.  
Matters came to a head on the cruise when he repeatedly told the men to straighten their 
caps and do up their shirts while they were working about the ship in the tropical heat.  It 
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was too much for the men and one of the demands placed before the captain was for the 
removal  of Lieutenant-Commander Parker.
464
 
 The witnesses raised a number of other concerns as well.  The ship's routine 
generally, for example, was an issue.  While the general routine was set by the senior 
ship, there was a considerable difference between ships in how strictly it was enforced.  
Ontario, for instance, had ordered that no smoking be permitted on the upper deck.  This 
was enforced strictly on Athabaskan but was not enforced aboard HMCS Cayuga which 
was also in company on the cruise.  The men aboard Athabaskan could see Cayuga's men 
smoking, and while they aware that they could not, had no idea why the differences 
existed.  This caused discontent among Athabaskan's hands, and in the absence of an 
explanation, they fixed the blame on Lieutenant-Commander Parker.
465
 
 Commander Medland, for his part, came to the defence of his executive officer.  
He characterised Parker as inexperienced, as it was his first appointment as executive 
officer.  He also described Parker as naturally quite shy, which came across to the men as 
distant.  Given the personnel shortages, particularly among experienced sea-going 
officers, there was insufficient time, according to Medland, to mentor him closely.  The 
demand for his removal was the first indication to Medland that there were problems.  
There was widespread agreement among the witnesses that the way in which Lieutenant-
Commander Parker executed his duties improved considerably after the incident and that 
complaints about his conduct had stopped altogether.
466
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 Lieutenant-Commander Parker's situation was made worse by the frequent 
changes in personnel that Athabaskan had experienced.  He was, according to Captain 
K.F. Adams of the personnel department, the fourth executive officer on Athabaskan in 
the previous twelve months.  While Parker had achieved the appropriate rank for 
appointment as an executive officer, he had done so with only one year of total sea 
time.
467
  This would have been barely enough time for Parker to become a competent 
divisional officer,
468
 and was completely insufficient time to train him to be responsible 
for the conduct and welfare of over a hundred me.  Unfortunately, according to Captain 
Adams, this was not an uncommon problem in the RCN.
469
 
 The Commission also dealt with the issue of subversive "red" influence in much 
the same perfunctory way that they had done in the case of Magnificent.  In fact, in 
Athabaskan's case even fewer witnesses were asked about it.  Of the three who testified 
that there was a subversive influence operative, the most thorough discussion was in the 
testimony of Lieutenant-Commander G.R. Tottenham, who had worked in the 
intelligence department at Naval Headquarters until 1947.  He testified that he believed 
RCN personnel were heavily influenced by the "Commercial [sic] Seaman's Union in a 
sort of "'brotherhood of the sea.'"  Because the CSU was heavily influenced by 
communist ideology, his argument went, it stood to reason that the RCN must be as well.  
The problem, however, according to Tottenham, was that the communists who had 
infiltrated the RCN were too well trained to be discovered.  He admitted that he had no 
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actual proof of communist agents in the RCN.
470
  Thus, in a remarkable feat of circular 
reasoning, the proof of communist subversion in the RCN was, in fact, the absence of any 
such proof.  
 In the absence of communists, some of the witnesses offered a novel alternative as 
the cause of the discontent.  A number of the most vocal complainers among 
Athabaskan's crew were men who wanted to get out of the RCN for various reasons.  
There was some agreement among the witnesses that recruiting material painted far too 
rosy a picture of life in the RCN, particularly in its amenities and living conditions.  Lack 
of resources, regrettably, made it impossible for the RCN to live up to the promises.  This 
combined with a tendency in the recruiting material to understate the hardships of life in 
the navy and led to discontent among some of the ratings, who felt they had been 
misled.
471
  When men became aware of the hardships it was too late for them to get out of 
the service and a general level of resentment grew.  This resentment was exacerbated by 
the abundance of lucrative civilian jobs available during the post-war period.
472
  The 
affected ratings, who felt stuck in their position for the duration of their enlistments, were 
more likely to complain about life in the navy, and were bound to be less tolerant of 
minor irritations. 
 During the Athabaskan hearings the word mutiny first reared its ugly head.  For 
the first time the Commission clearly indicated that its members believed that the actions 
of the crews of the three ships involved constituted a mutiny in each case.  They did 
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concede, however, that the failure of the regulations to define the term was problematic 
and there was some sort of qualitative difference between mutinies with and without 
violence.
473
  Commander  P. Hurcombe, the Judge-Advocate of the Fleet and the man 
who could clear the matter up if anyone could, was conspicuous by his silence on the 
issue. 
 The serving officers asked about the issue of mutiny were of no greater assistance.  
Commander Medland, who one would assume would be in a position to know, was under 
the impression that mutiny required violence combined with disobedience.
474
  Lieutenant-
Commander Parker testified that in his view a mutiny could only be classified as such if 
the participants intended it to be one.  As none of the men of the Athabaskan had 
manifested this intent, in his view no mutiny had occurred.
475
  In the face of this 
uncertainty the commissioners abandoned their exploration of the nuances of a mutiny 
with the officer witnesses, although when the ratings were questioned, the term continued 
to be used. 
 For their part, the ratings demonstrated very little knowledge as to what did or did 
not constitute a mutiny.  Those questioned about it were, however, unanimous in their 
position that at the time of the "incident" they did not view their actions as being in any 
way mutinous.  They felt, rather, that they were merely voicing complaints through 
legitimate, if extreme, means.
476
   This belief was bolstered by the presence on 
Athabaskan of some thirty-five ratings who had served on Ontario at the time of her 
"incident."  The absence of any disciplinary action against them and the apparent success 
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of their efforts in removing Ontario's executive officer had led to the general belief that 
collective action by the ratings was a legitimate method of expressing themselves and 
bringing about change.
477
  In fact the failure of the senior officers to take disciplinary 
action in the case of Ontario may well have led the ratings to conclude that not only were 
their actions legitimate, but that they may also have been tacitly sanctioned by the RCN. 
 In the Athabaskan hearings, the Commission intensified its inquiry into the issue 
of the Canadianization of the RCN.  There was widespread agreement among the senior 
officers heard from that there was a fundamental difference between the ratings of the RN 
and the RCN.  Canadian ratings tended to be better educated than their British 
counterparts, and required more explanation as to why things were being done.
478
  
Captain W. Ogle, the commander of the tri-service college Royal Roads, saw this 
difference as being related to a superior education for Canadian youth, and argued that 
the supposed deference of the British sailor had nothing to do with any social distance 
between the rating and his officers in the Royal Navy.
479
  Captain H. Rayner agreed with 
Captain Ogle and was firm in his testimony that the training of Canadian officers in 
British ships caused Canadian officers no subsequent difficulties in commanding 
Canadian sailors.
480
  The senior officers were clear in their evidence that perceived 
national characteristics of the RCN had nothing to do with the 'incidents." 
 Receiving no joy on the issue of national character, the Commission turned its 
attention to the absence of Canadian identification on the uniforms.  Among the witnesses 
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who testified on this issue, there was almost universal agreement that such markings 
would be desirable.  The reasons given, however, had little to do with a spontaneous 
desire to be identified as Canadian for its own sake.  It appears from the evidence given 
by the ratings that the real desire for Canadian identifiers stemmed from a desire not to be 
confused with British sailors.  The similarity in uniform between the RN and the RCN led 
to Canadian ratings being verbally abused by American sailors while they were ashore.  
They were called "juicers" and "limeys."  Occasionally the animosity went so far as to 
lead to brawls between American and Canadian sailors.
 481
 
 Although some of the witnesses raised the issue of Canadian identifiers without 
prompting from the Commission,
482
  the vast majority did so only when asked.  These 
prompts came out of the blue and often under somewhat false pretenses.  Typically it 
would be suggested to the witness that "a number of the men,"
483
 or in one extreme case 
"practically every rating"
484
 had indicated that they favoured 'Canada' markings, thus 
encouraging the witnesses to agree.  These statements were, however, patently false and 
no such preponderance of evidence at any point existed.  The questions were designed to 
encourage agreement with ideas put forward by the Commission itself and played on the 
desire of the individual witnesses not to stand out.  This type of questioning would never 
have been allowed in a more formal hearing as the questions assumed facts not in 
evidence and were legally improper. 
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 The issue of welfare committees also received attention in the case of 
Athabaskan.  Whereas on Magnificent it had become clear that no welfare committee had 
existed at the time of the 'incident," on Athabaskan it appeared that one existed but was 
essentially invisible.  Commander J.C. Hibbard
485
 was firmly convinced that Athabaskan 
had a functioning welfare committee at the time of the 'incident."
486
  On closer 
examination, however, there was considerably less certainty.  Commander Medland 
expressed his belief that the requirement for welfare committees had been cancelled.  He 
also testified that, regardless of the cancellation, in his understanding welfare committees 
performed the same function as ship's fund committees.
487
 This view was shared by 
Lieutenant-Commander Parker, who was responsible for running the welfare committee 
on Athabaskan.  While he was certain that a welfare committee existed, when pressed it 
became clear that in Parker's view the welfare committee met at the same time and in the 
same place as the ship's fund committee and consisted of exactly the same personnel.  It 
also performed exactly the same function.
488
  The welfare committee was, then, in all 
particulars indistinguishable from the ship's fund committee.
489
  It was clear that Parker 
was doing his best to provide the 'correct' answer to the questions put to him, but as the 
cross-examination by the commissioners progressed, it became equally clear that there 
was no functioning welfare committee aboard Athabaskan. 
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 The reasons for the failure to establish a welfare committee were similar to those 
given for Magnificent.  The failure to incorporate the directive that welfare committees be 
formed into the regulatory structure left the impression among senior officers that the 
idea had been dropped.  Even those officers, like Lieutenant-Commander Parker, who 
believed that such committees were a good idea, received very little guidance as to the 
functions that they were to perform and the parameters within which they were to 
operate.  This was particularly true of matters of ship's routine.  Ordinarily the purview of 
the executive officer, it was unclear whether they fell within the mandate of the welfare 
committees.
490
  In the absence of guidance it appears that, at least on Magnificent and 
Athabaskan, the senior officers took the path of least resistance and just failed to form 
welfare committees at all, leaving the ratings with no vehicle for airing complaints. 
 The final incident investigated was the one aboard HMCS Crescent.  As the last 
of the three ships to arrive in Canadian waters, it made sense that the other ships be heard 
from first.  The portion of the hearing devoted to Crescent was significantly shorter than 
those devoted to the other ships.  This was reflected in the more direct focus of the 
questions put to the witnesses.  By the time they got to Crescent the Commission had 
gained its sea legs and had determined what the important issues were. 
 As had been the case with the other two 'incidents," the proximate causes of the 
"incident" aboard Crescent were relatively mundane.  At the time of the "incident" 
Crescent was alongside in Nanjing China.  She was initially in company with HMS 
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Cossack and then on her own.  Given the uncertain political situation in China at the time, 
the crew were not given leave and were not permitted access to Nanjing proper.
491
 
 Prior to the "incident" the weather had been miserable and rainy.  To make 
matters worse, by the time she reached Nanjing, Crescent had used up much of her 
available supply of fresh fruit and vegetables and there were none available to purchase 
locally.  While the quantity of the food available was sufficient the menu became 
considerably more bland for the men than it had been previously on the cruise.
492
  These 
factors combined to create a generally negative feeling among the men. 
 In order to provide some form of entertainment for the ratings, Captain H.V.W. 
Groos had decided to establish a shore canteen in a warehouse structure near Crescent's 
berth.  To access that structure the men had to cross a bridge spanning a ditch.  This in 
turn necessitated the placement of two additional sentries, one in the canteen and one at 
the bridge.
493
  The sentries would by necessity come from the seaman's branch, and 
would be standing sentry duty in addition to their other duties.  This duty meant that in 
some cases the men were getting only one hour off between watches.
494
  This 
constellation of circumstances would prove unfortunate for Crescent. 
 The closest proximate cause of the "incident" ostensibly involved forty cases of 
beer.  Crescent was transporting this beer for delivery to the British ambassador.  On two 
occasions arrangements had been made with the ambassador to provide a truck to pick 
the cases up.  On each occasion the men on watch, primarily seamen, had to move the 
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cases from the ship to the jetty.  When the promised truck failed to arrive, the cases had 
to be moved back aboard to prevent the disappearance of the beer.
495
  One can well 
imagine how frustrating this must have been for the men moving the beer, particularly 
combined with the additional watches. 
 The "incident" itself began at 0805 on 15 March.  At that time "hands fall in" was 
piped following breakfast.  At 0815 Captain Groos was advised by Lieutenant G.R. 
Wood the executive officer that the seamen from both the fore and aft seaman's mess 
decks were refusing to fall in and had locked themselves in the forward mess deck.  
There were eighty-three men involved in this action, out of a ship's complement of one 
hundred eighty-six officers and men.
496
  It appears that Lieutenant Wood then had "clear 
lower decks" piped, on his own initiative, and again received no response from the 
men.
497
  The vast majority of the men involved were from the seaman's branch and were 
below the rate of leading seaman.  The stokers and electricians were not involved for the 
most part, as issues of ship's routine did not apply to them and the evidence is that they 
had no particular issues.
498
   
 Captain Groos then met with Seaman Rudolph, who he considered a leader 
among the men, although not necessarily a ringleader behind the "incident."  At 
Rudolph's request Groos agreed to visit the mess deck and address the men.  Groos made 
it clear, however, that he would be doing all of the talking during the meeting.  When he 
arrived in the mess deck, Groos advised the assembled crewmen that what they were 
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doing was wrong and not the correct method of stating a grievance.  He further advised 
them that their actions constituted a mutiny, and that he would have "hands fall in" piped 
at 0950.  Failure on the part of the ratings to respond at that time, Groos advised them, 
would be viewed as a mutiny and the appropriate steps would be taken to quell it.  At 
0950 the "hands fall in" was piped and all hands responded.
499
  No further action was 
taken against the men and the entire incident was over in less than two hours. 
 As had been the case with the other two ships, the Commission duly inquired 
about the presence of any "red" influence aboard Crescent.  The questions were by this 
point, however, pro forma and asked as almost an afterthought.  They also only asked 
three of the witnesses about this, with two of them dismissing the idea outright.
500
  Able 
Seaman Peden raised the idea of collective bargaining powers, but only in reference to 
the necessity of raising general grievances and he specifically excluded discussion of 
wages and similar issues from the appropriate areas for collective action by the ratings.
501
  
By the time of the Crescent hearing the Commission seems to have decided that there 
was no communist influence behind the 'incidents.' 
 Considerable attention was focused in the conduct of Lieutenant G.R. Wood, the 
executive officer.  One of the demands made of Captain Groos in a "manifesto" he had 
discovered on the port flat during the incident was for Wood's removal.
502
  The men 
complained that Lieutenant Wood did not seem to know his job, particularly with regard 
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to changes in ship's routine and the issue of the beer on the jetty.
503
  There was also a 
general criticism of the brusque and offhand way in which he spoke to the men.
504
 
 Some of the complaints certainly had some foundation.  Lieutenant Wood was 
undeniably inexperienced as an executive officer.
505
  Crescent represented his first 
appointment as an executive officer, and he had received no specific training in his duties 
as such.  The shortage of personnel on the ship generally and the diplomatic 
responsibilities which Captain Groos while in Nanjing meant that Wood had very little by 
way of mentoring available to him.  He was essentially left to fend for himself in his new 
duties.  To make matters worse, he had only recently been appointed to Crescent and was 
her third executive officer in a year.
506
  In these circumstances it would have been 
surprising if Wood had not shown signs of inexperience and uncertainty in the 
performance of his duties. 
 Some of the criticisms of Lieutenant Wood, on the other hand, were unfair.  He 
was, for example, blamed for the beer on the jetty issue and for changes in ship's routine.  
In fact, the order to move the cases of beer originated with Captain Groos and the 
changes in routine were done to conform to the senior ship on station, HMS Cossack, 
again something for which Wood was not responsible.  Thus Wood, to match Cossack's 
routine, ordered the ratings to change out of their work clothes to go to the canteen.  This 
annoyed them considerably.  While this was continued after Cossack's departure, it was 
unfair to blame Lieutenant Wood for things over which he had minimal control.
507
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 It appears that the problem of Lieutenant Wood was a matter of personality rather 
than any sense of superiority or entitlement.  According to Captain Groos, Lieutenant 
Wood was quite a shy individual.  His discomfort led to his appearing to have a brusque 
and superior attitude, which rubbed the men the wrong way.
508
  Once confronted with his 
shortcomings, however, all witnesses agreed that Wood's performance improved across 
the board, and by the time Crescent returned to Esquimalt, all agreed that he had become 
quite a good Executive Officer. 
 Lieutenant Wood's difficulties were symptomatic of a larger issue plaguing the 
RCN; the lack of stability in personnel.  The proper functioning of the divisional system 
as a vehicle by which the happiness and wellbeing of the crew could be supported 
required that the officers and men know one another and feel comfortable speaking to one 
another about a wide range of issues.  This, in turn, required that the officers and men 
serve together for extended periods of time.
509
  In Crescent's case there had been a 
frequent turnover of officers and men, with most of the divisional officers being new to 
the ship.  They did not, therefore, know their men particularly well, and the barometer for 
testing the mood of the crew had ceased to function.
 510
  This situation was made worse 
by the presence of an executive officer who was also new to his job and unfamiliar with 
both his fellow officers and the men of the lower deck. 
 The establishment of welfare committees was designed, at least in part, to address 
this problem.  Unlike Magnificent and Athabaskan, Crescent had a functioning welfare 
committee at the time of the "incident," separate and apart from the ship's fund 
committee.  This committee had met two or three times during the cruise prior to the 
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'incident," including a meeting on 13 March.  At that meeting the welfare committee had 
requested the abolition of the shore canteen which was the source of much of the 
discontent.  It requested that the men be allowed to have their beer on the ship instead.  
The request was duly put to Captain Groos by Lieutenant Wood and denied by Captain 
Groos on 14 March.
511
  It is difficult to believe that it is a coincidence that the "incident" 
occurred the very next day. 
 The failure of the welfare committee to alleviate the unrest and prevent the 
"incident" was due to a complete confusion as to the proper terms of reference for welfare 
committees in general.  The instructions on the creation of welfare committees did not 
provide any guidance as to what items came within its purview and which did not.
512
  
This left the decision in the hands of the individual executive officers.  In Lieutenant 
Wood's case, he had made the decision that the welfare committee was authorised to deal 
with amenities and recreational facilities, but that its authority did not extend to matters 
of ship's routine, such as the changing of uniforms or the establishment of recreational 
facilities ashore.
513
  On Crescent, then, Lieutenant Wood determined on his own 
authority that the welfare committee could not deal with some of the most serious causes 
of discontent among the crew.
 514
 
 Welfare committees were supported, in principle, by the men of the lower deck.  
Chief Petty Officer Pickering, the member for the Chief Petty Officer's Mess, went so far 
as to suggest that they, in and of themselves, were the answer to the RCN's morale 
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problems.
 515
  The failure to establish firm parameters for the operation of welfare 
committees, however, led to the general belief among the members of Crescent's welfare 
committee that in its present form it was all but useless in getting anything of significance 
accomplished.
516
  It seems, then, that an ineffectual voice was in many ways worse than 
no voice at all for the men of the lower deck. 
 In the absence of a functioning welfare committee, the spectre of HMCS Ontario 
once again hove into view.  The crew of Crescent were familiar with the actions of 
Ontario's crew and were aware that the men involved in that "incident" had not been 
punished for their actions.  While the witnesses uniformly denied that the Ontario 
"incident" was a factor in Crescent,
517
 this is not a credible claim given the similarity of 
the two series of events.  It is much more reasonable to conclude that the men of the 
Crescent, like those aboard Athabaskan, believed their actions to be appropriate in the 
absence of any other effective vehicle for airing their concerns. 
 The Commission also dealt with the issue of Canadian identification with the 
crew of Crescent.  As had been the case with Athabaskan few of the witnesses 
spontaneously mentioned a desire for Canadian identification on their uniforms.  Those 
who did wanted it for the same reasons that had prevailed among Athabaskan's people.  
They were tired of the abuse that they received when they were mistaken for British 
sailors and found that they were more respected, particularly by American sailors, when 
they were known to be Canadian.
518
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 Of particular interest in this regard is the testimony of Sub-Lieutenant C.B. 
Wither, who had recently completed his training with the Royal Navy.  He was acting as 
a divisional officer for Canadian sailors for the first time aboard Crescent.  Wither 
acknowledged that the Canadian sailor was better educated than his British counterpart 
and required more information generally about what he was doing and why he was doing 
it.  He was steadfast, however, in his belief that the divisional system in the RCN was 
"almost a dead loss" due to the frequent changes of personnel, and equally firm in his 
conviction that the training of Canadian officers on British ships had nothing to do with 
morale problems and had no negative impact on officer-man relations.
519
 
 It was at this point that the questioning took a strange turn.  The Commission 
began to question Wither's habits and mannerisms, at one point asking him whether he 
was conscious that he "spoke a different language than the other people on a Canadian 
ship,"
520
 presumably based on what the commissioners perceived to be his English 
accent. This was the first mention of any accent possessed by a Canadian officer that 
arose during seven volumes of testimony and the phrasing of the question made the 
Commission's view of the matter quite clear.  While it was not explicitly stated, the 
Commission clearly felt that Sub-Lieutenant Wither's accent was problematic in his role 
as a divisional officer.  While the specific Commissioner posing the question is 
impossible to determine from the transcript, given Louis Audette's feelings about British 
trained regular officers, it is clear that he was driving the questioning in this instance. 
 The commissioners continued to engage in some back-handed questioning 
practices.  In exploring the issue of whether the senior ratings and officers should have 
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seen the trouble coming, Coxwain Marshall [sic] testified that the incident had been a 
surprise to him and the other Petty Officers aboard Crescent.  He was then advised that 
there was evidence before the Commission that the conditions aboard Crescent were so 
bad that the impending trouble was obvious.
521
  No such evidence had been given and the 
statement was a trap designed to get Coxwain Marshall to agree with the general 
proposition that Crescent's officers had known of the trouble and been negligent in their 
response.  Such questioning, again, would never have been allowed in a more formal 
setting, and Audette and Wickwire, not to mention Commander Hurcombe, as lawyers, 
would have been fully aware of this fact. 
 With the views of the crews of the individual ships established the Commission 
moved on to the final phase of the inquiry.  This involved the examination of the more 
senior naval personnel and began in Esquimalt, to conclude in Ottawa in the early part of 
June of 1949.  Not surprisingly the testimony in this final phase moved away from 
specific causes of discontent and concentrated more on broader naval policy issues. 
 Among the most senior officers of the RCN there was universal agreement that 
one of the main problems facing the fleet was the paucity of properly trained officers, 
particularly for the executive officer and divisional officer positions.  Admirals P. Nelles, 
H.G. DeWolfe
522
 and H.T.W. Grant
523
 all agreed that the root cause of the shortage was 
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the rapid growth of the RCN following the wholesale discharge of personnel in the 
immediate post-war period.  As Admiral Grant explained the situation, the RCN had to 
expand in order to maintain its relevance among the three services.  While the option had 
existed for the RCN to remain small and operate as a training cadre for wartime 
expansion, this would have resulted in the RCN receiving a smaller portion of the 
defence budget.  If expansion or equipment replacement proved necessary, the RCN 
"would have a hell of a job trying to get another damn nickel from the Government."
524
  
Clearly the RCN's fall into virtual irrelevance in the inter-war years still haunted the 
senior naval leadership, and they were prepared to put up with a flawed system of 
expansion rather than have it happen again. 
 The consequence of the commitment to growth in the RCN was an over-
commitment of ships and inadequate time to train the personnel to man them.
525
  In order 
to both respond to its commitments and to provide some sea training for its officers, 
which was necessary to allow them to retain their watchkeeping certificates, frequent 
rotation of personnel was necessary.  This meant that in the case of both divisional 
officers and executive officers, men were being appointed to positions for which they 
lacked experience and in which they were not given sufficient time to know their men 
and properly learn their jobs.
526
  According to Mr. E.S.W. Belyea, a personnel selection 
officer during the war and an expert on the divisional system, the system in these 
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circumstances became less of a functioning unit and more of a tool for personnel 
management.
527
 
 The lack of experienced officers and the frequent changes of personnel led to a 
breakdown of communication between the men of the lower deck, the officers and the 
petty officers.  In essence nobody was speaking to anyone else about matters of concern 
in the ships.  The men, for their part, felt that their concerns had been disregarded and 
that there was nobody in whom they felt comfortable confiding.
528
  The petty officers, 
many of them new to their positions due to the changes in pay and trade group structure, 
had little confidence in their officers, who also were new to their positions.  The officers 
were inadequately trained to either recognise this or to do anything about if they had.  
While the method by which the men chose to make their grievances known was wrong 
from a regulatory point of view, even Admiral Grant was prepared to concede that the 
men felt that they had no choice in the circumstances but to take coordinated action.
529
 
 In the long term the solution to the inexperience problem was the provision of a 
dedicated training ship.  Admiral Grant suggested the use of HMCS Uganda but 
conceded that any large ship would suffice.  He was firm, however, that a large ship was 
essential if a significant number of officers and ratings were to be trained at the same 
time and a steady supply of properly trained officers was to be maintained.
530
    The 
operational portion of the fleet would then be manned by officers with both technical and 
leadership training and would be officers in whom the ratings could have confidence.  It 
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would also allow for divisional and executive officers to spend more time in their 
respective positions and thereby get to know the men under their commands.
531
 
 In the short term there were two potential solutions.  The first was to provide 
some relief to the seaman's branch.  It was no coincidence that the driving force behind 
all three "incidents" were the members of the seaman's branch, and this was not lost on 
the commissioners.  With increasing technical specialisation in the other branches, 
accompanied by higher pay, the seaman's branch had "fallen into disrepute" in the words 
of Admiral Grant.  The specialist ratings had come to believe that participating in 
cleaning and other maintenance tasks was beneath them.  According to Grant this was 
being immediately addressed and directives had gone out requiring the participation of 
other branches in seaman's duties.
532
  This was only a partial solution, however, and a full 
solution would only occur when the seaman's branch was treated as a specialty in the 
same way as the technical branches were, and, of course, paid accordingly. 
 In a related vein the Commission also explored making changes in the recruiting 
process.  In doing this they examined the system used by the United States Navy, which 
involved all new recruits entering the service as seamen and receiving initial basic 
training in seamanship.  Specialisation took place only after this initial training had been 
received, and the substantive pay was the same for all personnel by rank.  There was no 
grade group pay given in the US Navy.  While witnesses like Lieutenant A.H.M. Slater, 
the recruiting officer for the West Coast, were in favour of this system,
533
 expansion 
requirements again became an issue.  While a good idea in theory and for a large navy, 
the demand for technical specialists  required to keep Canadian ships operational, and the 
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additional technical training required to run increasingly sophisticated equipment made a 
general entry system impractical,
534
 at least until the size of the fleet had stabilised. 
 In terms of recruiting literature issued by the RCN, there were also problems.  As 
Admiral Grant colourfully put it, "our desire to afford the sailor reading lamps and 
bedroom slippers so that he will not be at a disadvantage with his contemporaries ashore 
conflicts in some measure with life on the lower deck."
535
  This echoed several other 
comments and a more general call for more accurate representations of naval life in the 
recruiting material produced by the RCN.  When the ratings completed their training and 
arrived aboard ship the marked difference between the rosy picture of travel and 
adventure provided by the recruiting material and the reality of the hard work and 
cramped living conditions of the lower deck was bound to cause some dissatisfaction.  
The witnesses were in agreement that while a more accurate portrayal of life in naval 
service might discourage some recruits, those that enlisted would be more prepared for 
the hardships to come and generally more content in the service. 
 There was also widespread agreement among the senior officers that in the short 
term the use of welfare committees could help to ameliorate the morale problems.  The 
Canadian rating, being viewed by the senior officers as both better educated and therefore 
more outspoken than his British counterpart, did not obey officers by virtue of rank alone.  
Obedience of officers in the RCN was the result of the officer proving himself as 
competent and concerned with the welfare of his men.
536
  A properly functioning 
divisional system would render welfare committees unnecessary.  Until such time as the 
divisional system had been brought up to scratch, however, the welfare committee would 
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provide a good safety valve for the ratings to make their concerns known to the more 
senior officers.  When combined with the appointment of a director of welfare and 
service conditions (in essence an inspector general for the navy), which had only been 
done four months prior to the hearings, Admiral Grant felt that a short term solution to 
the morale issues was at hand.
537
 
 Captain J.D. Prentice
538
, the President of the Naval Officers' Association, went 
even further.  He advocated the establishment of a central welfare committee as was used 
in the RN, which was made up of representatives from each individual ship's welfare 
committee and met once a year.  The central welfare committee would report directly to 
the responsible minister and to the naval staff as to issues of concern to the lower deck.
539
  
He was suggesting, in effect, giving the ratings a direct voice on the naval staff. 
 While the Commission was in favour of the welfare committee as a concept 
throughout the hearings, the suggestion of a central committee was more than its 
membership was prepared to countenance.  The commissioners expressed concern that a 
central welfare committee would in essence place the ratings in charge of the Navy and 
could lead to expectations of collective bargaining by the lower deck.
540
 There was 
clearly a limit to the amount of say that the Commission felt it was appropriate for the 
ratings to have.   
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 As it had throughout the proceedings, the Commission dealt once again with the 
issue of Canadian identification on uniforms.  Captains E.P. Tisdall and C.J. Dillon and 
Admiral Grant all indicated their support for Canadian identifiers on the uniforms of the 
ratings.
541
  The question was what form the identification would take.  By the time of the 
hearings, a maple leaf identifier had been approved for use on the ratings' uniforms.  The 
Commission, in all probability in the person of Louis Audette, immediately began a 
heated argument with Admiral Grant about whether a "Canada" shoulder flash would be 
more appropriate.
542
  It was clear from the thrust of the questions that the Commission 
believed it would be. 
 Unfortunately, Admiral Grant, no great fan of the Canadian identifier to begin 
with, became somewhat intemperate in his remarks.  He indicated that he was opposed to 
any identifiers because the sailors had not earned them, they spoiled the look of the 
uniform, and they didn't improve the quality of the men as sailors.  He also indicated, 
however, that he was prepared to go along with some identification if it would improve 
morale and that "if they [the ratings] don't like it [the maple leaf] and still want to put 
'Canada' on we will take the maple leaf off and put 'Canada' on the seat of their pants."
543
  
This was immediately interpreted by the Commission as a callous and disrespectful 
remark and undermined Grant's credibility.  In reality, and given the proper context, it 
was an ill considered response to deliberate goading on what he considered a minor issue.  
It overshadowed the remainder of his testimony, which made it clear that he was 
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prepared, within reason, to do whatever was needed to improve morale, but that the RCN 
had far bigger problems than Canadian identification to deal with.
544
 
 One of the bigger issues that Grant believed was detrimental to the wellbeing of 
the RCN was the tri-service structure introduced by Brooke Claxton.  He pointed out the 
unbalanced trade group structure in which, for example, a cook and a baker were two 
separate trade groups in the Army and Air Force and were functions performed by two 
different people.  In the RCN they were performed by one person and represented one 
trade group.  In Grant's view this was a fundamentally unfair arrangement for the naval 
personnel and required a remedy.  He also railed against the bureaucracy that the tri-
service structure had created which prevented the timely completion of any changes.  As 
an example he used the appointment of a Director of Welfare and Service Conditions, 
which, although having been completed months earlier, was still bogged down in 
discussions of authority and had yet to have any impact on service conditions.
545
  It was 
clear that Grant believed that the tri-service structure ignored the essential needs of the 
RCN as a distinct service, and in this the Commission agreed with him.
546
 
 One of the main areas in which the RCN was prejudiced by the tri-service 
structure was in the matter of budgeting.  Prior to the changes introduced by Claxton, 
each service submitted its own budget (known as "estimates" in the RCN) to Parliament 
annually to be approved or modified.  Under the changes made by Claxton, however, 
there was one pool of money available for the military, and it was up to the three services 
to allocate it as amongst themselves.  The minister held final approval on the allocations 
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and, depending on the situation at any particular time, would approve the allocation that 
provided the best "bang for the buck." in terms of prestige or to meet particular global 
conditions.
547
  This approach tended to give low priority to expenditures that would take 
years to realise, such as the construction of new ships and shore establishments, and a 
higher priority to programs in which the impact would be more immediate.  This by its 
nature prejudiced naval interests, which required expensive long-term projects such as 
ship replacement, in favour of army and air force projects which were cheaper and faster 
on a per unit basis. 
 Construction of accommodations, particularly on the East Coast, was illustrative 
of the problem.  The extant barracks at HMCS Stadacona had been intended to be a 
temporary structure to deal with the wartime influx of personnel.  By 1947 the building 
was badly in need of replacement.  Plans for construction of new barracks had first been 
submitted for approval in 1947.  Due to spending cuts and interference from the deputy 
minister of national defence, by 1949 they had still not been formally approved.  
Questions were raised by the deputy minister not only over the need for the construction 
and the costs of replacing the barracks, but over such minutiae as the selection of building 
materials.
548
  Given that construction of the barracks was a five year project, the earliest 
date for completion would be 1954, some seven years after the initial request.
549
  The 
implication in the testimony was that the other services did not have similar problems 
with construction, although Admiral Grant stopped short of stating this outright.  
Regardless of the truth of the matter, the RCN certainly believed that it was having a 
harder go of things at budget time than the other services. 
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 Similar difficulties were experienced in the procurement of clothing stores and 
other supplies.  Even such a seemingly simple thing as the purchase of hats required a 
lengthy tendering process, and resulted in the navy being chronically short of basic 
stores.  The men, then, were left to purchase their own clothing with an entirely 
inadequate kit allowance.  Again, this problem did not seem to exist in the army or the air 
force.  The upshot of it all was that even when the naval staff knew how to ameliorate 
service conditions, the systems in place rendered it virtually impossible for them to do so 
in a reasonable period of time.
550
 
 The issue of communist influence, which had been steadily declining in 
importance as the hearings progressed, was virtually ignored in the final session.  Only 
one witness, Commander L.L. Atwood, the director of naval intelligence, mentioned it at 
all.  For his part, Atwood was certain that there were communists at work in the RCN, but 
offered as proof only the absence of any mention of infiltration in the "communist 
press."
551
  Once again the circular reasoning applied and the proof was the absence of any 
proof.
552
  No other witness was asked about "red" influences or chose to comment on it.  
It is clear that by the time they got to Ottawa, the commissioners had decided that the 
RCN was not, in fact, a hotbed of communist activity and that the causes of the 
"incidents" were considerably less political. 
 Two additional issues of interest arose during the Ottawa hearings for the first 
time.  Admiral V.G. Brodeur called for more conformity of discipline for breaches of 
regulations.  He felt that punishments varied by officer and that the lack of uniformity of 
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punishment between officers led to confusion among the ratings.  Lenient officers would 
give the ratings a sense of what they would be able to get away with, only to have that 
proven incorrect under another officer.
553
  None of the other witnesses, the ratings in 
particular, had raised this as an issue. 
 The other new issue was that of class.  Both Mr. Pegg, who had left the RCN after 
a seven year enlistment, and Captain K.F. Adams raised the issue of social class.  While a 
number of witnesses had complained that the officers spoke to them in a condescending 
manner, only these two linked this and the resulting disaffection to social class.
554
  
Captain Adams suggested that officers be instructed in the difference between class 
distinction and those based on education, in order to address this issue.
555
  While he was 
the only witness to specifically raise this, Adams was preaching to the choir in Louis 
Audette, who was already firmly convinced that education and not birth should be the 
basis of social stratification and had made his views on this clear since his wartime 
service. 
 The hearings overall illustrated a number of problems plaguing the RCN both at a 
micro and macro level.  Communist influence in the RCN was not one of them.  The 
failure of the commissioners to follow up aggressively on indications that there may be 
subversion and their increasing lack of interest in the subject as the hearings progressed 
leads to the conclusion that they never really believed there were "reds" in the navy to 
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begin with.  Even with the heightened sensitivities of the cold war, the idea seemed too 
absurd for the commissioners to countenance. 
 On a micro level it became clear that while the proximate causes of the 
"incidents" were mundane, the factor that took them from minor griping to full scale 
disobedience was the absence of any method by which the men of the lower deck could 
express themselves.  The  frequent changes of personnel and overall lack of experience of 
the junior officers had rendered the divisional system non-functional as anything other 
than a bureaucratic organisational tool.  The orders promulgating the creation of welfare 
committees had not been done properly and allowed individual ships and officers the 
ability to opt out under the guise of not having been ordered to form one, or to mash the 
welfare committee together with the ship's fund committee and thereby deny it its proper 
function.  Ambiguous terms of reference made this problem worse, and inexperienced 
executive officers simply lacked the ability to determine what matters impacted ship's 
welfare and which did not.  The welfare committees, then, when they existed, provided 
an ineffectual voice for the ratings, which in many ways was worse than no voice at all. 
 On a macro level the problem was clearly one of funding.  The tri-service 
structure was not working for the RCN.  It had created a number of more lucrative 
specialist trade groups which were attracting the personnel on enlistment.  The seaman's 
branch, responsible for maintenance and operation of the ship generally, had become 
increasingly understaffed and overworked.  It is no coincidence that the driving force 
behind all three incidents was the seaman's branch, and that the seaman's branch would 
continue to be the lightening rod for discontent until something was done to fix the 
problem.  Part of the solution was to make the other branches more responsible for 
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general duties around the ship, and part was to recognise the seaman's branch as a 
specialist branch in its own right.  Both of these solutions were in the process of being 
implemented, but neither had been completed in time to prevent the "incidents." 
 The hearings also illuminate a shocking gap in the naval regulations.  Mutiny, the 
most serious crime in the naval lexicon, for some reason remained an undefined term in 
the regulations.  The disagreements between the commissioners and senior officers as to 
what constituted a mutiny is surprising in a military service dependent on discipline.  
This led to a situation in which, when the "incidents" occurred, there was uncertainty as 
to what disciplinary action was appropriate,  which in the long term is not a tenable 
situation. 
 Overall the picture of the RCN that emerges from the hearings is of an 
organisation undergoing severe growing pains.  From its massive wartime size the RCN 
had shrunk in the immediate post-war period to virtual non-existence.  It then, in a very 
short span, had to grow again to something approximating ten thousand men, very few of 
whom had any prior naval experience.  This situation was bound to cause problems in the 
short term while the new officers and men became more familiar with the naval 
environment and their duties in it.  The naval staff for its part was learning on the fly.  
While many of them had experience running a wartime navy, none were well versed in 
how to run a navy in peacetime.  As in many things, mistakes were proving the best 
teachers in this regard.  Given the internal studies being done, and the responses of the 
witnesses, the RCN was aware of what the issues were and the naval staff was taking 
steps to remedy them.  They unfortunately ran out of time. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Aftermath 
 
 
 
 The Commission forwarded its final report, rather cumbersomely entitled "Report 
on certain 'Incidents' which occurred on board H.M.C.S. Athabaskan, Crescent and 
Magnificent and on other matters concerning the Royal Canadian Navy" to Claxton on 25 
October, 1949.
556
  Given the number of witnesses and reports that had to be taken into 
consideration and the requirement for consultation among the commissioners, the report 
was produced with remarkable speed.  Overall the report represented a balanced and 
relatively moderate view of the evidence put before the Commission.  There were, 
however, some anomalies which allowed the report to be used by the government, and in 
particular Claxton, to change the focus of the discussion to the Canadianization of the 
RCN and away from the causes of discontent that required expenditure. 
 The Commission itself undoubtedly believed that it was performing a quasi-
judicial function rather than a purely investigative one.  At one point, for example, the 
commissioners took "judicial notice" of the name of a popular fictional radio character.
557
  
This device, used sparingly by judges, generally allows for the admission as fact things 
that are generally common knowledge and it is generally restricted to the courts.  The 
presence of Mr. Wickwire and Commander Hurcombe to provide advice concerning the 
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manner in which evidence was taken served to bolster the idea that the Commission was 
acting in some way as a judicial body.  As a quasi-judicial body, then, one would expect 
the commissioners themselves to act in a judicial manner and for the conclusions and 
recommendations made to be based on evidence presented to the Commission during the 
course of the hearings.  In most of the findings this was in fact the case but in a few 
instances the report came to conclusions and made recommendations with no basis in the 
evidence in some cases and in others with very little. 
 The Commission dealt with the issue of subversive influences in the RCN in an 
almost perfunctory manner.  While they found that "labour actions" in other areas had 
some influence on the attitude of the ratings, the Commission remained unconvinced that 
there was any ongoing communist agitation in the RCN.
558
  Given that, during the course 
of the hearings, the Commission never really looked for any such agitation, this 
conclusion is hardly surprising.  In light, however, of the pervasive fear of communist 
agitation in the trade union movement, and particularly the CSU, one is left to wonder 
whether no evidence of agitation was found because it was not there, or because the 
commissioners did not want to find it.  What is certain is that evidence of communist 
agitation, had it been found, would have placed the hearings and indeed the RCN in an 
entirely different light and would have critically undermined public confidence in both 
the RCN and in Claxton for allowing it to happen on his watch. 
 While communist agitation was not found the Report did find agitation present 
from another source.  The presence of men on the lower deck who had been aboard 
HMCS Ontario at the time of her "incident" was found to be problematic.  This was 
particularly visible in the demands of the men on Crescent and Athabaskan for the 
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removal of their respective executive officers.  The commissioners saw the link between 
these requests and the successful effort by the men of Ontario to remove their executive 
officer, Commander Brock.  The failure of the naval leadership to discipline the men of 
Ontario in any meaningful way, and the removal of Commander Brock, apparently in 
response to the demands of the ratings, was seen by the Commission as encouraging the 
men of Athabaskan and Crescent to take a similar course of action.
559
  For Admiral 
Mainguy, who had made the decisions concerning the Ontario  "incident," agreeing to 
this conclusion must have involved the swallowing of a considerable amount of pride 
indeed. 
 The commissioners were also quite careful to point out from the outset that their 
report would be, by its nature, critical of the RCN.  They were clear that they did not 
wish this criticism to overshadow the proud achievements of the RCN and its personnel.  
While they found some things wrong with the RCN, they also wished it to be 
remembered that "a great deal also is overwhelmingly right" with the Navy.
560
 
 In this context, then, the Commission was clear in its view that many of the 
problems encountered would be solved by the simple passage of time.
561
  Many of the 
difficulties were attributed to growing pains caused by the rapid peacetime expansion of 
the fleet and "the process of a quick turnover from war to peace."
562
 The report also 
contained an acknowledgement of the RCN's knowledge of and attempts to solve the 
problems in the years prior to the incidents.
563
  In placing these riders on their findings, 
the commissioners seemed eager to ensure that no radical or sweeping change was seen 
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by Claxton as a necessary solution to the RCN's problems.  While aware, then, that their 
report would be potentially useful politically, they sought to limit precisely how useful it 
could be. 
 The report then went on to make nineteen observations and thirty 
recommendations to improve morale in the RCN.  They ran the gamut from the relatively 
minor to the quite controversial.  What was excluded was any discussion of naval policy 
or any critique of the way in which the RCN was being utilised.  The argument that the 
RCN was trying to do too much with too little and sending under-trained, inexperienced 
and poorly equipped personnel into the international arena, while suggested throughout 
the hearings, would not be raised by the Commission and policy would remain Claxton's 
preserve. 
 Among the relatively innocuous recommendations was the call for the provision 
of better films for the men to watch while at sea.  Given the unique circumstances of life 
afloat, off-duty sailors could not simply pop into town to see a film or go to a tavern.  The 
maintenance of morale required that they be provided with some form of entertainment 
and it became clear during the hearings that pre-war films and outdated training films 
were not particularly entertaining and did not fill the bill.  It was therefore recommended 
that more and better films be provided for viewing at sea and that public funds be 
provided to subsidise the costs of this if necessary.
564
  Given the relatively modest costs 
involved in this it was not likely to raise a great deal of objection from Claxton or the 
government and so was a fairly safe recommendation. 
 A similar recommendation was made concerning the provision of recreational 
facilities ashore.  The Commission had travelled to Seattle, Washington, during the 
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course of the hearings and toured the US Navy base located there.  They were suitably 
impressed with the recreational facilities available to the men, next to which those for 
RCN sailors in Halifax were barely adequate, and those in Esquimalt non-existent.  They 
recommended that base accommodations and recreational facilities be constructed on 
both coasts without delay.
565
  This recommendation was also well supported by the 
evidence and unlikely to meet with any real opposition, particularly as no time line was 
suggested for the completion of construction. 
 The Commission's recommendation that payment for good conduct badges be 
reinstated and for the provision of lockers for the storage of civilian clothes so that the 
men could change before going ashore were also relatively easy fixes to minor nagging 
problems which arose during the hearings.  Similarly the recommendation that each class 
of ship in the RCN have its own routine followed by all ships of that class represented a 
solution to a nagging problem that was behind the incidents and could be fixed easily by 
fiat.
566
  These issues were more administrative than functional and were unlikely to have 
any significant impact on the direction of the RCN going forward. 
 Where things began to get more controversial was in the area of welfare 
committees.  The Commission found, quite correctly, that the incidents probably would 
not have happened had the ships had  properly functioning welfare committees.
567
  The 
commissioners were convinced that the men of the lower deck needed an outlet for their 
grievances, failing which discontent would simmer under the surface until it erupted in 
'incidents' of mass insubordination.  Furthermore, the outlet had to be a real and 
functioning one, not just the appearance of agency but real participation in aspects of the 
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decision making process aboard ship.  As a result the Commission recommended that 
welfare committees be established on all ships along the lines that had been previously 
set out, that is to say comprised of one member elected from each mess and chaired by 
the executive officer.  The Commission went one step further and also recommended that 
the power of the welfare committees be clarified by regulation and expanded to include 
all matters within the discretion of the ship's captain.
568
  This would, then, allow the 
welfare committees to comment on ship's routine and to have these comments be 
addressed rather than dismissed out of hand as had previously been the case.  The 
inclusion of the welfare committees in the regulations would also prevent 
"misunderstandings" among senior officers opposed to them about whether they were 
mandatory or optional. 
 While the standardisation would serve to rectify the veritable swamp of individual 
practices then operating, the Commission went even further.  Taking a page from the 
Royal Navy model, the Commission recommended that the minutes from each meeting 
aboard each ship be forwarded to the newly created Director of Service Conditions and 
Welfare.
569
  In doing so the Commission was advocating the creation of a central 
repository for feedback from the lower deck so that widely held complaints could be 
more easily recognised and acted upon in an organised way, before they festered and 
erupted in incidents of insubordination. 
 The Commission was also critical of the tri-service system of rank and pay 
structures instituted by Claxton, although the commissioners were careful not to make 
any recommendations about it.  The report found that the tri-service structure put an 
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undue administrative burden on a small number of individuals in the case of the RCN, 
and to a greater degree than in the other services.  The committees and paperwork 
required of the system, which were over and above those ordinarily required, fell to a 
relatively small number of suitably senior officers.  This left them inadequate time for the 
proper formulation and implementation of naval policy.  It also had the effect of leaving 
the RCN scrambling for personnel to fill staff roles, so departments tended to be staffed 
by whomever was available rather than by officers with appropriate training and 
experience.
570
  This was not an issue that emerged from the evidence before the 
Commission and in all probability reflected the overall impression made on the 
commissioners, particularly Admiral Mainguy.  Regardless of the source of the 
observations, however, the failure of the Commission to make any concrete 
recommendations regarding the tri-service structure, and to confine itself to observations, 
was clearly done out of deference to Claxton's policies. 
 This impression is reinforced by the absence of any mention of the pay structure.  
All of the reports done by the RCN had indicated that the changes in rank and pay 
structure had created some significant difficulties.  There were too many mid-range non-
Commissioned officers and not enough seamen.  It was no coincidence that the driving 
personnel behind all three incidents were crewmen below the rate of leading seamen and 
the hearings had made it clear that the bulk of the ordinary work around the ship fell to 
them.  Nonetheless, any substantive comments would have crossed the line into naval 
policy, and it became clear from the outset that this was a line that the Commission was 
not prepared to cross. 
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 The observations regarding the lack of expertise of departmental officers were 
certainly behind the Commission's findings concerning recruiting.  The Commission 
found that "in the opinion of almost every witness" there were problems with recruiting.  
The evidence, according to the report, was that RCN recruiting was handled too much by 
professional firms who had no knowledge of the RCN and not enough by naval 
personnel.  As a result the recruiting material tended to over-emphasise the adventure 
associated with life in the RCN together with the pay and pension benefits that 
accompanied it.  The material did not stress enough the qualities that the commissioners 
felt were important in recruits; the desire to pursue a "manly" career and to serve one's 
country which in turn, it was felt, would lead to a willingness to make sacrifices for a 
career in the RCN.  The rosy picture of naval life created by the recruiting material could 
not help but be belied by the realities of naval life and discontent was the natural 
outcome.
571
  The commissioners recommended that some officers be trained specifically 
in recruiting and that all recruiting material be centrally produced and approved by the 
naval staff before being disseminated to the public.
572
 
 While the Commission's findings on the issue of recruiting were undoubtedly 
accurate, they were also somewhat disingenuous.  Certainly some of the witnesses had 
referred to the disappointment caused by the differences between the picture of naval life 
presented by the recruiting literature and the somewhat harsher reality.  To characterise 
the number as consisting of "almost every witness," however, is a gross exaggeration of 
the evidence presented.  It would have been far more accurate to state that almost none of 
the witnesses mentioned recruiting.  While the issue of recruitment was not the most 
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important one dealt with, its treatment by the Commission is indicative of the way in 
which it was prepared to manipulate the evidence secure in the knowledge that there 
would be no inconvenient transcript of the evidence lurking about to expose its 
interpretive licence. 
 Of more concern was the tendency of the Commission to make recommendations 
on which no evidence had been presented at all, as in the training of officers.  The 
Commission found that officers generally were inadequately trained, particularly those 
who had transferred from the wartime reserves to the peacetime RCN.  They also found a 
"reprehensible tendency of certain senior officers of the RCN to condemn the transfereers 
[sic] as 'not of the same stuff as we are or were.'"
573
 To address this problem the 
Commission recommended that young naval officers receive more education in the 
humanities.
574
  This was a thinly disguised recommendation for the requirement of a 
university education for all officers and humanities courses for engineering officers, who 
were already required to have a university education. 
 These findings are troubling for a number of reasons.  There was no evidence 
before the Commission that the RCN's junior officers lacked in formal education or that 
any such lack, had it existed, contributed to the "incidents" in any meaningful way.  The 
assumption seems to have been that education in the humanities could teach young men 
how to be leaders and therefore better divisional officers.  There was no evidence 
whatsoever before the Commission to support this belief, and the commissioners seem to 
have taken the proposition as self-evident, which it clearly is not. 
                                                 
573
 Ibid., p. 49. 
574
 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
214 
 
 The second problem with the findings, particularly with regard to the 
'transfereers,' is that there weren't very many of them.  The vast bulk of the junior officers 
had joined the RCN after the end of the Second World War, and had not served in the 
reserves at all before making the Navy a career.  The overwhelming majority of the very 
senior officers had received their training in the Royal Navy and had never been reserves 
at all.  It is difficult, then, to determine what problem this recommendation was designed 
to address and who exactly it was aimed at. 
 The real motivation for both the findings and recommendations surrounding the 
education of officers was rooted in Louis Audette's wartime experience.  As a reserve 
officer he had railed against the treatment he had received at the hands of the 
"professionals."  For his part he had been open in his contempt for the lack of formal 
education of the regular officers with whom he came in contact.  As Mayne has argued, 
Audette spent much of the Second World War lobbying the government concerning the 
problems with the Navy, and one of his issues was the lack of education of the regular 
naval officers.
575
  The Commission and its report provided another opportunity to make 
his point, this time in circumstances in which the RCN would be hard pressed to respond.  
It appeared that, on this issue at least, Audette was going to have the last word. 
 A similar phenomenon is evident in the Commission's handling of the issue of 
"Canadian" identification on the uniforms of lower deck personnel.  The commissioners 
found an "almost unanimous" desire among the witnesses heard from for some form of 
Canadian identification on their uniforms.
576
  In fact they found that " the men were 
                                                 
575
 Mayne, pp. 39-40. 
576
 Ibid. p. 68. 
215 
 
vehement in their demands that they be identified as Canadians."
577
  The report duly 
contained the recommendation that "Canada," as opposed to a maple leaf, appear on the 
uniforms and that a maple leaf be painted on the funnels of His Majesty's Canadian 
Ships.
578
  This was, as has been seen, taking some liberties with the evidence presented.  
Very few of the witnesses expressed a desire for Canadian identification on their own 
initiative.  Those witnesses that did favour more Canadian identifiers, and they were in 
the overwhelming minority, did so in response to direct prompts from the commissioners 
in the form of very leading questions.  The men of the lower deck were neither "almost 
unanimous" nor particularly "vehement" in their demands for Canadian identification on 
their uniforms.  Those that wanted it seemed to see it as a way of avoiding getting into 
fights with American sailors who confused them with Englishmen.  
 The report went even further.  The alleged desire for Canadian identification was 
transformed almost seamlessly into an "almost universal" belief on the part of the 
witnesses that the RCN as a whole was not "sufficiently Canadian."  While the report 
gave little guidance as to what exactly this meant, the commissioners did find that there 
was among the witnesses a "general insistence...on the necessity of building up whenever 
possible Canadian traditions."
579
  The report regrettably provides no detail as to the exact 
traditions that were uniquely Canadian and that required "building up."  Given the RCN's 
history, however these findings could only be read as an indictment of Royal Navy 
traditions and a recommendation that the RCN draw away from the Royal Navy 
culturally.   
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 One of the Royal Navy traditions that the commissioners did feel needed to be 
changed was the perceived social distance between the officers and men of the RCN.  
They found as a fact that there was prevalent in the RCN an "artificial distance" between 
the officers and men that was "not wholly connected with the necessity of maintaining 
the essential differences in rank."
580
  This artificial distance was in reality a reference to a 
perceived difference in social class between officers and men and was apparently more 
prevalent in Athabaskan than on the other two ships.
581
  These observations were based 
on the Commission's belief that rank in the Royal Navy was achieved on the basis of 
social class rather than ability, and the corresponding belief that there was no Canadian 
context for such differences based on social or economic standing.
582
 
 In addition to the report itself Audette took the unusual step of writing a 
supplemental letter to Claxton on 11 October, 1949.
583
  It is significant that this letter was 
sent prior to the forwarding of the actual report as this allowed Audette to have the first 
word on the findings and to influence the context in which Claxton would read and 
interpret the findings.  There was a good chance, then, that any ambiguity in the report 
would be resolved in favour of Audette's interpretation of events. 
 In the letter Audette made two key points that were not driven by any of the 
evidence presented at the hearings.  The first concerned the education of the RCN's 
officers.  While he had little to say about the technical education and abilities of the 
officers in areas like engineering, he argued that they possessed an insufficient education 
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in leadership.  This inadequacy, he argued, left them unable to adapt to the differences 
between Canadian and British sailors on their return from their training with the Royal 
Navy.
584
  
 Without specifically stating it, what Audette was advocating was the requirement 
that RCN officers obtain a university degree, or the equivalency of one, in the liberal arts.  
Reserve officers, who were generally required to have such a degree, could, he 
maintained, rise to the command of a major vessel in three to four years.  Regular officers 
learning on the job, presumably took longer, although Audette offered no concrete 
evidence in favour of either proposition.  This viewpoint flowed directly from Audette's 
wartime experience and the low opinion that he had formed of the intellectual abilities of 
RCN officers.  While this argument also found its way into the report, the fact that he 
mentioned it in a side letter to Claxton both indicates the source of the report's findings 
and serves as an indicator of how seriously Audette took the matter. 
 The second significant point Audette made in his letter to Claxton concerned the 
RCN's insufficiently Canadian character.  Unlike the comments in the report, however, 
Audette in his letter is speaking specifically about the actions and mannerisms of RCN 
officers on their return from training in England.  He focused particularly on the artificial 
English accents acquired by the junior officers which were not "Canadian," in his 
view.
585
  The lack of social distance between Canadian officers and their men, he argued, 
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made such accents a "source of great irritation to sailors," and represented the imposition 
onto Canadians of the speech "of those who command and of those who obey."
586
   
 While there is no evidence in the transcripts that supports the idea that the accents 
of Canadian officers irritated Canadian sailors, they certainly irritated Audette.  As was 
seen earlier, the accents were only an issue with one of the witnesses, and in that case it 
was the questioner who raised it.  None of the other witnesses raised the issue at all.  
Regardless of this, Audette's papers contain a memorandum, placed there by Audette, 
which clearly outlines his belief that the training of Canadian junior officers with Royal 
Naval units led to speech and mannerisms which were not "characteristically Canadian" 
and which in turn led to an "unreasoned anti-British feeling" in the Canadian sailor.
587
  
While the memorandum is undated, it is reasonable to assume that it was written before 
the completion of the report and is a clear indication that, regardless of the evidence, 
Audette was concerned that the training arrangements involved the imposition of Royal 
Navy social patterns onto the RCN, and that this was problematic.  It was clear that 
nothing, particularly nothing as trivial as a complete lack of evidence, was going to drive 
him off of the idea. 
 Regardless of Audette's agenda, however, the real test of the effectiveness of the 
report would be in Brooke Claxton's use of it.  From the outset Claxton had been firm 
that the report would remain in his hands and that the decision on whether to release it 
would be his and his alone.  This would allow Claxton, and by extension the government, 
to control the message concerning the state of the RCN. 
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 After some initial hesitation, Claxton tabled the report in the House of Commons 
on 1 November, 1949.
588
  The following day Claxton rose in the House to offer a 
summary of the progress being made in implementation of the recommendations made.  
Of the forty-two recommendations he reported that thirteen had been implemented prior 
to his receipt of the report, six were in the process of being implemented, four were part 
of the Government's long-term plan and the remainder were dependent on government 
policy, which had yet to be determined.
589
  The policy in question would depend on the 
approval of the budget for national defence as a department and the remainder of the 
discussion in parliament surrounding the report would occur in this context. 
 From the outset Claxton made every effort to control the way in which the report 
was presented to the Canadian public.  While his initial comments in the House 
concerning the report were brief he did manage to emphasise what he considered to be 
the most critical parts of it.  He referred specifically to the "Canadianization" of the RCN 
as one of the "more important" recommendations made in the report.  He was also careful 
to include comments about the training of officers, remarking that the officers involved in 
the incidents were trained under a system that was "different from that which is now in 
effect."  This new system of training he characterised as more "genuinely Canadian" than 
its predecessor.
590
 
 Claxton was, of course, talking about the replacement of the "big ship time" that 
Canadian officers spent training with the Royal Navy by the tri-service college at Royal 
Roads.  This system had only just taken effect and was fraught with difficulties, from 
uneven divisions among the three services to the absence of any requirement that 
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graduates actually commit to serving time in any branch of the Canadian military.
591
  To 
argue that the new and largely untested system was a panacea for the RCN's problems 
was too naive for someone of Claxton's intelligence and experience.  Rather it became 
clear from the very outset that for Claxton the goal of the report and the investigation 
process more generally was to place the blame for the RCN's problems squarely at the 
feet of the British.  This would allow him to characterise the RCN as somehow less than 
Canadian, and ultimately to do with it as he pleased. 
 As debate over the budget continued in Parliament throughout the month of 
November 1949, it became clear that Claxton was not going to have it all his own way.  
George Drew, the leader of the opposition, rising to address the report on 3 November, 
used it to support his call for the establishment of a standing committee on national 
defence.  He had been arguing for such a committee for some time and had been opposed 
by Claxton at every turn.  The report allowed Drew to renew his argument for 
parliamentary oversight, arguing that a properly administered Navy would have discussed 
and addressed the habitability issues and other problems without the need for "incidents" 
such as those which occurred.  The "true lesson" of the Mainguy Report, according to 
Drew, was not the need for a more Canadian Navy but the need for a standing committee 
and a stronger parliamentary oversight of the Department of National Defence.
592
 
 Debate over the report followed this pattern.  Claxton continued to defend the 
report on the basis of the need for Canadianization of the RCN.  He went so far as to 
describe it as "historic" in the way in which it dealt with the issues of traditions and 
discipline, although he was somewhat unclear about what caused him to use that 
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particular word.
593
  The majority of the recommendations, although dealt with in detail by 
Claxton on 18 November,
594
 were given somewhat short shrift and treated almost as 
afterthoughts.  While he failed to define "Canadianization" in any meaningful way 
beyond the need for domestic training of naval officers, it was clear throughout Claxton's 
comments in the House that it was where he wanted attention to focus. 
 The opposition, for its part, saw through the report and continued to press the 
issue of parliamentary oversight of the armed services generally.  George Pearkes tied 
this idea to suggestions in the report that the RCN lacked adequate resources for its 
projected role as an anti-submarine warfare force.
595
 As Canada committed itself to active 
naval participation in the post-war world, the argument ran, parliament had the obligation 
and the right to ensure for itself that the RCN was capable of meeting Canada's 
commitments.  This concern was echoed by Davie Fulton, the MP for Kamloops, who 
extended the critique to all branches of the armed forces.
596
  Claxton had not, it appears, 
been particularly forthcoming in the past in releasing information about the Canadian 
military to the House of Commons.  In maintaining rigid control over the flow of 
information, however, he had raised the hackles of the opposition who now saw in the 
report an opportunity to leverage the administrative failures of the RCN into more 
parliamentary oversight and less control for Claxton.  Claxton, in resisting this push, 
needed to shift the focus of the discussion to the issue of Canadian identity, and he made 
every effort to do so. 
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 The news media, for its part, echoed the focus that Claxton put on the report in 
Parliament.  The Halifax Chronicle-Herald, for example, led with the report on 2 
November, 1949.  While the Chronicle-Herald's story provided a brief general overview 
of the report's findings, the focus was clearly on the relations between the officers and 
men of the RCN.  Emphasis was also placed on the need to Canadianize the RCN based 
on the "broad demand within the ranks" for such an effort.
597
  The attempt by the 
Chronicle-Herald to offer a broader perspective was, to a large extent, a nod to 
objectivity and balance, but was done mainly for the sake of appearances.  The real story, 
it was clear, was the issue of Canadianization, and in this the terms on which the report 
was to be presented to the Canadian public were set. 
 While the Chronicle-Herald had at least attempted, however, feebly, to present 
the report in a balanced way, the Toronto Globe and Mail made no such effort.  The 
headlines in that paper read "Nelson Tradition Overplayed," and "Ask Canadian Navy, 
Erase Pallid Imitation."  The article itself made references to "dragging skeletons from 
closets" and characterised the report as aiming a "withering fire of criticism" at Canada's 
naval leadership.  This criticism, the story insisted, was based on the need to Canadianize 
the RCN and do away with the slavish adoption of English Royal Navy traditions.  It was 
also the Globe and Mail that introduced the "phony accents" adopted by some junior 
RCN officers as a problem for the navy.
598
  As had been the case with the Chronicle-
Herald, the article focused squarely on the issue of Canadianization of the RCN. 
 The Globe and Mail's front page article was, of course, hyperbole.  The report did 
not drag anything out of any closets, and while it was critical of some aspects of the 
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RCN, the commissioners had also gone to great pains to state that there was also a great 
deal that was good about the RCN.  Thus the report's comments could hardly be 
reasonably described as a "withering fire."  What is most interesting, however, is the 
comment about the accents adopted by the junior officers.  This had only come up on one 
occasion during the hearings and did not feature significantly in the report.  It was, 
however, an issue that annoyed Louis Audette almost beyond reason.  While both 
Audette and Claxton were both far too experienced as political operators to leave proof 
behind, the appearance of this issue in such a prominent place in the coverage of the 
report could reasonably be seen as indicating that either Audette or, more likely, Claxton 
had spoken to the reporters at some point and was to at least some degree manipulating 
the way in which the report was covered and the emphasis that was placed on it. 
 The Globe and Mail did present a relatively balanced summary of the report's 
findings, and carefully summarised the steps already taken to address the 
recommendations
599
  but on page three of the paper.  Thus the front page coverage gave 
the impression that the main point of the report was about Canadianization with the other 
findings presented as afterthoughts.  This was, as has been seen, not an accurate portrayal 
of the report.  It did, however, place the emphasis where Claxton, and by extension the 
government, wanted it. 
 The Vancouver Sun continued the trend.  Although its initial coverage was buried 
on page thirty-seven, the headline read "English Accents Get the 'Full Treatment.'"  The 
thrust of the story was that officers with faux English accents were not particularly well 
treated by either the ratings or their fellow officers.  The story also referred to a Canadian 
Press "survey" conducted on the evening of 1 November 1949, which indicated that the 
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majority of the ratings were in favour of the Canadianization of the RCN.
600
  Nothing 
more was reported either concerning the Report or the "survey."  The focus for the 
Vancouver Sun was clearly to be on the Canadianization issue, although the positioning 
of the story indicates that the Sun did not believe that the report itself to be particularly 
important.  As for the alleged "survey," it was either astonishingly fast and managed to 
get a significant sample of ratings in almost no time, or it was not a survey in the sense in 
which that term is ordinarily used. 
 In the following days the focus of the reporting continued to remain squarely on 
the issue of Canadianization.  The Chronicle-Herald reported on Claxton's promise to 
begin the process of Canadianization without delay and described him as the "heart and 
soul" of the process.
601
  While long on generalities, however, the stories were short on 
detail as to how this Canadianization was to be achieved.  Some vague references were 
made to Claxton's comments about hiring civilians to perform much of the routine 
paperwork involved in naval administration, allowing naval officers to spend time at sea 
with their men.  General comments were also made about the need for more Canadian 
training and education of naval officers.
602
  Beyond this, though, little was said about 
how the RCN was to be made more Canadian, and it does not appear that Claxton was 
pressed on the issue. 
 After the initial blush had worn off the Report some of the news outlets began to 
explore other ramifications of the Commission's findings.  The Globe and Mail, for 
example, was critical of Claxton for allowing the situation to develop in the first place,
603
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while the Vancouver Sun led its story with the headline "Navy Too Small for Job Report 
Hints"
604
 a sentiment that was echoed a few days later in the Halifax Chronicle-
Herald.
605
   These articles must have come dangerously close to the mark from Claxton's 
point of view.  The commissioners, in making it clear in the report that they had not been 
tasked with commenting on the RCN's ability to meet its commitments, had inadvertently 
drawn attention to an area of potential criticism of the RCN that Claxton desperately 
wanted to avoid.  At a time when Canada's role in a nascent NATO was under discussion, 
a long and divisive discussion over Canada's military capabilities was the last thing that 
Claxton wanted.  The suggestions in the press and from the opposition benches that 
Canada's navy, at least, was not up to the mark must have been unwelcome and alarming 
to Claxton. 
 Fortunately for the government nothing further came of the suggestions 
concerning the RCN's capabilities.  By the end of November the report had passed from 
public interest.  The last parting broadside fired by the Globe and Mail was to criticise 
Claxton for keeping the information too close to his vest.  In an editorial suggesting that 
had Parliament had more oversight and information, the "incidents" would never have 
happened, the Globe was playing to the opposition.
606
  With this criticism Claxton was 
back on familiar ground and the potential for uncomfortable and damaging discussions of 
naval capability had passed. 
 From an international perspective the report received considerable attention.  In 
the United States, the report was "serialised" in the monthly intelligence report of the 
United States Navy.  In Australia and New Zealand it had received press coverage 
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focusing on the Canadianization of the RCN and the removal of British influence.  These 
stories ran along very similar lines to those published in Canadian papers.  In London, the 
report was mentioned in the press, again in the context of the dissociation of the RCN 
from Royal Navy traditions.  The Admiralty decided to make no comment on the report 
and to wait and see what actions the RCN took in response to it.
607
 
 While little is known about how Admiral Mainguy or Leonard Brockington 
reacted to the use of their report, Louis Audette's position is well recorded in his papers, 
and makes for some interesting reading.  While it would have been completely out of 
character for him to criticise Claxton and the government openly, in his private 
correspondence, he was less reticent.  He believed, for example, that the press reports got 
it wrong in their focus on breaking with Royal Navy traditions.
608
  While this was clearly 
part of the report, he was of the view that the focus on traditions and Canadianization 
detracted from the report's recommendations surrounding the education of officers, and 
the need for better communication between officers and ratings. 
 Audette was also displeased in the way the report was being seen as critical of 
Claxton's tri-service policy.  While it had been long reported that the RCN had not been 
cooperative with Claxton's attempts to harmonise the three services,
609
 Audette was 
displeased that any critique was in the report.  In a letter to Angus MacDonald he 
indicated that comments about the tri-service policy were included in the final draft as a 
compromise with the other commissioners, although it is probable that the commissioner 
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in question was Admiral Mainguy.  Audette was clear in his letter that he had not wanted 
it included and did not view it as his place to criticise policy in general terms.
610
 
 Audette's most interesting exchange was with G.W.G. "Shrimp" Simpson.  
Simpson had been the Commodore (D) at the Royal Navy base at Londonderry in 
Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the combat readiness of all the escorts that put in 
there for replenishment after the North Atlantic run.  In that capacity he had had 
extensive dealings with Canadian ships and their crews and was familiar with both the 
men and their propensities.
611
  Audette presumably felt that not only would Simpson be 
interested in the contents of the report, but would also agree with the Report and its 
findings. 
 In the second assumption, Audette could not have been more wrong.  Simpson 
believed that the report was a whitewash designed to cover up the real issues facing the 
RCN.  The large scale brawls between American and Canadian sailors that the report 
implied had taken place were, in Simpson's view, illusory and designed to create 
sympathy for the Canadianization arguments.  He was clear that he had never witnessed 
any such brawls, and that in his view the witnesses must have been speaking about small 
disagreements that occasionally led to fisticuffs.  This was not enough to base a change of 
policy on.  He also took exception to the inference in the report that all Royal Navy 
officers were either snobs, or bullies, or both and that Canadian trainees had suffered by 
exposure to this.  He wrote that he was unaware of any Royal Naval officer who had 
achieved his position by virtue of his social rank.  It was merit that counted in the Royal 
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Navy, in his experience.
612
  Any suggestion to the contrary was, then, part of the attempt 
in the report to shift the focus to nationalist issues and away from the real problems. 
 The real issue, in Simpson's view, was the failure to punish the men of the 
Ontario for their incident.  This had led the men of the lower deck to believe that locking 
themselves into the mess deck was a valid form of protest.  This situation was aggravated 
by the failure of the senior officers aboard the various ships to implement welfare 
committees as they had been ordered, thereby removing all other avenues of 
communication.  Simpson argued that better and more thorough training was what was 
needed and that the shift to Canadianization served to distract from this fact.
613
 
 Audette's response was to some extent predictable.  He saw Simpson's letter as a 
direct attack on the honour of the commissioners and particularly resented the suggestion 
of a whitewash.  His response, however, was more of a critique of Simpson than of his 
arguments.
614
   Given, however, that Simpson was serving in New Zealand at the time he 
made the comments, Simpson's opinion was not particularly relevant to the way in which 
the report was viewed in Canada.  The strength of Audette's response is perhaps 
indicative, however, of how close Simpson came to the truth of the matter. 
 The report itself and the way in which it was used by Claxton does, in fact, 
indicate that there was some degree of whitewashing going on.  In the House of 
Commons the focus was placed from the beginning on the Canadianization of the RCN, 
which apparently grew out of the desire for more definitive Canadian markings on the 
uniforms of the ratings.  This was a bit of a stretch, but was appealing enough to attract 
the attention of the press, who dutifully led their early reports with this issue.  The other 
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issues facing the RCN were thereby relegated to the interior pages of the newspapers 
where their impact would be lessened.  By shifting the focus of the report to a nationalist 
point of view, Claxton successfully parried opposition attempts to insert themselves into 
his domain, and allowed himself the opportunity to address the other issues at his leisure 
and with a minimum of expenditure. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The report of the Mainguy Commission has been viewed as an indictment of 
British influence on the culture of the RCN and a call for its Canadianization.  Wilfrid 
Lund has gone so far as to characterise the report as the Magna Carta of the RCN,
615
 
presumably due to its role in freeing the RCN from the perceived cultural tyranny of the 
Royal Navy.  Peter Haydon has taken a similar position, accepting the contention that 
most Canadians saw the RCN as a "small, exclusive cadre that was largely British in its 
thought and action."
616
  In this context he has argued that the report demonstrated a 
desperate need in the RCN for its own identity, independent of that of the Royal Navy.
617
  
Marc Milner for his part characterises the post-war RCN as an unhappy fleet, resentful of 
the harsh discipline imposed by officers who were overly British in their outlook.
618
  In 
coming to these conclusions, Milner, Lund and Hayden have taken the report at face 
value and assumed that it reflected an accurate and unbiased set of conclusions based on 
the evidence put before it.   
 The temptation to take the report at face value is understandable.  The memoirs 
written by wartime members of the RCN such as Alan Easton, James Lamb and Hal 
Lawrence tend to portray the RCN as possessing a “strong Canadian nationalist 
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sentiment.”619  It becomes tempting to draw a straight line between that portrayal of the 
RCN and the report of the Mainguy Commission and to conclude that the discontent in 
the RCN with British ideas of discipline and sense of Canadian national identity for the 
RCN had simply continued after the war and led to the "incidents."   With the Mainguy 
Report supporting this conclusion there is certainly no obvious reason for historians to 
adopt any other line of reasoning.   
To adopt this line of reasoning without further inquiry, however, is misleading.  
There is little evidence that the Canadian nationalist sentiment present in the RCN during 
the war continued afterwards.  None of the studies done by the naval staff between the 
end of the war and the “incidents” refer to nationalist sentiment at all.  If it was important 
enough to lead to the “incidents,” it is highly unlikely that this latent sense of nationalism 
would receive no mention whatsoever.  The report in many respects bore little 
relationship to the evidence of the witnesses and the use of the report by Claxton to 
emphasise the need to Canadianize the RCN ignored many of the recommendations it 
contained.  It is only, however, through a comparison between the report and the 
evidence presented that this becomes apparent. 
 Richard Gimblett, on the other hand, has based his conclusions on the hearings 
themselves rather on just the content of the report.  In examining the incident aboard 
HMCS Crescent he argues that the basis for the discontent in the lower deck flowed 
primarily from the manning policy introduced by Claxton, and that the RCN had been 
aware of the morale issues and their causes since 1947.  He further argues that the 
Mainguy Commission was led astray with regard to the perceived "yearning for identity" 
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of the RCN but he does not explore the reason why the Commission made the error.  
Given that he was studying the impact of Claxton's harmonisation policy had on the 
manning of the RCN, it is not particularly surprising that he would focus his attention on 
this issue.  It does again, however, represent the taking of the report at face value and 
treats the transcripts of the hearings as a discrete body of historical evidence separate and 
apart from the report that they supposedly inspired. 
 Treating the hearings and the report as two distinct historical events, however, 
misses the fundamental relationship between the two.  If the report was representative of 
a serious investigation, then the findings in the report should have a solid basis in the 
evidence presented.  It does not.  Many of its conclusions are based on very little 
evidence.  Others, such as the issue of the Canadianization of the RCN, were based on 
evidence planted by the commissioners.  The reasons for the divergence between the 
report and the evidence are attributable to both post-war naval policy and the historical 
context in which the report was prepared. 
 In this context the "incidents" aboard His Majesty's Canadian Ships struck the 
RCN at its weakest point.  In the wake of the V-E Day riots in Halifax the reputation that 
the RCN had won at great cost during the War had been damaged.  Rightly or wrongly, 
the inquiry into the riots led by Justice Kellock found that the fault for the disorder and 
the attendant destruction lay squarely at the feet of an ill-conceived naval policy.  
Whether that conclusion was correct or not became immaterial to a public that was 
looking for explanations, and in the public mind the RCN, and it alone, was responsible 
for the riots. 
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 To make matters worse, the RCN had been involved in a period of rapid and 
massive demobilisation and subsequent expansion.  Perhaps the only thing as impressive 
as the speed at which the RCN went from a small and obscure force to one comprising, at 
its peak, approximately 100,000 men, was the speed at which, in the immediate post-war 
period, it shrank back into relative obscurity.  Post-war planning called for a navy of 
approximately ten thousand men, many of whom, it was assumed, would be retained 
following the cessation of hostilities.  The reality was that the RCN did not manage to 
retain even that relatively small number of men, and went from a position of strength to 
one in which it was chronically undermanned.  The cadre of trained and experienced 
personnel, both officers and ratings, on which the RCN was relying and on which it 
hoped to build its fleet, simply failed to materialise.  This led to a situation in which the 
RCN was attempting to meet its increasing commitments with an undermanned and 
under-trained fleet. 
 By 1947, as Richard Gimblett has pointed out,
620
 the RCN was seriously engaged 
in the business of determining what issues were facing the fleet and what solutions 
existed.  As Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton would have been aware of the 
various reports and studies prepared by the naval staff and he was as a consequence well 
aware of both the causes of discontent and the impact that his harmonisation policies had 
had on the RCN.  In the post-war years, however, the focus of governmental spending 
was to be on social programs rather than the military.  Claxton's decisions would echo 
this and any changes to naval policy or living conditions would have to be made with a 
minimum of expenditure.   
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 The austerity required of the Canadian military did not, of course, stop Claxton 
from participating in discussions surrounding the establishment of NATO or of arguing 
for a strong Canadian role in the organisation.  The focus NATO placed on hemispheric 
defence meshed well with Claxton's desire to move further away from Britain and, at 
least from his perspective, its negative influence.  His experiences in both world wars had 
served to make Claxton a strong Canadian nationalist.  Moving defence policy away from 
British influence was, by definition, a good thing for Claxton and one to be pursued 
whenever possible. 
 In the context of the NATO discussions the three incidents could not have come at 
a worse time.  Part of Claxton’s job as minister was to convince Canada’s allies, 
particularly the United States, that Canada, and in particular her Navy, was reliable and 
capable of making a valuable and meaningful contribution to the collective security of the 
putative NATO allies.  It would be difficult to convince Canada’s NATO partners of that 
fact in the face of three very pubic incidents in which the Navy appeared neither reliable 
nor capable of performing the tasks before it.  Once they had taken place, then, Claxton 
had to at least appear to act quickly and decisively to address the problems. 
 The challenge that Claxton faced in planning his response hinged on the nature of 
the incidents themselves.  They fell into a legal grey area in which everyone, including 
the commissioners, recognised them as mutinies, but in which there was little legal 
support for this recognition.  Formal prosecution and punishment of the ringleaders 
behind the "incidents" would prove at least difficult, and at worst impossible.  To make 
matters worse the kind of sit-down strikes that had comprised the "incidents" in question 
had a long line of antecedents in naval history.  Incidents of mass disobedience were the 
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tried and true means by which the men of the lower deck made their views known to the 
senior officers.  Prosecution of the ringleaders would have brought this fact into the light 
of day and would have been a source of embarrassment to both the navy and the 
government.  In addition an acquittal would have had the effect of giving the conduct an 
official sanction.  It is one thing to have sit-down strikes unofficially available as a kind 
of safety valve, but quite another to have them given a more formal place in the relations 
between officers and men. 
 The impracticality of prosecution left Claxton with two options.  The first was the 
creation of a royal Commission to formally investigate the causes of the three "incidents" 
and to recommend solutions.  For Claxton this approach posed some difficulties, not the 
least of which was the fact that he knew full well what the issues were and what was 
causing the morale issues on the lower deck.  A royal Commission would have made this 
knowledge clear and a matter of public record.  This would have had the effect of forcing 
Claxton's hand in solving the problem. 
 The other difficulty of using a royal Commission to investigate the "incidents" 
came down to independence.  A royal Commission would, by its nature, have been led by 
a judge who would have operated independently of the ministry of national defence and 
would have had the power to take the investigation in any way he saw fit.  Furthermore 
the transcripts of the hearing would have been a matter of public record and available for 
review to anyone who wanted to do so.  This, of course, would allow the conclusions of 
the royal Commission to be checked against the evidence presented which was precisely 
what Claxton did not want. 
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 The other option available to Claxton, and the one that he selected was to conduct 
a departmental enquiry into the "incidents."  This type of enquiry would be almost 
entirely in Claxton's control as minister.  He would be in a position to appoint whomever 
he chose to conduct the investigation and to establish the process by which the hearings 
would be conducted.  This control allowed Claxton to dictate the scope of the inquiry, 
which he did to great effect by limiting its scope to morale issues only and excluding any 
questions or discussion of policy and expenditure.  As a result of Claxton's ability to 
control the process, none of the witnesses were asked questions about the future role of 
the RCN or about the harmonised structure of pay and ranks, both of which had a bearing 
on the morale issue.  The ability to control the process also allowed Claxton to ensure 
that there was no inconvenient transcript of evidence against which the findings of the 
Commission could be checked.  The report would, then, stand alone as the first and last 
official word on the "incidents."   
 Claxton's choice of commissioners is also indicative of his desire to control the 
outcome of the hearings.  In Louis Audette, for example, Claxton had very much picked a 
known quantity.  Throughout his wartime service in the RCN Audette had been a vocal 
advocate for more formal education among the officers.  Audette's anti-communist 
credentials were also spotless.  He was suitably nationalistic and had taken strong stands 
against communist infiltration whenever had the opportunity.  Furthermore, as an Ottawa 
insider he would have known what Claxton expected of him and would assiduously 
follow the terms of reference provided to him.  There was very little chance that Louis 
Audette would go off message and begin inconvenient discussions concerning planning 
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and general naval policy.  In short, Claxton could be sure that Audette would not 
embarrass him. 
 Audette's opinion of the professional serving officers was also well known to 
Claxton.  While a number of adjectives could be used to properly describe Louis Audette, 
reticent would in no circumstances be among them.  Throughout his naval service 
Audette had been openly critical of RCN regular officers with whom he came into 
contact.  Many of those same officers remained in the service after the war and had been 
promoted to senior positions.  He actively disliked them for what he perceived to be a 
superior or elitist attitude, often symbolised by an English accent, which he felt was not 
warranted by their lack of formal education.  While Audette had no difficulty on principle 
with the concept of elites running things, he clearly felt that the RCN was being run by 
the wrong one.  Education was the proper basis for elitism, in his mind, and Claxton 
would have been well aware of this view when he asked Audette to sit on the 
Commission.  For Audette, then, the Commission was the final battle in the fight with 
Admiral Nelles that had begun during the Second World War.
621
  In the report's 
conclusion that officer education was deficient Audette got the last word on the issue. 
 Leonard Brockington was similarly a known quantity to Claxton.  The two men 
had worked closely together in the establishment of the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation and Brockington was a senior career civil servant.  His experience in 
chairing the enquiry into labour unrest in the merchant marine had given him extensive 
experience in conducting such hearings in an efficient and effective manner, and perhaps 
more importantly in writing reports on the outcome that contained just the right amount 
of obfuscation.  Like Audette, Brockington would have known what was expected of him 
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in terms of the conclusions that were to be reached and the manner in which they were to 
be expressed.  With Brockington, as with Audette, there would be no questions raised as 
to expenditure or general naval policy. 
 For Rollo Mainguy the situation was somewhat different.  Unlike Audette, who 
had his own axe to grind, and Brockington, who was an experienced bureaucrat, Mainguy 
was simply placed in an impossible position.  If he came down on the side of the naval 
leadership he would be perceived as engaging in a cover-up of the problem.  If he came 
down in favour of reform he would be viewed by many of his colleagues as having 
betrayed them.  For Mainguy, then, the chairmanship of the Commission was a no-win 
situation, and the best course of action was for him to keep quiet and let the other two 
commissioners deal with the matter. 
 To make matters worse for Mainguy he was nearing the end of his career.  As 
Commanding Officer Pacific Coast he was in line for an eventual appointment as chief of 
the naval staff.  This was the pinnacle of any naval career and something Mainguy had 
worked towards for his entire adult life.  The CNS appointment was, however, made by 
the minister of national defence, who was not obligated to appoint any particular 
individual.  Any perception of Mainguy as uncooperative or as someone who could not 
be counted on to comply with ministerial directives and policies would seriously 
jeopardise his future carer prospects and perhaps more importantly his pension, which 
was rank dependent.  Professionally, then, Mainguy was well and truly stuck.
622
 
 There is, of course, no document in which Claxton indicates the reasons behind 
his selection of the commissioners.  He was far too experienced a political operator to 
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leave any such evidence behind.  The individuals selected, however, do indicate a desire 
on Claxton's part for a Commission that would follow its terms or reference and do what 
was expected of it.  Two of the three men selected were Ottawa insiders and would have 
been known to Claxton socially as well as professionally.  There was plenty of 
opportunity for him to convey his wishes to the men involved in a way that would remain 
undetectable.  In the end he must have been very pleased indeed with the work done by 
the commissioners. 
 In spite of outward appearances the Mainguy Commission and subsequent report 
do not represent a good faith exploration of the issues confronting the RCN in the 
immediate post-war period.  Claxton and the Naval Staff knew well before 1949 what 
was "wrong" with the RCN through a series of internal enquiries and reports that were 
quite exhaustive.  The harmonisation of the rank and pay structure between the three 
services was a priority for Claxton and he was not willing to scrap it even though it was 
one of the main causes of discontent on the lower deck.  The issues of habitability both 
afloat and ashore was a problem which would cost a great deal of money to solve, and 
military spending was not a priority for the government.  The absence in the RCN of 
anyone whose function was to keep abreast of the condition of the fleet compounded the 
problem and prevented the RCN from presenting a united front to Claxton.  The 
combination of factors, then, allowed him to do nothing to address the issues between 
1947 and 1949 which, until the incidents, suited him perfectly. 
 It was also clear from the internal reports prepared by the RCN what was not a 
problem.  None of the reports or correspondence make any mention of the perceived 
"snobbishness" of Canadian officers.  Nor are their "English" accents mentioned as a 
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problem by any of the personnel preparing reports, even those based on interviews with 
the men of the lower deck.  There was no indication prior to the hearings that the lack of 
a sufficiently Canadian identity was something that was bothering anyone, lower deck or 
upper.  At the hearings themselves this continued.  The vast majority of the witnesses 
failed completely to mention anything about the attitude of the officers or the absence of 
Canadian identifiers on the ships or uniforms until prompted to do so by the 
commissioners.  There were virtually no independent or spontaneous comments made 
and the chief problem with the lack of identifiers seemed to be being mistaken for British 
sailors by United States Navy personnel, with the attendant fisticuffs.  While it is difficult 
from the transcripts to tell who is leading the charge in the questions concerning 
Canadian identity, it is safe to assume that it was Louis Audette.  It is unlikely that it was 
Rollo Mainguy and it would have been uncharacteristically direct for Brockington.  It 
seems that only Audette was significantly bothered by the lack of Canadian identifiers to 
make an issue of it. 
 Whether or not he gave specific instructions to the commissioners to focus on the 
issue of national identity, the focus on it made in the report suited Claxton perfectly.  It 
allowed him to focus on an issue that would speak to the nationalist sentiments of 
Canadians and to blame the "incidents" on something that was as easy to appear to 
remedy as it was functionally meaningless.  In the end both the hearings and the attendant 
report were no more than an attempt to distract both the government and the public from 
the real problems facing the RCN.  The findings made by the Commission bear little 
relationship to the evidence given at the hearings.  The ordered destruction of the 
transcripts was designed to ensure that this fact would remain unknown and more 
241 
 
importantly unknowable.  The existence of the transcripts, however, allows the 
Commission to be seen for what it was, an exercise designed to produce the illusion of 
activity without running the risk of actually doing anything significant.  It would be 
another decade before most of the Commission's recommendations were acted upon, 
particularly those concerning the education of officers,
623
 but in drawing attention away 
from the operational weaknesses of the RCN the Commission served its purpose. 
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